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THE PAPACY AND THE NEW ORDER

AS the war goes on and the world's burden of ruin and suffering and oppression and hatred grows heavier and heavier, the problems of post-war reconstruction become increasingly complex and harder to solve. Nevertheless it is essential that we should face them, for a purely negative or opportunist attitude means that a ruined world will be left to flounder in a morass of apathy and despair. As a world-wide society—the largest organized international society that has ever existed—the Catholic Church is especially concerned with this question in its widest aspects, and ever since the war began the Vatican has been warning the nations of the tremendous dangers that threatened the world and urging them in the midst of war to face the problems that must come after the war and which may be even more serious than those of the war itself.

As the war monster progressively acquired, swallows and demands more and more of the materials available, all of which are inexorably put at the disposal of its ever increasing requirements, the greater becomes the danger that the nations directly or indirectly affected by the conflict will become victims of a sort of pernicious anaemia and the inevitable question arises—How will an exhausted or attenuated economy contrive to find the means necessary for economic and social reconstruction at a time when difficulties of every kind will be multiplied. . . .

These were the words of Pius XII in the first winter of the war and in the present winter—on Christmas Eve, 1941—he developed the same theme much more fully, dealing particularly with the need for moral reconstruction and with the moral conditions which are essential for peace and for a new social and international order. The Pope points out that the great opportunity for reconstruction which will arise after the war will inevitably be frustrated unless the political wisdom of the statesmen is inspired by a spiritual purpose and based on moral principles. All social planning which is inspired by purely secular ideals is bound to go wrong, whatever its technical efficiency. As St. Augustine says: "They run well, but they have left the track. The further they run the greater is their error, for they are going ever further off their course."

And it will not be the first time [says the Pope] that men expecting to be crowned at the end of the war with the laurel of victory have dreamt of

giving the world a New Order by new ways which in their opinion lead to well-being, prosperity and progress. Yet when they have yielded to the temptation of imposing their own interpretation contrary to the dictates of reason, moderation, justice and human dignity they found themselves disheartened and stupefied at the sight of the ruins of deluded hopes and miscarried plans.

Now the destruction brought about by the present war is on so vast a scale that it is imperative that there be not added to it also the further ruins of a frustrated and deluded peace. To avoid so great a calamity it is fitting that in the formulation of that peace there should be assured co-operation with sincerity of will and energy, with a purpose of a generous participation not only of this or that people, but of all peoples—yea, rather, of all humanity. It is a universal undertaking for the common good which requires the collaboration of all Christendom in the religious and moral aspects of the new edifice which is to be constructed.

Already, two years earlier, the Pope had made an impressive appeal to all men of good will to unite in a new spiritual crusade "to lead the nations back from the broken cisterns of selfish material interests to the living fountain of divine justice". In both these appeals and, in fact, in everything that the Pope has written about the war there is the same preoccupation with the question of moral reconstruction, without which all the ambitious programmes of economic and social reconstruction are condemned to sterility or worse. But how is it possible to bring about the moral reconstruction of a civilization which has not only lost its religious unity but which is also suffering from moral disintegration? As the Pope wrote in his Encyclical "Darkness over the Earth":

In our day discords arise not merely from the violent impulses of an ungoverned temperament, but more commonly from a confusion and revolt in the depth of the human conscience.

When faith in God and our divine Redeemer grows weak and slack, when the light that comes from the universal norms of uprightness and honour is clouded in men's minds, then the one and only foundation of stability and peace has been undermined—the foundation upon which the inward order of thought and the outward order of things alike depend, which alone can create and maintain the prosperity of states.

In order to have moral reconstruction we must have a foundation on which to build, and it is the loss of this common foundation which is the fundamental weakness of modern civilization. For the whole tradition of Western civilization from its beginnings in ancient Greece down to the nineteenth century is based on the recognition of this common norm which is the source alike of the moral and the social order, and the rejection of it involves a change far more profound than any social or political revolution that the world has known.

Pius XII and his predecessors are never tired of insisting

that the denial or setting aside of this principle of Natural Law is "the fountainhead from which the evils of the modern state derive their origin".

Everything in fact depends on whether the world runs blind, driven by irrational forces to which man is a slave, or whether we believe in the existence of a spiritual order of which man is naturally conscious and with which he can co-operate as a free and rational being. It is true that the Law of Nature is no longer a familiar conception to modern man. As the Pope says, it is "buried away under a mass of destructive criticism and neglect". Yet it is far from being confined to Catholics or to theologians. It has guided the mind of civilized humanity for thousands of years, and even in modern times on the threshold of a new age it was still regarded as the ultimate foundation and source of social order by the founders of modern democracy in England, America and France.

It is true that during this period the conception of Natural Law became increasingly secularized by the rationalism of the Enlightenment until in the French Revolution it was used as a weapon against the political and social tradition of Christendom, in just the same way as the Reformers used the appeal to the Gospel and the New Testament against the theological and ecclesiastical tradition of Catholicism. The ultimate result of this change was to discredit the conception of Natural Law itself by depriving it of its religious and metaphysical sanctions or even as no more than a legal fiction, with the result that the new historical science of the nineteenth century set it on one side and put in its place the idealization of the state and the social process, which finds expression alike in the nationalism of the German philosophers and the economic materialism of the Marxists. In order to restore the idea of Natural Law it is therefore necessary to bring it down from the dusty shelf where the works of Pufendorf and Nettelblatt sleep and bring it back to its original foundations in religion and in human nature. From the beginning Natural Law has had this double reference. Viewed *ex parte Dei* it is the eternal law which governs the universe, "The one thought by which all things are steered through all things." The recognition of this principle lies at the heart of all the world religions. It is Tao, the way of Heaven; Rita, the sacred order; Dharma, the norm; Dike, divine justice; the same idea which finds its classical English expression as late as the nineteenth century in Wordsworth's Ode to Duty:

Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong
And the most ancient heavens by Thee are fresh and strong.

This aspect of Natural Law has today become strange to us. Modern science which has mechanized human life has also secularized the cosmic order, and the starry heavens which from the time of the Sumerians to Kant were regarded with awe as the visible manifestation of a divine order in things, have become no more "numinous" than an electric advertisement in Piccadilly Circus. And therefore the humbler and more familiar side of Natural Law in human life and conduct is the only aspect of it which is still readily comprehensible to modern man. Viewed *ex parte hominis* Natural Law is seen in man's natural recognition of right and wrong; it is nothing else but the moral law which has played such a great part in Western thought during the last two centuries and which was, above all in England, the foundation of whatever religion the average man still preserved. Today it has lost much of its prestige and its spiritual significance, but it still retains its reality in the life of the average Englishman, even if it is disguised under some popular vernacular expression like "Fair Play" or "Decency" or "Playing the Game". Not to act dishonestly, not to hit a man when he is down, to hate cruelty and treachery, to help your neighbour when he is down on his luck, to face danger and hardship as part of the day's work without regarding yourself as a victim or a hero—all these things are still deeply rooted in the common life of the people and so long as they remain the principle of Natural Law still remains alive in men's hearts and conscience, even if it has disappeared from their ideology and their rationalized theory of human life.

How is it possible to make this innate moral sense a power in the public affairs of men and nations so that it becomes the basis of a moral reconstruction of society? The great danger at the present moment is that the political ideologies and the scientific techniques for the manufacture and control of public opinion are being used by the state (above all the totalitarian state) to undermine or destroy this natural moral foundation. As Pius XII has said—a moral vacuum has been created which no artificial substitute for religion, no national and no international myth is able to fill. In this vacuum,

in this atmosphere of alienation from God and de-Christianization, the thinking and planning, judgement and actions of men were bound to become materialistic and one-sided, to strive for mere greatness and expansion of space; a boundless demand for increased possession of goods or power, a race for a quicker, richer and better production of all things which appeared to be conducive to material evolution and progress. These very symptoms appear in politics as an unlimited demand for expansion and political influence without regard to moral standards: in economic life they are represented by the predominance of mammoth concerns and

trusts, in the social sphere it is the agglomeration of huge populations in cities and in the districts dominated by industry and trade, an agglomeration that is accompanied by the complete uprooting of the masses who have lost their standards of life, home, work, love and hatred. By this new conception of thought and life, all ideas of social life have been impregnated with a purely mechanistic character.

With the increasing lack of restraint, outward compulsion and domination purely founded on power seemed to prevail upon the forces of order, which established the relations of law and charity in their natural and supernatural foundations as they had been laid down by God. To the detriment of human dignity and personality, as well as society, the conception makes headway that it is might which creates right. Thus private property is being abused on the one hand as a means of exploitation, on the other hand as a reason for envy, revolt and hatred. The organization ensuing therefrom is being exploited in a struggle of interests which is being waged without any restraint.

In some countries a political conception which is godless and hostile to Christ has, with many tentacles, achieved a complete absorption of the individual so that it can hardly be said that there is any longer any independence, either in private or political life. Can anyone be surprised if this far-reaching negation of all Christian principles leads to a clash of the inward and outward tensions arising from that way of thinking, if it leads to a catastrophic annihilation of human lives and goods as we are witnessing today with horror? The war which is the sad result of the circumstances described will never be able to stop this evil development. On the contrary, the war accelerates and accentuates this evolution the longer it lasts, and increases the greatness and incurability of the general collapse.

Nobody should think that by indicting the materialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries we intend to blame technical progress. No, we do not indict what fundamentally is a gift of God; for, as the Lord God makes the bread growing from earth and soil, so, when He created the world He hid for us in the depth of the Earth treasures, metals, and precious stones, so that they may be mined by man to fend for his needs, for his works, and for his progress . . . but the spirit and the direction in which technical progress has been used has now resulted in science having to expiate its own errors. Science has been misused for destruction, and, in fact, it destroys today the very buildings that it yesterday proudly erected.

The present world crisis and catastrophe is the inevitable result of the progressive undermining of the spiritual foundation of our civilization which has gone on for the last 150 years. During the nineteenth century, in the heyday of economic expansion and bourgeois prosperity, it seemed as though the world could get along very well if everybody looked after their own interests and agreed to differ on everything else. Men did not realize that they were living on the moral capital accumulated by a thousand years of Christian civilization and which would inevitably disappear as soon as a single generation had become completely secularized. The real progress that was being achieved in science and economics and the conquest of time and space blinded men's eyes to the loss of spiritual values and

the lowering of spiritual vitality. It is true that everyone was not satisfied. There were the poor and there were the prophets—men like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Dostoevsky and Leontiev, Ruskin and Bloy, all of whom in their fashion bore witness in the streets of the new Babylon of the approaching judgement. For behind the superficial prosperity and the petty individualism of the new civilization, its more sensitive minds already perceived the nature of the new forces that were to dominate the world: Not the social millennium, not the greatest happiness of the greatest number, not even the Kingdom of Mammon, but the return of the dragon, the power from the abyss.

"This is no irony [writes Ruskin], the fact is verily so, the greatest man of our England, in the first half of the nineteenth century, in the strength and hope of his youth, perceives this to be the thing he has to tell us of utmost moment, connected with the spiritual world. In each city and county of past time the master minds had to declare the chief worship that lay at the nation's heart; to define it, adorn it, show the range and authority of it. Thus in Athens we have the triumph of Pallas; and in Venice the Assumption of the Virgin; here in England is our great spiritual fact for ever interpreted to us—the Assumption of the dragon. . . . The time has at last come. Another nation has arisen in the strength of its Black anger; and another hand has portrayed the spirit of its toil, crowned with fire and with the wings of the bat."*

This god whom the last age ignorantly worshipped has not been openly declared to us, and we all live under the shadow of his wings.

How can we be delivered from this kingdom of darkness? No material reconstruction can do it, nor any scientific re-planning of our social and political mechanism. Still less the auto-intoxication of a revolutionary movement inspired by blind exasperation and hatred. For it is precisely such revolutions of despair which are the destructive climax of the movement to the abyss. There must be a return to the foundations—to the Law of Nature and to the grace of God. Our situation is, after all, not altogether dissimilar from that of the world in which the Gospel was first preached. It came as the day spring from on high, to give light to them who sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, to guide our feet into the way of peace. Christianity is essentially a message of salvation, and if man did not need salvation, there would be no need of Chris-

* *Modern Painters*, V, pp. 317, 318.

tianity. Where our situation differs from theirs is that in the ancient world the power of man was still subject to the laws of nature. Even though Caesar seemed omnipotent he could not change human nature or alter the natural order which ruled men's lives.

But today the limits have been removed. The new powers seem to have conquered nature and aim at the transformation of humanity, so that man will be made in the image of the party or the state instead of the image of God. It is therefore necessary to restore the foundations that have been shaken, a return to the sources of life. It is necessary to return to nature, not as the French philosophers of the eighteenth century understood it, but in a deeper and more Christian sense. There is, as the Pope has said, on more than one occasion, an inherent "nobility" in human nature that rebels against all those systems and powers, however strong and well organized they may be, which ignore or outrage its spiritual dignity.

Although material progress which brings greater conveniences into human life is not to be depreciated, it can by no means suffice for man who was born for higher and better things. Created in the image and likeness of God, he longs for God with an ineradicable impulse of his soul. He is always dissatisfied and sad, if he fixes his affections where the highest truth and the infinite good are not to be found. To depart from God is to perish, to be converted to God is to live, to be established in God is to receive the light.*

Modern civilization has ignored this fundamental truth and consequently it has twisted and warped human nature. Men were able to shut their eyes to this, in the nineteenth century, because the ideal of individual freedom made it hard for them to realize that the human person was threatened. But the rise of the totalitarian state has changed all that. Their new orders are not confined to economic organization and political regimentation, they claim to control the whole life of man and they treat human nature as a reservoir of power which can be canalized and utilized by the State, in the same way as other natural resources are exploited by the industrialist and the engineer. Thus the order that they create is a subhuman order, which degrade human nature and the human spirit to serve lower ends.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

* *Encyclical on True and False Prosperity.* Cp. Leo XIII on The Duties of Christians as Citizens. "There has been considerable material progress; but nothing that the senses can perceive, no accumulation of wealth and power and plenty, however much they increase the conveniences and comforts of life, can fully satisfy the soul, born to greater and more magnificent things. The supreme law of man's life is to fix one's eyes on God and to make Him one's goal. For men, created to the image and likeness of God, are strongly urged by their very nature to the possession of God."

THE NATURAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

(Address of acceptance by JACQUES MARITAIN, recipient of the Christian Culture Award for 1942 of Assumption College, Windsor, Ontario, at Vanity Theatre, Sunday, 18 January, 1942.)

IN order to treat the problem in a philosophical manner, we should first examine the question of what is called natural law. There are people who believe that natural law is an invention of American Independence and of the French Revolution. Reactionaries of all categories have done a great deal to spread this nonsense; the unfortunate this is that in discrediting the idea of natural law they have found allies among most of the contemporary jurists (particularly those of the positivist school) who, by the way, are really attacking a false idea of natural law, and in destroying this latter, are only destroying a phantom drawn from some bad textbooks.

The idea of natural law is a heritage of Christian thought and classical thought. It does not go back to the philosophy of the eighteenth century, which more or less deformed it, but to Grotius and before him to Francisco de Vittoria; and farther back to St. Thomas Aquinas; and still farther back to St. Augustine and to the Church Fathers and to St. Paul; and even farther back to Cicero, to the Stoics, to the great moralists of antiquity and to its great poets, to Sophocles in particular. Antigone is the eternal heroine of natural law, which the Ancients called *the unwritten law*, and this is the name which best suits it.

Since I haven't the time to discuss nonsense (you can always find very intelligent philosophers to defend it most brilliantly) I am taking it for granted that you admit that there is a human nature, and that this human nature is the same in all men. I am taking it for granted that you also admit that man is a being gifted with intelligence and who, as such, acts with a knowledge of what he is doing, resolving freely upon the aims which he is pursuing. On the other hand, possessing a nature, being constituted in such a set manner, man obviously possesses aims which correspond to his natural constitution and which are the same for all—as all pianos, for instance, whatever their particular type and in whatever spot they may be, have as their aim the production of correct sounds. If they don't produce true notes they must be tuned or discarded as having no value. But since man is gifted with intelligence and resolves upon his own aims, it is up to him to put himself in harmony with the aims which are of necessity demanded by his nature. This means that

there is by virtue of human nature an order or a disposition which human reason can discover and according to which human will must act in order to be in harmony with the necessary aims of the human being. Unwritten law or natural law is nothing more than that.

The great philosophers of antiquity knew, Christian thinkers know even better, that nature comes from God and that the unwritten law comes from the eternal law which is Creative Wisdom itself. That is why the idea of natural law or unwritten law was linked for them to a sentiment of natural piety, to that profound and sacred respect unforgettably expressed by Antigone. Understanding the real principle of this law, the belief in this law is firmer and more unshakable in those who believe in God than in the others. In itself, however, it suffices to believe in human nature and in the liberty of the human being, in order to believe in the unwritten law, in order to know that natural law is something as real in the moral realm as the laws of growth and of growing old in the physical realm.

Now the law and the knowledge of the law are two different things. The man who does not know the law (if this ignorance itself does not rise from some fault) is not responsible before the law. And knowing that there is a law does not necessarily mean knowing what that law is. It is because this very simple distinction is forgotten that many perplexities have arisen concerning the unwritten law. It is written, they say, in the heart of man. True, but in the hidden depths, as hidden from us as our own heart. This metaphor itself has been the cause of a great deal of damage, causing the natural law to be represented as a ready-made code rolled up within the conscience of each one of us and which each one of us has only to unroll, and of which all men should naturally have an equal knowledge.

Natural law is not written law. Men know it with greater or lesser difficulty, and to different degrees, running the risk of error here as elsewhere. The only practical knowledge that all men have naturally and infallibly in common is that we must do good and avoid evil. That is the preamble and the principle of natural law, it is not the law itself. Natural law is the mass of things to do and things not to do which follow from it *in a necessary manner* and from the simple fact that man is man, in the absence of every other consideration. That all errors and deviations are possible in the determination of these things proves only that our sight is weak and that innumerable accidents can corrupt our judgement. Montaigne remarked slyly that incest and larceny were considered by certain people as virtuous actions, Pascal was scandalized by this, we are scandalized by

the fact that cruelty, denunciation of parents, the lie for the service of the party, the murder of "useless" old people should be considered as virtuous by the young people educated according to Nazi methods. All this doesn't prove anything against natural law, no more than a mistake in addition proves something against mathematics, or that the mistakes of the primitive peoples, for whom the stars were holes in the tent which covered the world, proves something against astronomy.

Natural law is an unwritten law. Man's knowledge of it increases little by little with the progress of moral conscience. This latter was at first in a twilight state. Ethnologists have taught us in what structures of tribal life and in the bosom of what half-awakened magic it was primitively formed. That proves merely that the idea of natural law, which was at first immersed in religious rites and mythology, emerged as something separate only slowly, as slowly as the very idea of nature ; and that the knowledge that men have of unwritten law has passed through more diverse forms and stages than certain philosophers or theologians believed. The knowledge that our own moral conscience has of this law is itself doubtless still imperfect, and it is probable that it will continue to develop and to become finer as long as humanity exists. When the Gospel has penetrated to the very depth of human substance, then will it be that natural law will appear in its flower and its perfection.

We must consider now the fact that natural law and the light of moral conscience within us do not prescribe merely the things that are to be done and that are not to be done ; they also recognize rights, in particular, rights linked to the very nature of man. The human person possesses rights because of the very fact that he is a person, a whole master of himself and of his acts, and who consequently is not merely a means to end, but an end, an end which must be treated as such. The expression, the dignity of the human person, means nothing if it does not signify that by virtue of natural law the human person has the right to be respected, is a retainer of rights, possesses rights. There are things which are owed to man because of the very fact that he is man. The notion of right and the notion of moral obligation are correlative, they are both founded on the freedom proper to spiritual agents ; if man is morally bound to the things which are necessary to the fulfilment of his destiny, it is because he has the right to fulfil his destiny ; and if he has the right to fulfil his destiny he has the right to those things which are necessary for this purpose. The notion of right is even more profound than that of moral obligation, for God has sovereign right of crea-

tures and He has no moral obligations towards them (although He owes it to Himself to give them that which is required by their nature).

The consciousness of the dignity of the person and of the rights of the person remained implicit in the pagan antiquity over which the law of bondage cast its shadow. It is the evangelical message which, suddenly, awakened this consciousness, in a divine and transcendent form, revealing to men that they are called to be sons and inheritors of God in the kingdom of God. Under the evangelical impulse, this awakening was to be diffused by degrees, with regard to the exigencies of natural law itself. In the realm of man's life here on earth and of the terrestrial city.

It is fitting to recall here the classic distinction, a principal one for civilized tradition, between natural law, common law (or *jus gentium*) and statute law or positive law. As I pointed out a few moments ago, natural law deals with the rights and the duties which follow from the first principle: do good and avoid evil, in a *necessary* manner and *from the simple fact that man is man*, in the absence of every other consideration. This is why the precepts of unwritten law are in themselves or in the nature of things (I am not saying in the knowledge that man has of it) universal and invariable.

Common law is difficult to define exactly, at least for the jurists, because it is intermediary between natural law and positive or statute law. The notion of common law developed in England in about the same manner that the notion of *jus gentium*, the law of nations, had developed at Rome. Though these two notions are very different for the historian and for the jurist, the philosopher, nevertheless, is allowed to bring them together in order to disengage from them the notion of natural or unwritten law itself as going beyond the mere sphere of nature and particularized by the conditions of social life. This definition once stated, I shall use, in order to designate it, both the term common law (deprived of its specific English meaning) and the term *jus gentium* (deprived of its specific Roman meaning), these two terms being thus made synonymous.

Like natural law in the strictest sense of the term, *jus gentium* or common law also deals with the rights and the duties which follow from the first principle in a *necessary* manner, but this time supposing certain conditions of fact, as, for instance, the state of civil society or the relationship between peoples.

Positive or statute law deals with the rights and the duties which follow from the first principle, but in a *contingent* manner, by reason of the determinations set down by the reason and

the will of man when they institute the laws or when they give birth to the customs of a particular community.

But it is by virtue of natural law that common law and positive law take on the force of law and impose themselves upon the conscience. They are a prolongation or an extension of natural law passing into objective zones which are less and less determined by the simple intrinsic constitution of human nature. For it is natural law itself which requires that whatever it leaves undetermined shall subsequently be determined, either as a right or a duty existing for all men by reason of a given state of fact, or as a right or a duty existing for certain men by reason of the human regulations proper to the community of which they are a part. Thus there are imperceptible transitions between natural law, common law, and positive law. There is a dynamism which impels unwritten law to expand within human law and to render the latter even more perfect and more just in the very field of its contingent determinations. It is according to this dynamism that the rights of the human person take political and social form within the community.

For instance, man's right to life, to personal freedom and to the pursuit of his moral fulfilment, pertains, strictly speaking, to natural law. The right to the private possession of material goods, rooted in natural law, arises also from common law or *jus gentium* in so far as the right of private ownership of the means of production supposes the conditions in fact especially required for human work and for its normal management (which varies, moreover, according to the forms of society). Freedom from want, and freedom from fear, as President Roosevelt has defined them in his four points, correspond to the demands of *jus gentium*, which are to be fulfilled by statute law and world political organization. The right of suffrage granted to each one of us for the election of the officers of the State arises from positive or statute law.

After these philosophical explanations dealing with the natural law, I should like to lay stress on the rights of the human person. It was first in the religious order, and by means of the sudden upsurge of the evangelical message, that this transcendent dignity of the human person was revealed in human history. But from that point the consciousness of this dignity took over, by degrees, the sphere of the natural order itself, by penetrating and renewing our consciousness of the law of nature and of natural law.

When the apostles replied to the Sanhedrin, which wanted to prevent them from preaching the word of Jesus: "It is better for us to obey God than man," they were affirming at

one and the same time the freedom of the work of God and the transcendence of the human person summoned and ransomed by it, raised up by grace to divine adoption ; but implicitly they were affirming by the same stroke the transcendence of the human person in the natural order, in so far as spiritual totality created for the absolute.

The transcendence of the person, which appears most manifest in the perspectives of faith and redemption, manifests itself thus in the philosophical perspectives and affects first and foremost the order of nature. That is, moreover, in complete accord with Christian theology which teaches that grace perfects nature and does not destroy it. It is important to stress this fact that even in the natural order itself the human person transcends the State to the extent that man is ordered to things which are superior to time.

This appears in the first place in the natural aspirations of man towards spiritual life. Aristotle and the wise men of Antiquity knew that moral virtues are ordered to a contemplation of truth which exceeds political intercommunication. It follows that if humanity were in what theologians call the state of pure nature, a kingdom of the spirits akin to that of which Leibnitz likes to speak would normally have had its place above the world of political life. We may look upon the spiritual network which joins together artists, scholars, poets, philosophers, true humanists, all those who cherish the works of the spirit, as the vague lineaments of such a natural kingdom of the spirits ; such a network is like the rough draft of a single family above the national frontiers. This is only a rough draft, and the Leibnitzian kingdom of the spirits is only an hypothesis for a possible world, for in reality it was by the Grace of God that there was established above the realm of emperors, kings and parliaments, a better kingdom, the Kingdom of God, the great city of the coming century, of which in the eyes of the Christians, the Church is already the beginning on earth. It remains true that this kingdom of eternal life corresponds, by virtue of a gift which surpasses all measures of nature, to a natural aspiration of the spirit in us.

The fact that the human person naturally transcends the State, to the extent that the former is ordered to supra-temporal values, may be verified in other ways.

The universe of truths—of science, wisdom and poetry—towards which intelligence tends by itself, arises by nature, from a plane higher than the political community. The power of the State and of social interests cannot exercise itself upon this universe. The State can ask a mathematician to teach mathe-

matics, a philosopher to teach philosophy—these are functions of the social body. But the State cannot force a philosopher or a mathematician to adopt a philosophical doctrine or a mathematical doctrine, for these things depend solely and exclusively upon truth.

The secret of the heart and the free act as such, the universe of moral laws, the right of conscience to listen to God and to make its way to Him—all these things, in the natural as in the supernatural order, cannot be affected by the State. Doubtless, law has the force of conscience, yet, because it is only law if it is just and promulgated by legitimate authority, not because the majority and the State are the standard of conscience. Doubtless, the State has a moral and not merely a material function; law has a pedagogical function and tends to develop moral virtues; the State has the right to punish me if, because of a blinded conscience, I follow my conscience and commit an act in itself criminal or unlawful. But, under these circumstances, the State has not the authority to make me reform the judgement of my conscience, nor to define good and evil, nor to legislate on divine matters, nor to impose any religious faith whatsoever. The State knows this well. And that is why, whenever it goes beyond its natural limits to enter the sanctuary of the conscience, it strives to violate this sanctuary by monstrous means of psychological poisoning, organized lies and terror.

Every human person has the right to make his own decisions with regard to his personal destiny, whether it be a question of choosing his work, or of marrying the woman of his choice, or of pursuing a religious vocation. In the case of extreme peril, and for the safety of the community, the State can require by force the service of each one of us and demand that each one of us endanger his life in a just war; it can also deprive of certain of their rights criminal individuals, for example, men judged unworthy of exercising paternal authority. But it becomes iniquitous and tyrannical to base the functioning of civil life on compulsory labour, or if it tries to violate the rights of family society in order to become master of men's souls. For just as man is constituted a person, made for God and for a life superior to time, before being constituted a part of the political community, so man is constituted a part of family society before being constituted a part of political society. The end for which the family exists is to produce and bring up human persons and prepare them to fulfil their total destiny. And if the State too has an educative function, if education is not out of its sphere, it is to aid the family in fulfilling its mission, not to efface in the

child his vocation as a human person and replace it by that of a living tool and material of the State.

To sum up, the fundamental rights like the right to existence and life—to personal freedom or to conducting one's own life as master of oneself—to the pursuit of one's human, moral and rational fulfilment (in other words, to the pursuit of happiness, which is above all the pursuit, not of material accommodations, but of moral righteousness, internal strength and completion, with the material and social conditions involved)—the right to the pursuit of one's eternal fulfilment—the right to corporeal integrity, to private ownership of material goods, which is a safeguard of the liberties of the individual, the right of assembly, the respect of human dignity in each one of us, whether or not it represents an economic value for society, all these rights spring, after all, from supra-temporal values naturally contained in the human person.

The first of these rights is that of the human person to make his way towards his eternal destiny along the path which his conscience has recognized as the path indicated by God. With respect to God and truth, he has not the right to choose according to his own pleasure any path whatsoever, he must choose the true path, in so far as it is in his power to recognize it. But with respect to the State, with the temporal community and with the temporal power, he is free to choose his religious path at his own risk, his liberty of conscience is a natural, inviolable right. This is the right which President Roosevelt has designated as the "Freedom of every person to worship God in his own way everywhere in the world".

The same must be said of the rights and the liberties of spiritual families, which are at the same time the rights and liberties of the person in the spiritual religious order. These rights and liberties spring from natural law, not to mention the superior right which the Church invokes by reason of its divine foundation.

I have emphasized in this address the rights of the human person in so far as it is human. A complete examination of the question would also involve discussion of the rights of civic person, in other words, political rights, and discussion of the rights of the social person, more particularly of the working person. Thus we could outline the features of a true and integral democracy.

Amidst the difficulties, conflicts and distress of a still primitive state of humanity the political work must realize as much as it is able of its essential and primordial exigencies. And even that is possible only if it recognizes these exigencies, and if it is attached to a noble and difficult historical ideal, capable of

raising up and drawing forth all the energies of goodness and progress hidden in the depths of man and which are today abominably repressed or perverted. The political work in which human persons may truly find communion, and to whose realization, for the sake of centuries to come, the earthly hope of our race and the energy of human history must normally apply themselves—this work is the establishment of a fraternal city and the liberation of humanity. *Liberty and fraternity* describe the historical ideal for which we have the right to ask men to work, fight, and die. Contrary to the myth of the twentieth century as the Nazis conceive it, contrary to the millennium of brutal domination which the prophets of Germanic racism promise their people, a vaster and greater hope must surge up, a more fearless promise must be made to the human race. Liberty and fraternity are not dead. If our civilization is struggling with death, it is neither because it has ventured too much, nor because it has proposed too much to men. It is rather because it has not ventured enough, and because it has not proposed enough. It will revive, a new civilization will come to life, on condition that it hope, on condition that it love heroically, liberty and fraternity.

JACQUES MARITAIN.

THE HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCEPTION OF NATURAL LAW

LACTANTIUS, an important patristic writer of the beginning of the fourth century, has preserved for us the famous fragment of the *De Republica* in which Cicero set out the character of that "eternal and sacred Law of God" which is the foundation of all true laws, and the embodiment of reason and justice.

"There is a true law, a true Reason, agreeable to Nature, known to all men, constant and eternal, which calls men to duty, which commands, and forbids. . . . It is not lawful to amend this law, nor to take anything from it, nor can the Senate, or the People, alter this. . . . It is not one in Rome and another in Athens, one thing now, and another afterwards, but binds all races of

men, and all times, it is eternal and immutable . . . for it is God who is the discoverer and the maker of this.”*

This is the conception of the Natural Law, which is set out in an important passage in the Institutes of Justinian: “Sed naturalia quidem jura, quae apud omnes gentes peraeque servantur, divina quaedam providentia constituta semper ferma atque immutabiliu permanent”, and they are contrasted with those laws which every State makes for itself, for these are frequently changed by the tacit consent of the people, or by other modes of legislation.†

A similar conception is expressed by St. Paul in the Epistle to the Romans, when he says: “For when Gentiles which have no law, do by nature the things of the law, these having no law, are a law unto themselves, in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness thereunto.”‡

And this is the conception of the Natural Law as maintained by the Christian Fathers. St. Ambrose says that the law is twofold: Natural and Written; the Natural Law is in men’s hearts, the Written Law in tables; all men are under the law, that is under the Natural Law.§

St. Jerome says the Natural Law speaks in our hearts, telling us what is good, and bidding us avoid what is evil.||

When we turn to the legal system of the Middle Ages we find the same conception in the Canonists, and the Schoolmen, and we may take St. Thomas Aquinas’ careful statement of the nature and varieties of law as representing the normal character of their conception of law. He discusses this under four terms: the Eternal Law of God, the Natural Law, the Divine Law given by Revelation, and the Human Laws.

The Eternal Law of God is that by which He eternally rules all things, and all things therefore have their part in the Eternal Law, but the rational creature participates in and is subject to this in a more excellent way, for it shares in the work of Providence, it makes provision for itself and others, and this participation of the rational creature in the Eternal Law is called Natural Law. It is the light of Natural Reason by which we discern good from evil; it is nothing else than the impression of the Divine Light in us.

The Natural Law is therefore the participation of the rational creature in the Eternal Law. The term Divine Law is used by

* Cicero, *De Republica*, III, 23. (Lactantius. “*Divinarum Institutionum*,” VI, 8.)

† Justinian. *Institutes*, I, 2, 11.

§ St. Ambrose.

|| St. Jerome. Comm. on Galatians, III, 2.

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‡ Romans II, 12-14.

St. Thomas to describe that twofold law of God which is contained in the Old and New Testaments. They are needed for various reasons, because the final end of man is beyond human reason, because of the uncertainty of men's judgments, because human law can only deal with the external actions of men; because Human Laws cannot prohibit or punish all evil actions, lest they should do more harm than good. The Divine Laws do not contradict or annul the Natural Laws, but they are added, that men might participate in the Eternal Law, in a higher measure.

Human Laws are described by St. Thomas as being commands of the practical reason, for Human Laws must draw out and apply to particular circumstances the general principles of the Natural Law. The term Human Law includes two different species of Law, the "Jus Gentium" and the "Jus Civile". The first are derived from the "Natural" Law as conclusions from premisses; the second are derived from the Natural Law "per modum determinationis", and are those which any State establishes as being suitable to its own conditions.*

It is no doubt from St. Thomas that the great English theologian and political thinker Hooker derived his very careful and comprehensive statement of the character and source of the Natural Law: "The Apostle St. Paul having speech concerning the heathen, saith of them, They are a law unto themselves (Rom. ii, 14). His meaning is that by force of the light of Reason wherewith God illuminateth everyone which cometh into the world, men being enabled to know truth from falsehood, and good from evil, do thereby learn in many things what the will of God is; which will himself not revealing by any extraordinary means unto them, but they by natural discourse criticizing unto the knowledge thereof, seem the makers of those Laws, which indeed are his, but only the finders of them out."† "That which hitherto we have set down is (I hope) sufficient to show their brutishness which imagine that religion and virtue are only as men will account of them. . . . We see then how nature itself teacheth laws and statutes to live by. The laws which have been hitherto mentioned do bind men absolutely even as they are men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do or not to do."‡

Natural Law is that part of the law of God which men learn by the exercise of their reason, which is binding upon them

* St. Thomas Aquinas. *Summa Theologica*, I, 2, 91.

† Hooker. *Ecclesiastical Policy*, I, 8, 3.

‡ Hooker. *Ecclesiastical Policy*, I, 10, 1.

without any direct revelation of God's Will. This is the doctrine both of St. Thomas Aquinas and of Hooker.

From this tradition there is derived the conception of the Law of Nature in Locke. The state of Nature was, according to him, a state of freedom and equality, but the state of Nature had a Law of Nature to govern it, and Reason which is this Law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to hurt another in his life, liberty or possessions.*

These passages will, I think, sufficiently indicate the general character of the conception of the Law of Nature, and if we try to put this in general terms we find that it is the conception that behind all the laws which particular political societies may make there is a law which is greater, more august, more sacred than any of these, a law taught men by their reason, and this is not only human, but is the law of God himself.

As has been said, Cicero had cited Carneades as maintaining that this was an illusion, that there was no such thing as the Law of Nature, and that human laws had been created by men for their utility; Utility was the real origin of Law, not the Divine or Natural Law. It was this conception which was maintained by Hobbes, and in the earlier part of the nineteenth century by the Utilitarian thinkers.

That those thinkers like Bentham did much service in applying the test of utility to many of the traditional institutions and laws of European society is, of course, obvious, but that they were right in simply repudiating the principle of a Natural and Rational Law behind the positive laws of political societies is another matter.

We may perhaps find an important development of the conception of Natural Law if we turn to the mediaeval conception of the significance of the principle of Justice. Justice is no doubt a different conception from that of the Natural Law, but it is parallel to it, and it is worth while to notice the elaborate care with which it is treated by the great Roman Jurists of the Middle Ages.

They treat Law as the expression of "aequitas" and they identify "aequitas" with the will of God himself, and Justice is the will of man to embody this in law (jus).† Indeed they speak of Jus as flowing from justice, as a stream flows from its source.‡

* Locke. *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, II, 6.

† *Summa Trecensis*, I, 3.

‡ *Fragmentum Pragense* (anonymous fragment, [possibly of eleventh or twelfth century], III, 9.

We find the same principle set out in the feudal law books of the thirteenth century. There is an admirable example of this in the Assizes of Jerusalem*: "If any man or woman, knight or burgess, has obtained a judgement of the court, and the king or queen endeavour to prevent its execution, this is a sin against God and their oath. For the king has sworn to maintain the good usages and customs of the kingdom, to protect the poor as well as the rich in the enjoyment of their rights. If he now breaks his oath he denies God, and his men and the people should not permit this, for 'la dame ni le sire n'en est Seigneur se non dou dreit'" (the word 'dreit' means both law and right). Or again, we see the principle set out in the great work of Bracton in England. "The authority of the king is the authority of right or law, not of wrong; the king therefore should use the authority of law (or right) as being the vicar and servant of God on earth, for that alone is the authority of God; the authority of wrong belongs to the devil, and not to God, and the king is the servant of him whose work he does." Therefore when the king does justice he is the vicar of the eternal king, but the servant of the devil when he turns aside to do wrong.†

Or again, we may turn to the very emphatic words of John of Salisbury in the *Policraticus*. "There are some," he says, "who imagine that the Prince is not subject to the law, and that whatever pleases him has the force of law, that is not merely that which he as legislator has established as law in accordance with equity, but whatever he may chance to will. The truth is that when they thus withdraw the king from the bonds of the law, they make him an outlaw."‡ Or again in another place, "All men are bound by the law, the Prince is said to be free from the law, not because he may do unjust things, but because his character should be such that he follows equity and serves the commonwealth, not from fear of punishment, but from love of justice."§ Or again in another place he cites from a work which he attributes to Plutarch a definition of the Commonwealth which represents the conception that all political authority embodies the principles of equity and reason.||

It is indeed in the region of politics that the conception of the supremacy of Justice finds its most forcible and practical expression. The mediæval king or ruler had no arbitrary or absolute authority. St. Isidore of Seville in his *Etymologies* had set out a distinction between the king and the tyrant, which runs

* *Assises de la Cour des Bourgeois*, 26.

† Bracton. "*De Legibus Anglia*", III, 9, 2.

‡ John of Salisbury. *Policraticus*, IV, 7.

§ *Ibid.*, IV, 2.

|| *Ibid.*, V, 2.

through the whole political literature of the Middle Ages. "Kings," he said, "are so called from ruling" ("Reges a regendo vocantur"), "but he does not rule who does not correct," and he cites an ancient proverb: "Thou shalt be king if thou doest right, if thou dost not do this thou shalt not be king," and the royal virtues are specially two: 'Justice' and 'Pietas'." And he contrasts him with the tyrant. He is aware that the ancient writers had used the word tyrant as equivalent to that of king, but now the word tyrant meant those wicked kings who oppress the people.*

Ratherius, Bishop of Verona in the tenth century, uses a significant phrase when he says that the king should be prudent, just, strong and restrained; without these qualities even the man who holds the monarchy of almost all the world can only be called king by an abuse of the term, for the man who governs ill loses his authority.†

And it is very noteworthy that Waltram, Bishop of Naumburg, in one of the most important treatises in defence of the Emperor Henry IV, cites (from St. Augustine *De Civitate Dei*, xix, 21) Cicero's description of law as being the embodiment of justice, and of the state as that which exists to maintain law and justice.‡

It may be suggested that this conception or principle of the supremacy of justice which may sound very emphatic was really little more than an abstraction, but this is a complete misconception of the actual structure of mediaeval society. It is quite clear that in mediaeval political society there was a method of expressing the rule of justice even against the king. The political society of the Middle Ages was a feudal society, and feudal law recognized that the feudal obligations even of the king were enforced in the Feudal Court. There is a well-known sentence of the great German law book of the thirteenth century which says that the Count Palatine was judge over the Emperor, and that it was for him to decide cases between the Emperor and his vassals,§ and we may recall the decision of the Diet of the Emperor at Nuremberg in 1274 that a case between the Emperor and the King of Bohemia should be decided by the Count Palatine.||

This is the real significance of the famous 39th clause of Magna Carta in which it is laid down that no free man should be dispossessed of his property, or imprisoned, without the legal judgement of his peers or the law of the land, and this was not a

* St. Isidore of Seville. *Etymologies*, IX, 3.

† Ratherius of Verona. *Praelegendum*, III, 1.

‡ Waltram of Naumburg. *De Unitate Ecclesiae conservanda*, I, 17.

§ *Sachsenspiegel*, III, 52, 3.

|| 17, 9.

doctrine peculiar to England but also that of Castile and Leon. In the proceedings of the Cortes of 1188 we find Alfonso IX saying that he would never take measures against the person or property of anyone until he had been summoned to his court, to do right according to the judgement of the court, and the Cortes of Valladolid restate the same principle very emphatically.*

The supremacy of justice was not in the Middle Ages a merely abstract doctrine, but was embodied in a strict legal form.

A. J. CARLYLE.

DYNAMISM TRUE AND FALSE

IN a book entitled *Scepticism and Animal Faith* Professor Santayana argues that we know only the natures, the characters, of what are apparently objects, but cannot know whether there are objects in which those natures are realized outside our own thought and sensation. Nevertheless we cannot help believing that a real world of such objects exists. This belief, however, is but an animal faith dictated by our animal needs. We cannot agree with him. We are sure that we do know, not merely believe, the existence of the world outside us. Nevertheless there is such a thing as animal faith, a belief produced not by evidence and reason but by a biological impulse. Such is the lover's conviction that the girl he has fallen in love with, though she may have had a score of predecessors in his affection, is really and truly the best and the most beautiful girl in the world and her love absolutely indispensable to his happiness. The motive of his belief is the powerful urge of sex. It is a biological, an animal, faith. The biological herd instinct also gives rise to animal faith producing the false patriotism which will fight and die for one's country, be her cause just or unjust, and such blind, unquestioning faith in the herd leader as the Germans give to Hitler, the Russians to Stalin. Such faith is the animal faith of sheep pressing after their leader, of the lemmings, who, obedient to an instinct age-long implanted, rush blindly to a watery grave.

The power and scope of this animal faith increase as confidence in reason weakens following the decay of a spiritual order and a

* *Cortes of Leon and Castile*, 8, 7, 2, 25, 1.

supernatural faith in Divine revelation accredited to reason. That is to say animal faith is correlated with scepticism. Here Professor Santayana has seen the truth. I do not, of course, mean that the sceptic is necessarily a man of animal faith. He may, on the contrary, be a man in whom the instinctive and biological life has been to a considerable degree atrophied by concentration upon that erroneous use of reason which has made him a sceptic. And there can be and are entire groups of sceptics with little animal faith.

But I maintain, and modern history proves it to the hilt, that the triumphant advance of scepticism on a large scale is followed by an invasion of animal faith, a movement so strong that it may even threaten to overpower human reason completely and enslave it everywhere to itself. Man cannot live in a vacuum. If scepticism has called in question every certitude, every loyalty, every value to which he has hitherto anchored his existence, if it has robbed his life of rational significance, his endeavour of an aim which makes the toil and sacrifice worth while, it will not be long before he turns desperately to some form of animal faith in which the biological instinct will replace reason or religious belief as the motive for acting and enduring, and will restore at least the illusion of meaning to a world and a life unendurably meaningless.

Let us now contemplate the accomplishment of this process in recent and contemporary history. We shall see scepticism paving the way for an invasion of animal faith unprecedented for extent and power.

The Movement began with a scepticism not of reason but of revealed religion. Man must believe nothing he cannot rationally prove. Faith in truths above, though not contrary to, reason, must therefore be discarded. Thus the enlightenment opened with the purely rational religion of Deism, of which Voltaire may be regarded as the typical and most outstanding representative. But false views of the nature of knowledge and evidence restricted knowledge to the clear, and in the last resort measurable and quantitative knowledge, proper to the natural sciences. Religion first and any metaphysical truth of a spiritual nature were abandoned as incapable of proof because they cannot be known in the same way as the truths of mathematics and the mathematico-physical sciences. And since these are of their nature sciences of matter which alone can be accurately measured, materialism spread. Outside matter there was nothing but purely subjective imaginations, feelings and notions which do not or at least cannot be proved to represent anything outside the human experience in which they occur.

Nevertheless, by an odd inconsequence of human reason, it was taken for granted that this human thought which does not possess the reality of tangible matter, gives reliable information about the latter. This was the confident "scientific" and materialist rationalism which was the prevalent conviction of the intelligentzia of Western Europe throughout the nineteenth century and is very far from dead today.

But the old confidence has departed. Scientists have begun to realize that to know the measurements of matter is not to know what matter is. It is being more widely understood that what is most valuable in things is precisely what cannot be measured—qualities, not quantities. But these qualities—the beauty of a landscape, for example, the nobility of a deed—because they are immeasurable and therefore not the subject of scientific knowledge, cannot be known. Confidence in scientific knowledge as the only true knowledge thus led directly to scepticism. Moreover, the rapidly increasing command of nature given by applied science, however excellent in itself, has proved double-edged. It can be used for destruction and death as well as for construction and life. Nor can science inform us for what purposes it should be used. Therefore if the sole knowledge possible is that given by the sciences and their methods we cannot know how these new powers bestowed by applied science should be employed. It is a matter of subjective preference. Meanwhile psychology has brought home the enormous part played by irrational factors—by will, desire and the biological instinct which produces animal faith in determining judgments professedly reached on rational grounds—judgments which are in fact but makeshift justifications, "rationalizations" of the irrational motives which have produced them.

Nor is this all. If the sole objective reality is the irrational being which can be measured—whether it be called matter or force is irrelevant—reason is but an accident of it, an illusion it has somehow produced. How then can we trust reason? If the instrument by which we determine the measurements of matter is the product of the irrational it must be fundamentally irrational. The reason therefore which discovers supposed scientific truth being an accident and product of the irrational cannot be trusted. It may be nothing more than a practically useful illusion or just the way in which the action of our nervous system compels us to think. A radical scepticism this—what has been termed scepticism of the instrument.

At the same time the solvent action of this scientific and positivist rationalism was progressively demolishing or discrediting

the traditional institutions of human society, the traditional bases of human life. How should a morality which is no more than the preference or the taste of an individual or group bind anyone unwilling to be bound by it? In any case what sanction can it have in an amoral universe? How can it be worth while to do right at the cost of labour and sacrifice if morality is a will-o'-the-wisp, and life without meaning or enduring value? "The good of posterity," it may be replied, "is a sufficient moral sanction." Posterity will also be mortal. And why should we be asked to sacrifice the sole life that is ours for those with no greater right to happiness than our own? No wonder the younger generation has tended to live from day to day, numbing their wound and concealing their nakedness by the search for as many and as exciting sensations as possible: not "lest we forget" but lest we remember that all is vanity indeed. For man's only life is a brief and a tormented span on earth in which, as Virgil observed long ago, the best days pass swiftly and are followed by the suffering and impotence of an old age on the threshold of death.

*"Optima quaeque dies miseris mortalibus aevi
Prima fugit : subeunt morbi tristisque senectus
Et labor et durae rapit inclementia mortis."*

To lose sight of the skeleton, the feast must be frequent, absorbing, and constantly varied, and it must be a feast, a meal enjoyed in company. Silence, reflection, loneliness, these must be shunned. Man must be always in the company of his fellows. Their excitement must support and stimulate his. Their number must give him a sense of significance and security of which he would be deprived if faced alone with an immense universe of mindless stuff completely indifferent to his welfare and destined very soon to wipe him out of existence. His music even must be a crude stimulant, the jazz which acts directly on the nerves, a musical counterpart of the popular cocktail. Scepticism has produced inner emptiness and a fevered life on the surface among masses equally confined to the surface, equally empty within.

That is to say the sceptic, in order to live at all, is living on the irrational level of instinct, on the biological, the animal, level. He no longer attempts to live a life according to reason. His life is frankly biological-animal. These men and women indeed are still sceptics. Even when the vital excitement is sought, as so often, in the field of sex, its nakedness is not covered by the illusion of romantic love. The sexuality of mid-war years has known itself for what it is, a biological passion, and has not

produced a forged patent of spiritual nobility, as the deified love of such romantics as Shelley. There is therefore no question as yet of animal faith. Men are aware that they are living biologically, following animal instinct. Nevertheless rationalism has already given place to the false dynamism which I have termed energeticism. For they no longer acknowledge even hypocritically the sovereignty of reason and the truths it perceives, the natures or forms of things which it apprehends. For they deny or question the validity of reason or at best restrict its scope so narrowly that it cannot guide man's life or place him in possession of the truth he needs to know, if he is to live rationally. Conation, that is will, desire, appetite, instinctive urge, has taken possession of the throne from which scepticism has deposed reason, its lawful occupant, and its objects replace the truth declared inaccessible. With the majority, of course, this attitude is not fully conscious. They do not think enough to make it so. But it is no less real and no less powerful for that. The exercise of a vital energy has superseded the perception of forms, the natures of things, by the understanding as man's most valuable function. The false dynamism, the energeticism which exalts energy above form, the biological and the animal life above the rational and the spiritual, has entered into the void made by the scepticism which has discredited reason and spirit.

Nevertheless, even at this stage we may detect the beginning of animal faith. The excitement-loving and biological sceptics will often refrain, sometimes even at a considerable cost of renunciation and self-sacrifice, from conduct which is opposed to the code of their herd—"what isn't done"—the behaviour of the outsider. Since they do not attempt to justify this ethical choice on rational or religious grounds it is animal faith, a choice dictated by biological herd instinct. In the concrete, it is true, it is impossible to decide how much of this instinctive morality is due to animal faith, how much to direct intuition of moral values, an insight self-justified even when those who possess it cannot translate their perception in terms of discursive reasoning. We cannot, however, doubt that a large proportion of the morality of sceptics is animal faith, faith in the herd to which they belong. For where the herd does not prescribe a moral rule they are at sea, often frankly amoral. Today, moreover, we witness sceptics who in other respects live only for a good time, a series of excitements drowning thought, willing to risk suffering and death in war. They have no moral principle by which to judge the justice or injustice of their country's cause. They are as ready to die for flagrant aggression as in defence against it. The motive

which impels such men must therefore be animal faith in their herd, the gregarious instinct of the pack.

We have witnessed, however, a further advance of animal faith. It is no longer enough to act and suffer with and for the herd, or even to accept its judgements of social behaviour. What the herd taught by its leaders thinks is therefore true. All the values which it represents or claims to represent are true and supremely valuable values. The faith, born of this biological herd instinct, requires not only obedience to the leader of the herd but belief in his infallibility. This is the animal faith of the totalitarian states. We see it most obviously in National Socialism. Hypertrophied herd instinct has persuaded the German people that they are a nobler race than the rest of mankind, a nation of masters whose right and destiny it is to dominate the inferior breeds of mankind. This biological instinct seeks to rationalize itself by a patently absurd racialism and anti-Semitism. The latter may even be influenced by an obscure awareness that the Alpine element in the German people is of kindred stock to the Hittite stock of Western Asia which at an early period became the dominant physical type among the Jews.

The victory of this biological ideology was made easier by the fact that the keener intellect of the German made the intellectual vacuum produced by scepticism more intolerable to him than to the less reflective mind of the Anglo-Saxon. Because the Germans are among the most intelligent of the European peoples they could not endure an insignificant life in a meaningless world. They therefore clutched at an ideology of animal faith which *seemed* to restore meaning and value to human life, though it has led in fact to evil, to the indulgence of tribal passions, privation, suffering and death. It is the tragic paradox of the contemporary German that just because he is so intelligent he has so readily fallen a victim to the most unintelligent faith ever professed by man. Plumbing the depths of scepticism and turning from its void and despair, he has espoused a biological, an animal, faith of bestial inhumanity. Italian Fascism is a kindred version of the National Socialist ideology. But the lighter temper of the easy-going Italian has weakened its hold on the nation and rendered it more superficial than the former. Under the onslaught of a victorious Germany French scepticism succumbed and disintegrated before any ideology of an animal faith had taken possession of the nation. But it has made its appearance both on the left and the right, even in places beneath a Catholic cloak, and it may yet triumph.

The animal faith of Russian Bolshevism is masked by the fact

that its official ideology was the creation of the rationalist nineteenth century. But its unquestioning acceptance is animal faith in the herd, whether the herd is conceived as Russia represented by its rulers or the proletariat, or as doubtless in most cases a blend of both. To accept whatever the party leaders teach as true is neither rationalist nor rational. A few months ago the Communists were denouncing Britain's war against Nazi Germany as a war of capitalist imperialism. Overnight it became a struggle for the freedom of mankind. Reason clearly played no part in such a *volte-face*. It was the work of animal faith, that a herd, class or nation or both, is the supreme value.

Moreover, since matter is in the last resort energy, when dialectical materialism pronounces self-moving matter the ultimate reality, it is enthroning energy as supreme. True, the energy in question is below even the biological level. It is the inorganic energy which drives machines rather than the life which manifests itself in the organic processes. Since, however, at a certain degree of complexity it gives rise to the latter, is the womb of the latter, and cannot be sharply opposed to it, the way is open for a biological dynamism to replace an inorganic. And in any case the motive which produces unquestioning faith in this self-moving matter is, as we have seen, biological.

From all sides, therefore, in one guise or another, the animal faith of energeticism is pressing into the vacuum left by scepticism. Its effects have wasted the world with war and enslaved mankind. Even its opponents, in so far as they are sceptics, can oppose it only by drawing on the resources of the patriotic herd instinct with the animal faith it tends to produce.

This predominance of animal faith is the triumph of false dynamism. For throughout the universe the forms impressed on their material by the Divine Wisdom determine the nature of the objects, the energy therefore which they exert, or rather, as I believe, in which their very being itself consists. In this human world of topsy-turvydom the vital energy of biological instinct determines the ideas, the mental forms, which should be determined solely by the object they represent, as it is made known by the co-operation of sensation and rational thought. That is to say, the subjective world produced by such dynamism is not modelled, however imperfectly; on the world of objective reality but is a world of illusion. It cannot therefore endure. The real world outside must in the end smash to pieces this unreal world of biological illusion. Biological instincts have indeed their place and an important place. They maintain contact with the biological level of exterior reality and serve

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man's animal needs. But they cannot without disaster claim to inform him of truth which only reason or a religious faith whose credentials are rationally warranted can make known. The animal in man must refrain from intruding into the province of intellect and spirit. It can do no more than provide the material, the energy, of which reason and the higher energy of spirit make use. The immediate consequence of this false biological dynamism, this animalism and its animal faith, is to make men behave like the beasts, though, since bestiality is a perversion in man, much worse than a beast can behave. *Si quaeris monumentum circumspice.* Throughout the world a headlong fall from the humanitarianism of recent years into a revived barbarism displays the hideous spectacle of the animal man revealed in a nakedness no longer ashamed.

That which is false alike to the nature of man and of the universe must be destroyed by the truth it denies. Man cannot be finally satisfied by the illusion of animal faith. Since he is, after all, rational, his reason must in the long run reject it. Man's dominion over the world is due, under Divine Providence, to his reason. If he dethrones reason and reduces it to the servile task of forging tools and weapons for irrational instinct he will no longer be able to control and order his environment. The weapons thus forged for irrational abuse will destroy their maker. The beast enthroned in men who have deposed reason will devour humanity.*

This doom, however, is not inevitable. Man still possesses the reason which can refuse the yoke of biological dynamism and its animal faith. By using it aright he can recover his old certainty of God and the spiritual order and be once more in a position to examine the credentials of revelation. He can thus escape the deordination and illusion of energeticism and its ideologies of animal faith and conform once more to the hierarchy of being as it exists whether he conforms to it or no, to his salvation in the former, his ruin in the latter, case.

Nevertheless, reason unaided is too feeble to defend itself against the assault of scepticism and the animal faith which follows in its train. Its guarantee is the knowledge that reality is rational because the work of a supreme Intelligence. This truth can, it is true, be discovered by its own light—itsself, of course, God's gift. But it lies so remote from the normal objects of knowledge, from the world accessible to sense, that it is hard to keep the mind focused so steadily upon the evidence that it can

* N.B. Not, however, necessarily by war. A secularist world federation or empire is by no means impossible. But it must submit to rational and religious truth or finally disintegrate.

achieve and maintain a steady conviction of theism in face of all the questionings which must arise from the very obscurity of the Godhead and things divine, from the problem of evil, the distraction of earthly interests, the downward pull of passion, and, most subtle foe of all, the pride, whether of the individual or his group or generally human, which would fain have man the highest being in the universe and his own master, subject to no lordship of a Creator.

Therefore reason must be reinforced and secured by faith in God revealing Himself to the soul in her private communion with Him and in his public revelation. Only thus is the foundation safely laid of that confidence in reason, and a rational universe, in moral, aesthetic and metaphysical values and truths without which men must pass through scepticism to the irrationalities of animal faith, from rationalism to a false dynamism. But if faith is genuine, is a living faith, it implies a spiritual, indeed a supernatural, life. If, therefore, reason is to be secured against energeticism, with its false supremacy of biological life, we must go beyond and above it to another dynamism, another life. That is to say, only a higher life can finally maintain the lower in its due subordination to mind and spirit. Only a true dynamism can permanently repress the false. If man is not to live like an animal by animal faith he must live by a spiritual faith. He cannot live successfully and permanently by reason alone. If he attempts to do so he does not live a full life. Nor, as we have just seen, is he able, in the concrete at least, whatever its theoretical possibility, to guarantee the reason by which he would live and the truths such a life implies. Therefore the attempt will be followed by the triumph of biological life with its animal faith, hypnotizing his intelligence into acquiescence by its suggestions. To secure reason and at the same time satisfy his need for a full life man must transcend reason and live by the spiritual life to which religious faith admits him. This life, however, is not simply the life of a human spirit at its height and fullness. It is the life of the Divine Spirit communicated to man. It is the abundant life Our Saviour came to give and which He gives in effect when He gives the Holy Spirit. If the biological life which is deified by the false dynamism and produces its animal faiths is on a lower level than the intellectual, and still more the spiritual, life of man, how infinitely inferior it is to the Life of God Himself, the Life which is God! And this, no less, is the life bestowed when the Holy Ghost is bestowed. For the most part this new, this Divine, life is embryonic, and therefore it often makes a poor showing as compared with the fully developed life of the animal man. The false, the biological dynamism that is

to say, seems often more powerful, indeed more real, than the true, the life of the Spirit. But the saints and their achievement are sufficient proof that the latter is nevertheless more real than the former and more powerful. And the history of the Church bears the same testimony. For it presents the conquest of entire territories and the creation of Christendom by a body which began with twelve poor and uncultured Jews and a minute handful of disciples—the hundred and twenty who met in the Upper Room after the Ascension. For the Holy Spirit descended on that small and unimposing group and gave them His life. He built up the gigantic organism of the Church and through it organized the Catholic culture of Christendom. Today it is true the power of this Life and its organism is under eclipse. But we are certain that the eclipse must end not in extinction but resurgence. The Life of Christ's Mystical Body may appear to be dying in union with His death. But it will rise again to power greater than it has ever possessed hitherto. Through apparent defeats it will achieve new and more splendid victories. As the false dynamism of deified biology succumbs to the facts of human nature and the universe, the true dynamism of spiritual Life, supernatural, Divine, will take possession of men in whom the "pride of" the lower "life" has been broken. Horace thought, or at least professed to think, that the ruin of the world would leave the upright man standing firm and undaunted. *Impavidum ferient ruinae*. Yet the Stoic failed and passed away. It was the man inspired by the Life of the Spirit, the Saint, who stood erect and unscathed when the Roman Empire crashed about him and who laid the foundations of the new order which rose on its ruin. So it will be again. Once more the Saint, the man inspired by the true life, the life of God, will stand firm amid the ruin of Europe's ancient order and the foredoomed failure of new orders based on no firmer foundation than the animal faith of masses blindly moved by a life merely biological. But this supernatural life, just because it is God's Life, not man's, cannot be attained by man's effort. He must ask it in prayer and receive it in prayer. And the prayer which effectually asks and obtains God's life is that living contact with Him termed contemplation, though union would, I think, be a better name for it. For it is not primarily a perception, an intuition. It is primarily a union between the spirit, the spiritual life of man, the depth or height of his will, and the Spirit, the Life of God, which because it is Divine exceeds the grasp of human thought and cannot on earth be revealed in clear vision to his mortal mind. Nevertheless, as we have seen, his vision of such truth as he can understand is in the last resort secured to him only by this life beyond

understanding. From rationalism undermined by the scepticism it has itself produced, modern Energeticism has retreated to the unlearned ignorance of animal faith. From the collapse of both man must rise above rationalism and human reason to the "learned ignorance", as Cusa termed it—of the Divine life received in the union of contemplative prayer. So and only thus will he save reason and order his biological instincts aright.

The tradition of contemplative, or rather unitive, prayer has been handed down by a series of Catholic masters of the spiritual life who have been saved by their Catholicism from the erroneous or one-sided interpretations of their experience which have led astray even contemplatives of high attainment who have lacked these doctrinal safeguards. Some who are still far from accepting Catholicism or Christianity in any form have of late been seeking at this source the life and wisdom whose need they feel. May they increase and may they go further along the path they have entered. We may, I trust, greet in them pioneers of a return from scepticism and a false vitality, to the life of the Spirit.

Our contemporaries do well to seek life full and intense. But they seek it amiss. They must seek not the life which is below reason, to the denial or distortion of reason, but the life which is in accordance with reason, though inexhaustible by it because its source is above, not below, reason, and the source of reason and rationality. This is the life that is strong in weakness and immortal. The decays and failure of biological life cannot destroy it. Nay, they release it from the confinement of earthly bondage to be fulfilled as life eternal. The false vitalism sacrifices the individual to his herd and to a posterity whose life is itself mortal. Such is the way of biological life regardful only of the species. The true life demands no sacrifice that is not, like Calvary, the road to life everlasting. Just because man's life is more than biological it is too valuable to share its mortality. And this life of the Spirit is permeated with intelligence no less than the Wisdom which gives it and itself. It is joy even in suffering and sorrow, joy without sorrow hereafter. "Strength through joy" is the bait offered by Nazi vitalism to a youth taught to spurn the Cross as a morbid worship of suffering. But those who have swallowed it are perishing like the flies of a season for their Leader's ambition. The strength of omnipotence through the Divine joy abiding even in the passion of God made man and His suffering members: this is the Life whose end is the joy of God. Whatever its foes assert it slays only what is hostile to a life ordered according to the hierarchical order of truths and values. It is a life so completely positive

that it makes what is itself negative—suffering, weakness, even the effects of sin—minister to its growth. Far from producing the illusions of animal faith, it dares look facts in the face however grim or ugly. For it is anchored in the Truth which can and will explain and justify the permission of evil. Energeticism, the false biological dynamism, rejects light for life. The true dynamism, the life of the Spirit, issues from Light and brings light with it.

And though in its utmost earthly splendour that light is the darkness of its own excess, it accepts, secures and kindles the inferior lights extinguished by scepticism and the irrational vitalism which follows it.

To this life and light, this life of light, and this life which is light, the Church invites mankind today in the name of the Light that enlightens every man, and is the Life. May the havoc wrought by the false dynamisms, whether nakedly biological or wearing a rationalist cloak, lead to a wide acceptance of her invitation. For "with Thee the light of the world is the fount of life", the Spirit Thou hast sent and "in Thy light shall we see light".

E. I. WATKIN.

CONSTANTIN FRANTZ, CHAMPION OF THE "OTHER GERMANY"

IN 1817, two years after the birth of Bismarck, there was born in southern Prussia a man who was to become one of his most vigorous critics.

If we are allowed a simplification of history, we may say that National-Socialism is the culmination of an evolution initiated by Bismarck. At the launching of the battleship *Bismarck*, Hitler himself acknowledged the debt of the Third Reich to the Iron Chancellor. He it was, said Hitler, who set Germany on the right path and brought unity to the nation by the only effective means: the exercise of Prussia's might. But, he added, Bismarck's action was restricted to the field of politics. Several decades elapsed before National-Socialism provided the spiritual instruments and the organization necessary to complete

the task of national regeneration. The decisive steps, however, towards the triumph of radical nationalism with its totalitarian dictatorship within the country and its ruthless foreign policy were taken when Bismarck imposed on Germany the Prussian solution of the problem of unity.

It is with interest and sympathy that we can consider Constantin Frantz, for he was conscious of witnessing the initial stages of a process which would grow in strength and create increasing havoc as it did so.

For some forty years—until his death in 1891—Frantz, though he felt that he was “preaching in the wilderness”, never ceased to admonish his compatriots. Had he succeeded in converting them, that “other Germany” which, as a dream, has haunted the minds of idealists might well have become a reality. Like us, he lived at a time when Europe seemed incapable of finding lasting peace and when Germany was constantly being “forced by necessity” to threaten or to wage war. Though half a century has passed since his death, the diagnosis he made and the remedies which he suggested are still of peculiar interest to us who are faced with the same phenomenon, albeit in a later phase. They can, moreover, prove useful since they express an aspect of German thought which, though repressed for generations, is not quite dead yet. When the day comes to make peace an understanding of Frantz’s ideas may save one from antagonizing through ignorance those elements in Germany which might prove willing to participate creatively in a reconstruction of Europe.

It is possible to study here only those aspects of his work which are of special interest today: his attitude to the process which led to the creation of an empire by Bismarck, his criticism of that empire and his advocacy of an entirely different form of empire.

The son of a protestant clergyman, Frantz was expected to follow an academic career. But early writings on philosophic subjects, first under Hegel’s and later under Schelling’s influence, soon gave way to writings on political themes. These attracted official attention and in 1850 he was enrolled in the Prussian civil service. In this he seems to have acted as a sort of philosophic expert on politics. He was sometimes called upon to present the Government case to the public or to prepare reports, for instance on the Polish question. When, however, he found himself a consular official in Barcelona in danger of losing touch with the life of his country, he decided to leave the service and in 1856 he embarked on his career as pamphleteer.

Frantz’s decision can be well understood, for Germany’s

situation at the time could not but rouse the greatest anxiety in a patriot. For some centuries already the peoples known generically as Germans had, owing to their lack of unity, failed to exercise a political influence proportionate to their numbers and to their talents. Up to 1806 at least a semblance of unity had existed under the symbolical sovereignty of the Holy Roman Empire. That year, however, saw the dissolution of the empire and for a decade Germany was divided into a number of states completely independent of one another. The catastrophes of this decade showed the urgency of achieving unity. Since then, this problem has haunted the Germans and it is in the name of unity that both Bismarck and Hitler achieved their successes.

At the Congress of Vienna the sovereign states of Germany joined a Federation, but the degree of political and economic unity it ensured to the nation was quite insufficient. There arose, moreover, in this period a feeling of mutual distrust between the people and the princes. The former longed for an empire which would give them both liberty and unity. The latter, on the other hand, deprecated any agitation which demanded unity and democratic liberty at the expense of their dynastic privileges and sovereignty. They therefore sought to consolidate their position by a concerted reactionary policy. In 1848 the progressive elements tried to solve the question by revolutionary methods. But lack of political experience and of military power deprived the idealists of the Paulskirche of practical results. The outcome was again a German Federation, but the situation had now altered. Disappointment caused the realistic demand for unity to take precedence over the idealistic one for liberty. And unity, it was now thought, could be achieved not through the instrumentality of the whole nation but through that of either of the two most powerful states within it: Austria or Prussia.

It is at this juncture that Frantz began to warn his countrymen of the danger if any individual state acquired political predominance. Though unity might be achieved for a time, it would be at the expense of the natural evolution of the nation. Germany could be saved only by a common effort and not by the might of either Austria or Prussia, for neither fully represented its true character. Victory by either would inevitably destroy valuable elements in the nation's personality which might not be characteristic of the victor.

In one of his earliest works, *Die Staatskrankheit* (1852), Frantz diagnosed the disease affecting most continental states and especially Germany. Europe, he explained, is suffering from the

lack of a uniting principle such as Christianity. The Holy Alliance was the last effort of the states to act as a commonwealth of nations. Since then the tendency of every state to prosecute a purely selfish policy and to achieve the rank of a Great Power has developed unchecked. The result is a ruthless international struggle for existence. The internal situation, especially in Germany, suffers from the fact that political institutions and doctrines—such as the doctrine of divine right—are artificially maintained by the rulers while the social and economic conditions and the moral and political conceptions of the people have changed considerably. The maintenance of an anachronistic state and hierarchy is causing the different classes of society to drift further apart and thus undermines their feeling of solidarity. If Germany is to be saved a course of action must be found which will preserve the values inherited from the past without disregarding the altered conditions caused by historical evolution. The princes have so far entrenched themselves in reactionary romanticism and have not participated in any constructive policy. But they still retain a position of great influence and by taking advantage of this position they can be of use to Germany and to themselves. In order to do so, however, they must set out to solve modern problems by modern methods. Above all they must establish their position of leadership not on the anachronistic feudal principle but on the principle of service. Their segregation must cease: for instance, they must abandon their exclusive matrimonial policy. Living bonds with the rest of the community must be re-established. They must forget their contempt for money matters and become active participants and leaders in economic life. There lies before them, for instance, a vast field for colonization not only beyond the seas but also within Germany. They must also consciously help to stimulate the spiritual life of their individual states. In fact, they must encourage regeneration by reviving in the nation the feeling of solidarity and by giving it confidence in its leaders.

This demand for internal colonization and for the recreation of a natural hierarchy led by a class aware of modern needs has characterized German nationalist thought for the past century, including that of the National-Socialists in their more pacific moments.

In 1865, on the eve of the events which began with the Prussian victory over Austria in 1866 and led to the triumph of the Prussian solution in 1870-71, Frantz published a comprehensive study of the situation under the title *Die Wiederherstellung Deutschlands* ("The Reconstruction of Germany"). Here he

studies in detail the faults of contemporary Germany, elaborating the arguments already mentioned. These faults threaten to acquire permanence. What remedies are offered are either unsuited to the times or to the German character, being the fruit either of outworn theories such as reactionary conservatism or of imported theories, such as liberalism, *laissez-faire* economics or communism.

But if the princes still ignore the real nature of the problem, the nation at large does not. In the Wars of Liberation the feeling of national solidarity had revived in the struggle against the common enemy, Napoleon. Already the people feel that they are primarily Germans, and Prussians, Saxons or Bavarians only in the second place. They resent artificial cleavages. This feeling must not be allowed to retrogress and the elements of unity must be co-ordinated to create a politically united nation out of a loose federation. "The most precious treasure of our tradition is the memory of the former unity of our nation, of the emperor and of the empire and of our past greatness and magnificence; a memory which has never quite died and which is now reviving." Why, adds Frantz, should not a new empire arise out of the ruins of the old one?

By empire—"Reich"—Frantz, like most Germans, understands something far more comprehensive than merely a powerful state. Rather is it a form of life conditioned by constitutional, economic, social, moral and cultural reform and guaranteed by a powerful political organism resembling a closely knit federation. Like all European civilization it must be based on Christianity. It will give to the nation the longed-for unity and be the symbol of the community to which selfish ends and dynastic pride may be sacrificed. It will not be governed according to abstract theories based on the conception of a standard citizen and of a standard state which would lead to centralization and to loss of individuality. It will recognize the value of the individual character in human beings as well as in communities and allow all to follow an evolution best suited to their character. It will express the true character of the German nation which is naturally divided into different branches. Each district will govern itself and will retain its local culture, but all will co-operate in matters affecting the whole community and all will have access to its pooled resources. Thus, unity of the nation will be combined with liberty of its component elements. The principle of federalism would also apply to religious life: Protestantism and Catholicism would be regarded as complementary spiritual forces. This principle would, moreover, pervade the whole of society. Each class,

each association would be free provided it followed Christian rules of conduct and each would willingly co-operate in the service of the community according to its character and ability, secure in the knowledge that its rights would be respected.

This ideal of national solidarity has been the main theme of nationalists since Frantz's time. As presented by him it has much in common with the ideas expressed in *Rerum Novarum* and in *Quadragesimo Anno*. But this ideal can be achieved only by the conversion of the whole nation and it is to the task of conversion that Frantz devoted his life.

As regards constitutional reform the first step would be the creation of a "closer federation" of the smaller German states. This federation would have a common political, military and economic policy and would, by its combined power, discourage any attempts either by Prussia or by Austria to achieve hegemony. Safe from internal rivalries the empire would then pursue a common German policy in all matters affecting the whole nation, while each individual state would perform its own peculiar mission. Prussia, for instance, would set about colonizing North-Eastern Europe, a task traditionally assigned to her in Germany; Austria would do likewise in South-Eastern Europe. Such an empire might even emulate the—idealized—Holy Roman Empire and help the rest of Europe find peace, prosperity and culture by showing it the blessings of co-operation. It might even form the nucleus of a European commonwealth of Christian nations which would forsake the Great Power system and the principle of balance of power for that of federation and co-operation. Germany is eminently suitable to act as leader in view of her geographical position, of the tradition of the Holy Roman Empire and of the character of her people.

It is useful to mention here another work which appeared just before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war: *Die Naturlehre des Staates* (1870). Prussia had fought and defeated Austria. She had created a vassal North German Federation and could bring the South German states to heel whenever she chose. Though purporting to be a theoretical study, this is in fact a polemical work. Its purpose is to show that the present structure of Germany is a "Provisorium" because it is contrary to the "natural" doctrine of states.

This book is interesting not for the novelty of its thesis, but for the elaborations of the latter and for the forcefulness of tone roused by the dangerous political developments. Attacking all the current "fictions": "universal suffrage", the "sovereign people", "divine right", a "rational" organization of mankind,

and attacking above all Roman law and the encouragement it gives to selfish individualism, Frantz seeks to convince his people that salvation lies in federalism. Europe is sinking ever deeper into chaos since politics, influenced to a great extent by the conduct of Prussia, are becoming increasingly immoral. The principle of nationality accelerates this tendency. International politics, divorced from internal politics, come to be judged by different standards. The feeling of international solidarity gradually disappears as the same state behaves internally as the champion of law and externally as a pirate. Playing on words Frantz claims that "cannon law" now obtains and that "the professorial chair of the late Stahl (the apologist of divine right) is now occupied by Professor Krupp and his 'Gussstahl' (cast steel)". The future is full of peril and it would seem that only war or revolution can provide a solution for Germany. All the greater is the need to create a Reich which would enforce moral principles in external as well as in internal politics.

When on 18 January, 1871, the King of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor it seemed that nothing could prevent the complete conquest of Germany by Prussia. Germany seemed doomed to follow an increasingly imperialistic foreign policy and to become a more and more centralized state. Indeed, not only was Prussia's might sufficient to impose her will on the whole country but she could make her policy palatable by appealing to the sham romantic legend that the true Reich had been recreated by her.

Though this seemed to dash his hopes, Frantz did not lose heart and until his death continued with untiring vigour to criticize contemporary Germany and especially Bismarck's influence. He now proceeded to apply his principles to a more detailed study of various evils. Among his later works the most noteworthy are: *Bismarckianismus und Friedrichianismus* (1873), *Der Bankrott der herrschenden Staatsweisheit* (1874), *Der Nationalliberalismus und die Judenberrschaft* (1874), *Der Untergang der alten Parteien und die Parteien der Zukunft* (1877), *Der Föderalismus* (1879), *Die soziale Steuerreform* (1881), and *Die Weltpolitik* (1882). In all these writings he did not merely criticize but always sought to show by what reforms a healthy empire might yet be created.

His criticism of the empire was directed predominantly against three evils.

The first was political: the empire perpetuates the antagonism of Prussia and Austria; it allows Prussia a share of power which she is morally unqualified to wield and thereby threatens to introduce soul-destroying centralization. Furthermore, it per-

petuates the conception of an international struggle for existence between sovereign states lacking all sense of communal responsibility.

The second great evil lies in the divorce of state and church. While a true Reich should be based on the Christian conception of the nation, this empire regards the individual not as a living being but as the standard citizen of a purely temporal state. Internally this leads to the growth of materialism and to the loosening of the natural ties within society. Externally, it causes Germany to abandon her universal mission of helping to create a moral order of the world incompatible with Bismarck's Machiavellianism.

The third great evil is the growing influence of the Jews. Frantz's antagonism to the Jews is not based on the race theory but on his national and Christian conception of a healthy state. The Jews, he says, form a distinct nation governed by principles alien to the German character and to Christianity. As they are interested in lucrative rather than in creative work their growing influence on economic life tends to accentuate the vices of capitalism, above all class hatred. They exert an equally harmful influence on political life; lacking respect for German traditions, they spread ideas founded on abstract conceptions which are out of harmony with the German character. In fact, so long as they remain a distinct national community they represent an alien element which might eventually cause the whole nation to lose its national solidarity and make of the empire "ein deutsches Reich jüdischer Nation".

In brief, the disrupting forces are so powerful that the empire can only be a "Provisorium". What the "Definitivum" will be cannot yet be anticipated. At any rate, Frantz confidently maintains that it can only be achieved by applying the political philosophy of Federalism. It can, moreover, be achieved by the true guardians of the German tradition, that is by the "Reichsfeinde", the enemies of Bismarck's empire.

In *Der Föderalismus*, Frantz outlined the essential internal reforms which need not be studied in detail. Suffice it to say that the individual's interest in civic life should be encouraged by enlarging the scope of local self-government; that his political efficacy should be increased by substituting for the ordinary parliamentary system a corporate system of representation reflecting the natural associations in the community; that ethics should be preserved in economic life by a strict control of private enterprise and, when necessary, by the nationalization of certain types of enterprise. Society must be based on the sanctity of "the hearth, the plough and the altar".

In fact, Frantz advocates a "soziale Monarchie" and a structure of the nation which is met with again and again in the writings of political thinkers in Germany, especially Catholics.

In his later works one can note a growing interest in the social problem. Frantz recognizes the need of social reforms, among them the introduction of a progressive income tax, and in the title of one of his last works he calls "the social reform of taxation, the *conditio sine qua non*, if social revolution is to be avoided". Christianity and socialism should co-operate in the service of the national community and in the "provision of the maximum amount of goods for the minimum amount of labour". The life of the lower classes must be made easier by passing legislation for the limitation of working hours and for the introduction of health and unemployment insurance. This is to be done by international agreement of all countries, so that none should suffer or benefit by introducing reforms which its neighbours did not introduce.

Frantz's attitude to the problem of social justice can best be illustrated by two quotations: "The Christian nations . . . must feel bound . . . to work towards the replacement of wage slavery (*Lohnknechtschaft*) by a corporative relationship (*genossenschaftliches Verhältnis*) of the workers"; and "If henceforward it becomes recognized that property—and income—is not an exclusively private matter but that it has also a social aspect, this in itself will save and safeguard property which in its present exclusively individualistic form could not much longer maintain itself." In brief, society must be saved by ridding itself of selfish materialism.

As for international politics, here too Frantz preaches federalism. In *Weltpolitik* he describes how modern conditions bring nations into closer contact with one another, making them more dependent on one another both in economic and in cultural life and mutually more sensitive to changes. The states, meanwhile, ignore this tendency and stubbornly resist it, jealous of their individual sovereignty and each selfishly going its own way as though it was responsible to itself alone. This is a dangerous and retrograde policy impeding the normal development of Europe. It is no longer states but continents which are the great units of communal life, and co-ordination of effort and agreements are now required not only on a national but also on a continental scale. Some modest steps in the right direction have been taken in the postal and telegraph conventions. Similar conventions must now be initiated in the realm of finance, of economic life and of social reform. The nations must be made to realize that a happy future can be achieved

only by co-operation; "the most urgent and practicable need is to recreate an occidental commonwealth of nations such as has in fact existed in the Middle Ages". The Christian principle itself on which our civilization is founded demands the creation of a federation of states. "The Christian nations and the Christian governments must feel bound . . . to initiate the creation of a Christian League of Nations."

Being a German, it is natural that Frantz assigned to Germany the task of forming a solid kernel for such a federation. In fact, it seemed to him that a powerful united Germany was the essential preliminary for it, a Germany which would include Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland in Western Europe and which, through the medium of Prussia and of Austria, would colonize and civilize Eastern Europe to an unspecified depth. However similar this programme may be to those put forward by the chauvinists, one must bear in mind that it was to be put into practice only if Germany had turned her back on Bismarck and had herself put into practice the principles of Christian federalism. Such an empire would set an example to the other European nations which might eventually of their own accord form a commonwealth of nations around it. Nothing short of such a commonwealth—of which England might become a member—would have sufficient vitality to maintain the specific European civilization against the different types of civilization represented by the U.S.A. and by Russia, the latter a semi-Asiatic power. The united nations of Europe could then develop, no longer fearing the conquering urge of the Russian or of the Moslem world and secure at last against the internal disintegration fostered by the Jews.

Frantz died before he was able to witness the triumph of that Germany which he so feared and abhorred. But the European tradition which he had so valiantly upheld did not die with him. A number of level-headed critics continued to uphold it up to the World War, while since 1918 it has found a number of champions. Catholic thinkers in the periodical *Hochland*, Young Conservatives like Edgar Jung, who exerted a considerable influence in the early thirties, and men like Foerster, whose *Europe and the German Question* has only recently been translated, continued to oppose rabid nationalism. True, they have had little success. But it is especially important today to remember that there have been Christian Germans who have dreamt of federation without condemning nationality, who have longed for a united Europe without demanding conquest by Germany, who have advocated social reform without fostering class hatred and who have preached harmony and co-operation as a remedy

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for distrust and selfishness. It may be argued that Frantz's antagonism to the Jews and to Russia and his longing for a united Germany show that even in him there lives the aggressiveness so characteristic of German nationalism; and that unconsciously he is even more dangerous than Hitler, since in the long run his policy of conciliation would far more certainly bring to Germany hegemony in Europe. It is, however, human to err in favour of one's nation; it must also be admitted that his errors are comparatively slight and that many of those ideas which he advocated may one day contribute to a real peace.

NICOLAS SOLLOHUB.

AUTHORITY AND DEMOCRACY

I

THE characteristic of modern, political democracy is the legal, organic and representative participation of the people in the exercise of authority. Such participation in no wise conflicts with the Christian theory of authority, nor does it mean an usurpation of divine power, from which all human power is derived.

Those who in order to justify the theory of modern democracy still base themselves on the thesis of human nature as good of itself (implicitly or explicitly denying Original Sin), have not learned from the experience of a century and a half that this thesis is an Utopia. Nor has this experience profited those who still, in theory, attribute all social power and the origin of power to the Sovereign People, with no intrinsic limitation. A popular sovereignty without limits cannot exist in practice, for it would coincide with anarchy, nor can it be accepted in law, that is, carried on to the plane of the State, for it would degenerate into State tyranny. The pseudo-principles of these two schools were, historically, a polemical premise of modern democracy, but never its real basis.

What it is important for us to establish unequivocally is that the present democratic regime, as it exists in the United States, in Great Britain and her Dominions, in certain States of Latin

America, in Switzerland, in Sweden and Ireland, and as it existed till recently in France, Holland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway, and the Baltic States, in no way implies a denial that all power comes from God. I say "in no way implies", in order to exclude a necessary connection between democracy and a similar denial. This does not mean that in the democratic regimes there had been no infiltration of theories founded on the idea of an absolute human autonomy. In the same way in the *ancien régime* erroneous theories on the nature of authority crept in, like that of the Divine Right of Kings.

This preliminary observation may seem to many a truism, especially in view of the fact that the Popes (from the time of the French Revolution onwards) have repeatedly declared that the Church is indifferent to the form of political regimes. But since there can be no form without content, and since the content of all modern political formations is tainted by erroneous theoretical premises, adverse criticism of a regime passes easily from content to form, attributing to the political form as such the incompatibilities with Christian doctrine that may be found in the content or in the theories it may presuppose. Criticism of democratic regimes, from the point of view of the nature and use of liberty and of the character of authority, is made easier by the fact that the thinkers and philosophers of modern political democracy have been in many instances contrary to a Christian conception of society.

The authority of the State in a democratic regime is not concentrated in a single person, but is distributed among various organs, with at the basis the popular electorate. In America, for instance, there is the elected President, who represents the nation and is its symbol, and, at the same time, holds the executive power. There is the elected Congress, with its two bodies, as legislative power, besides the legislatures in the separate States. There is an independent judiciary, as judicial power, and an electorate, as ultimate source of the organs of power. Each organ has its competences, its limits, its rules, its responsibilities. In Great Britain there is the King, a Parliament divided into House of Commons and House of Lords, a Cabinet Government, a Judiciary, an electorate for the House of Commons and for local government bodies.

Do all these represent authority? The authority that comes from God? Assuredly. Within the ambit of its proper functions, each organ has a share of power and is hence, in the exercise of its proper power, invested with authority. In the case of King or President, or of the Government, or of

the Judiciary, or of the administrative and military organs of the machinery of State, this is not questioned. Neither should it be questioned in the case of the legislature, but in France, for instance, and elsewhere people had grown so accustomed to bitter attacks on parliamentary institutions from the whole of the Press of the Right, and even from a part of the Catholic Press (a criticism, harsh though it was, perhaps not wholly unjustified), that many Frenchmen, for instance, would be surprised to think that their Parliament possessed an authority that came from God. Yet, on reflection, they would have to realize that this was the case.

Must we attribute even to the electorate, a power that comes from God? Precisely. The electorate is an organ of power, it is invested with a fundamental power, and it has a grave responsibility for the right exercise of it. Unhappily, in few countries has the electorate been educated to feel its moral responsibility. It has been flattered as the expression of an unrestricted will, as the sovereign people (the sovereignty of a moment!). It has been a prey to popular passion, its feelings have not been guided into proper channels, parties have been formed on a basis of false ideals, there has been too little insistence on the moral value of democracy.

In France, for example, there was also the fact that the electorate was called upon only at fixed intervals, and could take no other share in political life; there was neither the appeal to the country, in case of conflict between Government and Parliament, or when a change of policy was required, as happens in Britain, nor the referendum on determined questions of general interest, as used in Switzerland. Thus the education of the electorate was lacking or defective, while, on the other hand, a Parliament without continuity of contact with the country (given the automatic, periodic form of the elections) was too easily transformed into an autonomous body, at the mercy of groups. Hence, in France, the discredit into which the Parliament fell, and the depreciation of the electorate.

Crises in the organs of power, however, do not affect (at least ideally) the finalistic, moral value of power. If Louis XV of France kept a kind of brothel at Versailles, or George I of England emulated his colleague across the Channel, this did not invalidate their laws and decrees. Actually, the acts of the electorate and those of Parliament assume the character of acts of authority and as such should be received.

Those who confuse authority with a kind of arcane and hierarchical power, believe that the open and legal criticism of the acts of power, such as occurs in a democracy, is at variance with the

principle of authority. This mistaken opinion is the result either of ignorance of the essential nature of power, or of a confusion between a healthy democracy and the real abuses that may enter into it, as into any other regime. From the legal aspect, there is the "preventive" criticism of the law in the period when it is taking shape; hence dissensions in the press, in public meetings, in referenda, in the parliaments, till the sovereign sanction has been obtained. Then the law is an accomplished fact and must be respected. There is also the other form of criticism, that of an existing law, seeking to improve, change, modify, or abrogate it; this corresponds to a need inherent in the nature of things, and implies no outrage to the law if the criticism is honest, temperate, and reasonable. Finally, there is the criticism of the acts of the Government and of its general policy; this is characteristic of democracy, for the people in a certain mode takes a part in government itself; it is but looking after what is its rightful business.

In any case, it must not be thought that in the *ancien régime* of France, criticism was absent. It took other forms. The classes concerned were the noble ones, the groups those represented by the guilds, universities, municipalities, mercantile burgesses, and so on. There were assemblies of the three Estates, petitions, the local parliaments or general assizes, where the fiscal question was hotly debated. When the direct voice of the people could not reach the kings, there was no lack of confessors and preachers to act as its echo. Even official mistresses sometimes served to play the part of Esther, when they did not do just the contrary. It is well to note, once for all, that the State in the days of the *ancien régime* had few functions as compared with the modern State, which has gathered up the whole of the civil, moral, cultural, and economic life of the nation. In England, on the other hand, the permanence of Parliament (in spite of the vicissitudes of over seven centuries) led the political classes to take their share in the formation of laws and the government of the country.

In the conception of the relationship between subjects and sovereign, local bodies and the State, citizens and the Nation, we must note the substantial historical demarcation between the "contractualist" theory of the Middle Ages and the "publicist" theory of modern times. In the first case, the relations between subjects and sovereign were not individual but communitary. The State, or better, the Kingdom, was a kind of higher community within which the other communities existed—cities, guilds, ecclesiastical bodies, universities, and so on. Each community had its own existence, entirely autonomous and con-

tractually bound to the King, as head, and protector and guarantor of its rights. This was what is called a corporate State—remote indeed from the Corporative State of totalitarian countries! The basis of relationships was contractual. At that period there were not two systems of law, the one private, the other public; law always crystallized into a contract. Even between subjects and king there was a contract, pledging, on the part of the subjects, obedience and fealty, and on that of the sovereign, respect of their rights and a guarantee of defence. If the contract was not kept, the mutual obligations ceased. Is it surprising that parliaments and local bodies should put up a resistance to laws, decrees, and acts of the sovereign when they deemed these to trespass upon their autonomy and on those rights that the kings themselves had sworn to respect?

The conception of the State as the *res publica*, a public entity, with full sovereignty of its own, gave rise to the absolutist theory, which carried with it either as presupposition or as corollary the theory of the Divine Right of Kings. (Neither the Popes nor Catholic doctrine ever accepted this theory, notwithstanding the weaknesses of local episcopates or national churches.) When the theory of Divine Right fell into discredit, it was supplanted by that of Natural Right (*Jusnaturalism*), which later came to provide the basis for the popular sovereignty of a formal and symbolic character, which survives today both in the democratic conception and in the totalitarian one of the Nation or Race, taken as a vital, permanent, and superhuman totality. In substance, it is the State, a self-subsistent entity of public character, that sums up authority in itself without other limits to its power than those set by its nature as an entity embracing the whole of society.

The one limit should have been the moral limit, but since the State-totality cannot go outside itself to seek a moral basis where it is to be found, in human personality and its religious relationship with God, it seeks to forge itself a morality of its own. This is actually a compromise between traditional morality, of a Christian and natural type, and the unlimited conception of statal power. In a democratic regime the unlimited power of the State is corrected by the reciprocal limitation of each organ of power by the others; the keystone of this limitation is the classical division of power into legislative, executive, and judicial, with a formal synthesis at the base, in the electorate, and at the summit in the King or President, as Head of the State. Hence are derived other elements of the limitation of power: that of a law equal for all, that of the periodicity of appointments, that of the political responsibility of Government or Cabinet, that, maybe,

of the political irresponsibility of a King who "rules and does not govern". Here is a kind of mechanics of the forces in the State, in order to obtain, as resultant, a political equilibrium; but this is not enough if it has not at its base a stable moral element, such as is usually found in the fundamental laws of the State—Constitution, Codes, rules of administration. In the event of this equilibrium's being destroyed, the organ of power that becomes dominant will no longer feel the value of a political limit and as a consequence, not even that of a moral limit: the result will be the tyranny of a dictator, or that of Parliament, or anarchy of parties and of the masses.

In summary, modern democracy has organized the limits and controls of power in a permanent, legal, public, and popular form, whereas in other forms of State the limits and controls are of an aristocratic nature, or else merely bureaucratic and functional. The nearer the approach towards the conception of an absolute power without limits or controls, the more the moral character of the political power is attenuated, so that this resolves itself into the arbitrary acts of an individual or of the few and into the dominion of material force. The cult of authority, if it is put forward by itself, as an absolute fact in society, without the concretization of ethical and political limits by means of living social organisms, leads to the identification of power with arbitrary will and with force.

II

When we speak of subjection to the constituted authorities this cannot be understood as a personal subjection, but merely as a legal subjection, that owed to the established order, that is, to the law. No one can deem himself *solutus a lege*, not even those invested with authority. Civic obedience, however, cannot be envisaged in the same way as monastic obedience, or that of serfs or slaves. Obedience is due only to the law and to the judicial or administrative precepts issued in enforcement of the law. If in such enforcement the magistrates or officials exceed their powers and burden the citizens unjustly, a right of appeal or of non-fulfilment is admitted.

The early Christians behaved no differently from the other citizens of the Empire, nor from the citizens of today. They obeyed the laws (when these were not contrary to Christian morals) and when occasion arose they too claimed their rights, as did St. Paul when he asserted his quality of Roman citizen in appealing to Caesar. To say that they obeyed Tiberius or Nero or Domitian neither adds to nor detracts from their civic sub-

jection, in as much as they remained obedient to the laws and not as slaves of the emperors. Their passive resistance to anti-Christian laws, making them prefer flight or martyrdom to acquiescence, was occasioned not by the wickedness of the emperors but by their bad laws. Christians were more persecuted by a Trajan or a Marcus Aurelius, who are reputed good emperors, than by a villainous type like Commodus. The question of the evil prince arises only in regard to the right of citizens or of their accredited bodies to depose him, or, in the case of tyranny, to the right of revolt.

In order to establish clearly the character and limits of the obedience of citizens to authority in a democratic regime, we must distinguish the forms it may assume. We find, in fact, four different types: (1) civil obedience, (2) political obedience, (3) the obedience required by office or service, (4) military obedience.

The first is that which is commonly spoken of: obedience to the laws. The second is that due to the political authorities (it may be on personal command) in the case when the State or order or national life are in peril, that is, in the event of wars, revolts, or the suspension of the usual guarantees through exceptional happenings such as earthquakes, epidemics, famines, riots. The third is the obedience owed by a person invested with an office or entrusted with a public service, as minister, member of parliament, ambassador, civil servant, down to the messengers or policemen. The fourth is that imposed on soldiers and officers by military discipline.

All these relations between authority and subjects are dominated by the principle that nothing can be demanded that goes beyond the letter and spirit of the law. Civil obedience is of an impersonal character, being owed to the law and not to the person in command, and reaching the person only in cases of strictly legal and administrative enforcement (a judge's sentence, a police injunction). Political obedience, on the other hand, admits of a wider sphere of personal command in execution not so much of a definite law as of a duty of co-operating for the common good, with personal sacrifice in cases of grave and urgent necessity, when the authority becomes naturally a co-ordinating and compulsive centre.

The obedience demanded by office or service and the obedience of military discipline have particular features, the first as a relationship of justice (public appointment or contract of employment), the second as a strict application of political obedience through the necessity of achieving the practical ends for which military service is ordained.

If the law is to carry obligation, it must be moral and just. An immoral and unjust law carries no obligation.

An immoral law may be *positively* so if it demands the performance of an immoral act (worship of false gods, compulsory sterilization and so on), *negatively* so if it forbids the performance of certain moral acts (public worship of the true God, preaching of the Gospel, public acts of religious marriage, etc.).

The action of resistance to the law may be of two sorts : (a) *political and collective*, with a view to the repeal of the law and to its non-observance ; (b) *civil and personal*, on the part of those to whom the injunction is made, by *refusal* to observe it.

The obligation of political resistance falls upon all citizens, according to the legal possibilities and personal positions of each, as electors or as members of parliament or as journalists, and so on. More strictly, it falls upon those who in virtue of their office have the duty of defending morals and religion when these are offended, or on those who may be called by their profession to carry out the immoral law (doctors, for instance, in the case of compulsory sterilization). Whether this obligation is binding in justice or in charity, may be determined from consideration of factual conditions. To my mind, in a democratic regime, the obligation of the Minister and Member of Parliament is one of justice ; that of the citizen elector, too, might be considered to be one of justice if the elector were sufficiently conscious of his office in the face of the political community as a whole. There is no question about the case of the priest, obliged by his sacred ministry to defend morality, especially in the case of parish priests and bishops.

The refusal of obedience at the moment of a personal injunction is a duty not only for the person receiving the order (for instance, the doctor who is personally ordered to carry out an unjust sterilization), but also for his necessary collaborators (such as those assisting in the operation) and for those who are charged with punishing disobedience (the judge or magistrate).

The prohibition to co-operate in evil entails the obligation for all ministers, officers, and civil servants to refuse their concurrence in the performance of immoral acts commanded by their superiors—violation of laws, unjust decisions, refusals to give justice, and the like. Those who look with ready indulgence on immoral projects of the representatives of political power, do not discuss with their consciences whether, in the particular case, there is a conflict of duties between blind obedience and enlightened disobedience, between the duty of conscience not to co-operate in evil and that of carrying out the orders of authority. Unfortunately, in the usual course of things, men think chiefly

of holding on to their jobs, of assuring themselves a brilliant career, so that they yield to pressure from above in the face of the feeble voice of conscience protesting against a formally immoral act.

Such conflicts, in the normal way, are less frequent and less acute in democratic and legal regimes than in absolute and arbitrary ones. In any case, it is less difficult to follow the voice of conscience in a democratic regime than in a dictatorial one, for the danger of dismissal is less real and never irreparable.

I remember a civil servant who had been told to draw up a report which, without altering the actual facts, would conclude in a sense adverse to the man who, to his mind, had the right to a favourable decision. It was in Italy, in a period before the last war. This civil servant several times pointed out the realities of the case to his immediate superior and finally asked to be excused from making that particular report. I remember with what intense anxiety he waited for the final answer. He was prepared even to lose his place, or to be transferred to some other district, or subjected to disciplinary proceedings. To his surprise, he learned that the Minister concerned, appreciating his arguments, had decided to suspend any decision and ordered further investigations. It is hard to say whether this would have been possible in a dictatorial regime, in which, as general psychology, the employee is more disposed to obey even in the case of a manifest injustice. An atmosphere of subjection, servility, fear is formed, that lessens to quenching-point any sense of responsibility.

What we have said of the civil servant, is to be said of the citizen when for reasons of general peril he is called to lend his services or make personal contributions (it is the case of political obedience): the first limit of such obedience is provided by the morality of the order given. The problem of who is to judge of the morality of the order is solved by the principle of the well-informed conscience: the man who must carry out the order is the natural judge of it, and he, if circumstances allow, should take counsel with enlightened and prudent persons. In case of doubt, the order has preference, and is assumed to be moral unless there is previous knowledge that its emitter despises moral principles and mocks at justice.

In the case of a law or order that has a negatively immoral character, it is necessary to draw various distinctions. If it is a case merely of prohibiting the exercise of a right, although the prohibition may be immoral and injurious, the persons affected, who have no means of lawful defence, may, at their own loss, renounce the exercise of their right at least for a time. Thus,

for example, in regard to the publishing of a book or paper in a forbidden language.

If, however, it is a case of the prohibition of the fulfilment of a ministry that entails moral obligation (that of a doctor forbidden to treat certain patients because they are Jews, or a parish priest forbidden to teach the catechism in the vernacular, when the children of the people may not understand the national language), then the law or order cannot be obeyed. A number of different cases may arise. That of a positive duty of justice, outraged by a negatively immoral law is different from that of a generic duty, such as, for example, hearing sermons in the common tongue or going to hear Mass. In a case of grave inconvenience, if scandal is avoided, the citizen may refrain from exercising his rights. In certain cases a collective passive resistance is the only means for obtaining the repeal or mitigation of a law that denies a right or hampers the full or partial performance of duty. Passive resistance is of immense value as a means of making the political authorities return to the sphere of their proper competence, of giving a moral tonic to society and for educating peoples in the sense of duty, conscience and responsibility for their own actions.

III

Our sketch of obedience to the constituted authorities in democratic regime will be completed by an examination of two special questions—that of the legitimacy of power and that of the duty of the citizen in the event of an unjust war.

(A) *Legitimacy of Power*

There is no true power that is not legitimate. Legitimacy is a necessary condition of power. An illegitimate power is no true power. If it originates as such, legitimization is a step demanded by social order, and an only apparent legitimization will be sought if a real one is unobtainable.

In our own times when *coups d'état*, military occupations without declaration of war, conquests without peace treaties, are everyday occurrences, the problem of the legitimacy of power is of the highest actuality.

For the purposes of our study we may distinguish the following cases: (a) usurpation of power; (b) un-legitimized *de facto* government; (c) *de facto* government apparently legitimized,

with an inadequate title; (d) legitimized government that has become traditional.

(a) Moral theologians agree that it is lawful, and for certain persons or in certain cases a duty, to resist an usurper in the act of usurpation even by force. It is the duty of the Head of the State and his government when attacked by the usurper to resist by armed force, when this is possible, and in any case in the legal field, for they represent the interests of the community; the armed protection and the juridical guardianship of the country is in their hands. The army and the citizens called to the colours have in such a case the obligation of obedience to their legitimate head, and hence that of fighting against the usurper. Other citizens have the obligation of political obedience, under the head of general peril. If, however, the causes of the attempted usurpation are those of a just revolt, then the situation changes, as I showed in a previous study.*

(b) Supposing that the usurper has been victorious and has created what is called a *de facto* government, then the moralists agree that for the sake of order and the common good such a government is to be obeyed, even before any possible legitimization. This does not contradict the famous words of Pius IX, on 8 December, 1864: "It is false that in the political order *faits accomplis*, by the very fact that they are *faits accomplis*, have the value of law." Obedience to such a government does not imply any recognition of the *fait accompli*, nor does it entail an implicit legitimization.

(c) Legitimization is posterior to the existence of the merely *de facto* government; it constitutes a principle of law, and as such does not demand a fixed and constant form, for it is, by its nature, original and historical. Every type of regime, every juridical conception of society, every *de facto* situation resolves the problem of the legitimization of power as best it can. Pepin, to be surer of the Frankish throne, obtained the approbation of the Pope. In the fifteenth century the kings of Spain and Portugal had recourse to the Pope to legitimize their actual and future occupations of the New World, and to obtain the exclusive right of such occupations. Today recourse is made to *plebiscites*. From Napoleon III onwards these have become an instrument of tyranny "with the enthusiasm of the people". (What would have been the result of Schuschnigg's intended plebiscite in Austria in 1937? Certainly, the opposite of that summoned by Hitler a month later.)

From the manner in which legitimization is achieved, and from

* "The Right of Revolt", in *Politics and Morality*. (Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1938.)

the state of mind of the majority of citizens and those who, at a given moment, represent the responsible political class, we may deduce whether such legitimization is to be considered as apparent or real, as precarious or stable, as accepted by all or only by a fraction. At the root of every legitimization there is the common will, the assent—implicit or explicit—of the population concerned, for legitimization is a form of acquiring power *ex-novo*; through it we come to the question of the origin of power. Whatever the prevailing conception, contractualist (that of the schoolmen), historical (that of positivism), or formalistic (that of the jurists), all presuppose a common will, explicit or implicit, through which alone can a legitimate power take concrete shape. Even the idea of "prescription" (taken from private law)—by which a king (or regime) established illegitimately, through the passage of a long period without real or apparent opposition, ends by becoming by this very fact a legitimate power—is merely a juridical formula that masks the real essence of legitimization: it tacitly implies the popular will, through long acquiescence.

It might seem as if this interpretation were a means of evading the doctrine of Pius IX on the *fait accompli*, but this is not so. In the case of prescription, it is not the *fait accompli* that creates the lawful right, but the subsequent will of the people, assenting to the *fait accompli*. So long as the *de facto* government is not legitimate, citizens are bound to civil obedience within the limits stated, but not to recognition: it is the case of the occupied countries.

If a legitimization that is only apparent comes about, citizens are bound to civil obedience as to a *de facto* government, but not as to a legitimate government: it is the case of Austria.

In both cases their right remains to demand a cessation of the *de facto* government and the return of the rightful one. The mode in which this right is to be exercised depends on the type of regime that has been installed. If this is democratic, the mode will be legal. If, instead, the regime is an absolute or, as we say today, a totalitarian one, allowing of no legal action to claim the return of the lawful government, then nothing remains but revolt, in the cases and modes taught by Catholic moral theology.

(d) Finally, if the legitimization is real and effective, and no objection can be made to it, the *de facto* government becomes the lawful government. The relations between the citizen and the public authorities become once more entire and conclusive.

(B) *The Unjust War*

The theologians say that in the case of a manifestly unjust war, the soldier must refuse to fight (whether he be a citizen or subject

obliged to military services, or a volunteer with or without contract of service). The same is to be said of an ally. (Italy in 1914 refused to combine with Austria-Hungary in the war against Serbia, because her treaty of alliance carried with it no obligation to take part in a war of offence.) In general, it is the duty (as well as the right) of all those who are called to co-operate formally in an unjust war, to refuse political obedience. Parliaments are morally bound to refuse approbation of the war and the necessary credits; bankers to refuse loans; the press, its support; parties and citizens even their applause and encouragement.

When there is doubt of the justice of the war, some theologians teach that the presumption lies in favour of its justice, and hence soldiers must obey the prince. Others draw a distinction between a sovereign State and a vassal State. In the first case, the justice of the war is to be presumed, in the second, its injustice, for the vassal must first appeal to his sovereign to clear up the question.

In our own time, in a regime of international law, when there has been the League of Nations, the Hague Court, the Pan-American Union, the Kellogg Pact, it could be affirmed with tranquil conscience that a war was to be presumed just when, before it was declared, the rules of international association had been observed, and in spite of all attempts at conciliation and fulfilment of all the procedure prescribed, the adversary refused to accept the findings obtained. The criterion of presumption may also be set in other terms: every war of aggression is to be presumed unjust, every war of defence on the part of the victim of the aggression is to be presumed just.

■ The value of the presumption helps to bring out clearly the citizen's obligation in conscience either to obey the political power in taking part in the war, or to withhold obedience and resist the orders he may receive.

LUIGI STURZO.

DANTE AND THE NEW STYLE

IN the twenty-fourth canto of the *Purgatorio* comes a famous dialogue in which the speakers are Bonagiunta and Dante. For present purposes it may be thus rendered :

"But you before me—are you then he who once
 Led the new verses forth, whose opening was
Ladies that have intelligence of love ?"
 "I am one," I said, "who when love breathes on me
 Take note from him, and even as he within me
 Dictates, so give the interpretation forth."
 "Ah brother," thus he answered, "now indeed
 I see the knot which hindered those before
 And held with me the Notary and Guittone
 Short of the sweet new style I hearken now.
 Your pens—how clear I see it—follow close
 Him who dictates ; with ours it was not so.
 Any that looks past this, shows that he sees not
 'Twixt one and the other style what difference lies."

It is plain at once that Dante is here making some statement of his own principles in the writing of verse, and that in the light of it Bonagiunta contrasts the achievement of Dante and his friends with that of an older school of poets to which he himself belongs. The statement itself is accepted as clear and final ; nevertheless this passage has been a source of much controversy, and by this time many hundreds of pages have been written round it. As commonly happens in such cases, the elements of a true solution have all been seen long enough ago by one writer or another, but they have been dimmed again by changing fashions of thought and by the mere accumulation of criticism. A documented history of the dispute would be tedious and wasteful, but I think it may be of use to review its main positions, since in so doing one must necessarily touch errors still current and truths which remain relevant to our own time.

Two styles and two schools are opposed in our text, and it will be as well to make clear at once who are the poets concerned. Bonagiunta da Lucca (c. 1240–1300) classes with himself Giacomo da Lentino (c. 1195–1245, notary to Frederic II of Sicily) and Guittone d' Arezzo (c. 1230–1294). The members of Dante's school are not named here, but may reasonably be taken to include Guido Cavalcanti (1255–1300), Lapo Gianni (c. 1260–1327), and Cino da Pistoia (c. 1270–1336), whose names and work Dante elsewhere associates with his own.* With these it

* *De Vulg. El.*, I, 13 ; II, 2, 5, 6, 12.

is usual to place three other contemporaries, Guido Orlandi, Gianni Alfani, and Dino Frescobaldi, though there is no mention of them in Dante's extant writings. Lastly, it should be noted that Guido Guinizelli (c. 1230-1276) is regarded as in some sense the initiator of the new style and that Dante himself (*Purg.* XXVI, 97, 98) calls him "the master of me and of my betters".

This said, we may enter the debate by considering two extreme theories on the nature of the new style. According to one, the new style is essentially concerned with feeling and emotion; according to the other, it is essentially intellectual or metaphysical. The first theory is most uncompromisingly stated by Lauro de Bosis in his preface to an Oxford anthology: "The school of the *dolce stil nuovo* proclaimed that poetry, though still considered the handmaid of philosophy, must be inspired by emotion and not by reason."* Without committing themselves so far, more serious and more mature critics than de Bosis have made considerable admissions in this direction. Mr. J. D. Sinclair says on this passage: "The language has a significant correspondence with that of Wordsworth in the Introduction to *Lyrical Ballads* . . . Dante's *love* is Wordsworth's *emotion* and Dante's *taking note* is Wordsworth's *recollection in tranquillity*."† And Professor Grandgent in his commentary speaks of Dante as representing a "transformation of art from formalism to subjectivism", and supports this by quoting Dante's lines on the painter to which I shall return.‡

After all allowances for the reservations made here or there by this or that critic, it remains clear that pronouncements such as these impose on Dante's words a meaning which is in fact romantic. There is the familiar opposition of "heart" and "head". The love which dictates is either quite simply an emotion felt for a woman or at least some kind of emotional state. Emotion is regarded as the natural source of a true work of art, and "unfettered genius" inspired by it is held to soar above reasoned thought or the traditional rules of a craft. Critics of our day are prevailingly romantic, even when they disown the name; and it is not surprising that they should believe anti-intellectual criteria to be applicable to Dante's practice. What is surprising is that they should believe such criteria to be those of Dante himself, a Scholastic philosopher with severe intellectual standards which, whether they are accepted or not, should at least be recognized for what they are.

* *The Golden Book of Italian Poetry*, p. xviii (1933).

† *The Divine Comedy*, Vol. II, p. 321 (1939).

‡ C. H. Grandgent, *La Divina Commedia*, p. 543 (1933).

I have called Dante a Scholastic, and for the purposes of this essay there is no need to define his position further. I am concerned here to show that the romantic interpretation given to some words of his is incompatible with his theory of love and his theory of art; and in both these matters his thought follows the main Scholastic tradition, being in fact Thomist-Aristotelian. For the theory of love the best starting-point is another passage which bears at least some resemblance to the central lines of our text, a passage of verse on which as it happens we have Dante's own commentary in prose. This is the opening line of the famous ode *Love who within my mind holds discourse still*, which Casella sings to Dante on the threshold of Purgatory. Dante calls it a love-song, and it was sung then with a sweetness not to be forgotten; nevertheless its theme is by no means emotional, and the lady praised in it is Philosophy.*

The exposition of this ode occupies the third book of Dante's *Convivio*, which contains much that is relevant to our discussion. In the first place, we are reminded that the Scholastic conception of love is not univocal, but reaches analogically from inanimate things up to and beyond man. All love is some kind of appetite for some kind of good, but there is first "natural" appetite, such as that of the falling stone for the earth's centre, of a plant for the river bank or mountain from which it cannot be transplanted and live; then "sensitive" appetite, such as that of beasts for each other; and finally "intellectual" or "rational" appetite, such as that of man for virtue and truth.† (Sensitive love is in Scholastic terms a "passion"; intellectual love is not, being a simple act of the will.)‡ Dante, who makes more divisions than St. Thomas of the lower forms of love, says that man, embracing all lower natures in himself, "may have, and has indeed, all these loves"; yet the proper love of man is the highest, the love for truth and virtue, for perfect and noble things, and it is of this that he speaks himself in the words *Love who within my mind holds discourse still* (*Conv.* III, 3). Moreover the "mind" in which love speaks is the highest and most godlike part of the soul (III, 2). The nature of this love is further expounded thus. "Love is no other thing than a spiritual union of the soul and the thing loved. . . . This love, that is to say the union of my soul with this gentle lady, in whom abundance of the divine light was shown me, is the discourser of whom I speak, since from him were born continual

* This point is well made by Mr. Sinclair in his note on the incident (*Purg.* II, ll. 106-14).

† St. Thomas, *S.T.* I-II, 26, 1, c.; Dante, *Conv.*, III, 3.

‡ *S.T.* I, 59, 4, ad. 2.

thoughts, gazing on and examining the worth of this lady who had become spiritually one thing with my soul" (III, 2).

The next point to be made is that love in Scholastic theory always presupposes knowledge. Nothing is loved unless it is first known; this is equally the doctrine of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and Dante, and the principle is so important that even in "natural" love the knowledge absent from inanimate things themselves is held to be supplied by the Author of nature. In man, the interaction of love and knowledge is close and continuous. The intellectual prelude to love is described by Dante with technical exactness. "Your apprehensive faculty draws a species from real being, and so unfolds it within you that it makes the mind turn thither; and if, having fully turned, the mind inclines towards it, that inclination is love" (*Purg.* XVIII, 22-26). For though the initial knowledge may be general and confused, some knowledge there must be; when it is followed by love, love itself moves the intellect to acquire more express knowledge, on which again there follows a deeper love. In this connection we may observe how in poems addressed to a living lady, not only by Dante's contemporaries but by his predecessors, there is constant reference to the "knowledge" and "teaching" which belong to her; these, no less than her "gentleness" and "nobility", are things which the lover hopes in some sense to share, though it is commonly said that the fullness of intellectual and moral virtues alike is beyond his reach. This implies that the lady is loved not merely as some beautiful creature, but as a rational being; and her words and gestures, says Dante, are praised as manifestations of reason reflecting the divine light (*Conv.* III, 7). When the object of love is wisdom or philosophy, the relations of love and knowledge become still clearer, as in the passage already quoted, where love inspires thoughts which "gaze on and examine the worth" of the thing loved. And there is a natural theological application of the same principle in the seventh canto of the *Paradiso*, where it is said that the mystery of the Redemption is "buried from the eyes of all whose wit is not yet matured in the flame of love".

We may now proceed to the Scholastic theory of art, whose chief principles are summed up in Aristotle's definition, "Art is a habit of mind, concerned with making, and involving a true course of reasoning".* St. Thomas, in his commentary on the *Ethics*, accepts the translation *Ars est quidam habitus factivus cum vera ratione*,† and constantly returns to one or another part of it in such phrases as *Ars est habitus intellectivæ partis* and *Ars*

* *Eth.* VI, 1140a.

† *In Eth.* VI, lect. 3.

est recta ratio factibilium. In other Thomistic texts we are told that the artist works through a "form" or "word" conceived in the mind, and that art is directed to some particular end and has fixed means of attaining it.* In this theory of art it is clear that emotion has no formal place; whatever emotions the artist may at some time have had, whatever emotions the work of art may cause in others, they are accidental to the nature and purpose of art.† The intellect, on the other hand, is directly concerned, and it is in intellectual terms that Dante speaks of the painter in the lines which Professor Grandgent so strangely misapplies: "The painter of a figure, if he cannot be it, cannot draw it."‡ For this is precisely the common Scholastic formula of knowledge and truth—truth being the conformation of intellect and thing, whereby the knowing mind in its own manner becomes the thing known. What Dante requires of the painter is therefore the most objective possible knowledge of the thing, not a subjective "impression" reaching no further than the sensitive nerve-ends of the patient.

We have seen that in this scheme of things there is no place for love considered as an excitement or an emotion in the artist; there is, however, a place for it as a movement of the will. For according to St. Thomas, "the artist works through a word conceived in his intellect and through the love of his will applied to some thing".§ Joining to this the further principle that "the maker in act is in a manner the work itself",|| we are enabled to make a new synthesis. In the conception of his work, the artist is united by love and knowledge¶ with the abstract form

* Cf. *De veritate*, III, 3, c.; *S.T.* I, 45, 6, c.; II-II, 47, 4, ad 2.

† Obviously emotions felt by the artist or another may be the *theme* of a work of art—the grief of Dido, the anger of Ajax and so forth; but as themes they are essentially *known* in the same way as themes remote from any emotion, such as the laws of astronomy or the nature of free will. Thus it is in a sense true that a work of art proceeds from "recollection in tranquillity" (cf. St. Thomas, *De ver.* XXVII, 7, c., *intentio intelligibilis in anima quiescens*), but emotion is certainly not a prerequisite. Again, the completed work of art may well cause some emotion (for instance, admiration) in the reader or hearer or spectator; but on the Scholastic theory—which for me is also the *true* theory—it is absurd to say with Wordsworth that "the end of poetry is to produce excitement in co-existence with an overbalance of pleasure". Strictly speaking, any particular poem has a particular end; but in so far as a general end is sought for, I imagine that Dante would have agreed with St. Thomas that *poetae est inducere ad aliquod virtuosum per aliquam praecedentem repraesentationem* (*In Post. An.* I, lect. 1).

‡ Ll. 52-3 of the ode *Le dolci rime*.

§ *S.T.* I, 45, 6, c.

|| *In Esth.*, IX, lect. 7.

¶ It is usual to distinguish the union of knowledge and that of love as in a sense internal and external; that is, the knower is regarded as drawing the thing known to himself, the lover as being himself drawn towards the thing loved. But this distinction may be transcended by the general conception of the union of soul and thing, as when St. Thomas speaks together of the presence of the thing known in the knower and of the thing loved in the lover (*S.T.* I, 8, 3, c.; and 49, 3, c.).

of the thing to be set forth; in its execution, he is again united by love and knowledge with the form becoming embodied in its proper material.

At this point we may conveniently turn back to the dialogue with Bonagiunta and reconsider the difficulties of the romantic theory. In the first place, it is clear that the interpretation of love is very much too narrow. For though on particular occasions Dante uses the word in the confined sense of love for a woman, the sense is then determined by context or contrast; the more general the statement in which the word is used, the less likely is it that a narrow sense will be satisfactory. Here we have obviously a quite general statement. Our caution in this matter may be fortified by other passages—both in Dante and elsewhere—where love is spoken of as in some way inspiring speech. One is the first line of the philosophical ode already quoted, *Love who within my mind*. Another is in the *Paradiso*, where St. Thomas says that “sweet love invites” him to expound his doctrine to Dante—but it is very austere doctrine on the wisdom of Solomon (XIII, 36). To these may be added two examples from poets outside Dante’s circle. Francesco da Barberino (1264–1348) opens his *Documenti d’Amore* with the words: “The sovereign virtue of love our lord has kindled my intellect anew”—but this poem is a treatise on social morals. And the historian Dino Compagni (c. 1260–1340), begins in similar words—“Love constrains me”—a moral ode (*Del Pregio*) on the different kinds of honour to be aimed at by different conditions of men.*

In the second place, it has been shown that Dante’s contemporaries and predecessors did not normally make the romantic opposition of love and reason,† but that on the contrary the conception of love was currently associated with that of knowledge. “May that woman perish,” says Dante himself, “who believes in love outside reason’s garden.”‡ Lastly, the Scholastic theory of art, severely intellectual, has been recalled in opposition to the romantic theory with its insistence on feeling and its impatience of rational restraint.

On all these grounds the romantic theory fails badly under the weight of evidence, and there seems to be a final argument against it in the actual work of poets of the new style—the *stilnovisti*, as they have compendiously been called. For as certain Italian scholars have not failed to ask, if the new style represents emotional and subjective lyricism, how is it that among

* Though in the clear context of the seventh stanza he uses “love” in the confined sense.

† Unless for *amor villano*.

‡ End of the ode *Doglia mi reca*.

its most famous products are poems of abstract philosophical thought? What is to be said, for instance, of Cavalcanti's ode *Donna mi prega*, which in its own time and long after was considered one of the noblest examples of the new style? Written in reply to Guido Orlandi's sonnet, *Onde si muove e donde nasce amore?*, the ode treats indeed of the nature of love, but in such precise Scholastic terms* that in the last century critics made merry over its "mediaeval pedantry" and that even now it is usually omitted from Italian anthologies.† It seems then that some other theory is to be sought.

At first sight it might appear that we need look no further than the precisely opposite theory mentioned towards the beginning of this essay—the theory that the new style is essentially intellectual or metaphysical. With this as with the first theory I do not profess to give an exact catalogue of the names, positions and differences of critics. It must be enough to say that some scholars—of whom Vossler, Cesareo and Biondolillo may be taken as roughly representative—consider the love which dictates to be either the philosophic love of the *Convivio* or God himself as "the love which moves the sun and the other stars"; hence the matter and manner of the new school are held to be characteristically intellectual, metaphysical or theological. It is in favour of this theory that it is in accordance with the mediaeval intellectuality which I have been at some pains to emphasize, and that it would not have seemed absurd to Dante himself, from whom one might quote certain doctrine in support—for instance that love is the form of philosophy as the soul of the body (*Conv.* III, 13). Nevertheless I think that this theory likewise fails to give Dante's true meaning. *A priori*, it seems to offer an interpretation of love which, without being too narrow, is yet too specialized. It is not without some help or some preparation that Dante speaks of love and expects us to understand simply the Primal Love.‡ And if the song of philosophy, *Love who within my mind*, is indeed a love-song, so surely are the songs to the human Beatrice, "one of the Christians of the thirteenth century". And *a posteriori*, to quote opposing critics once more, if we read the *stilnovisti* themselves, how many philosophical or metaphysical poems are there to be found? It has been suggested, I think, that apart from Dante (whose doctrinal poems are not included by everyone in the

* E.g. "Love proceeds from a form seen and apprehended which takes its place and dwelling in the possible intellect as in its subject."

† It is not in Levi's *Lirica italiana antica*, *The Oxford Book of Italian Verse*, de Bosis' *Golden Book*, or Govoni's recent *Splendore della poesia italiana*.

‡ There is a passage in Fazio degli Uberti (1326-1360) where the year of our Lord is given with the word Love: *Dico, dal dì che nacque il nostro Amore . . .*

poems which Bonagiunta speaks of) there are really only three such poems in the whole work of the school—Guinizelli's *Al cor gentil*, Orlandi's sonnet to Cavalcanti, and the answering ode *Donna mi prega*. This is something of an overstatement. Without attempting a formal definition (and the terms "intellectual", "philosophical" and "metaphysical" verse have been so much and so loosely used that there would be a great deal of preliminary distinction to be made) I suppose one may say descriptively that verse of the kind meant is intellectual as being not only addressed to the intellect (for so, in the last resort, is any verse whatever), but as being concerned with the processes of the intellect itself and as making them part of its theme; that it uses constantly (whether or not it names them) the distinctions and categories of formal philosophy;* that it seeks ultimate causes; and that in its images it considers rather the natures and functions of things than their appearances and contingent doings and sufferings. If in the light of this we examine the work of the *stilnovisti*, we can certainly find more examples of philosophic verse than the minimum suggested above. Guinizelli's *In quanto la natura* is a poem on the relations of natural powers and acquired knowledge. Cino da Pistoia in several places uses directly philosophical conceptions, for instance in the sonnet *Qual dura sorte* (music of the spheres and the knowing of like by like); in the ode *La somma virtù* (good and evil cannot co-exist in the same subject); in the madrigal *Poichè saziar non posso* (the nature of angelic beatitude). Nevertheless the sum of such things remains comparatively small. With the best will in the world, I cannot see how the odes of Lapo Gianni and Gianni Alfani can be supposed to be "full of philosophic wisdom"†; nor is Frescobaldi any more fruitful of examples. The most one can say of such poets generally is that they had absorbed just enough of the philosophy of their time to avoid the merely ignorant utterances which so often betray romantic poets; and such a conclusion is too negative to commend the theory put forward.

What, then, do I hold to be the true interpretation of Dante's words? I think that he means by love the union of a man with something outside himself, a union of will implying a previous union of knowledge. Man as artist conceives from this union the "intelligible word" which is the form of the thing to be made, and it is his task to embody this form without

* Thus Guinizelli's *Al cor gentil* and Dante's *Amore e' l'cor gentil* both hinge on the distinction of act and potency; neither poet uses the words in his poem, though Dante does in his commentary.

† Ernesto Lamma, in his preface to *Rime di Lapo Gianni e di Gianni Alfani* (1912), p. 7.

alloy in the due material, directing knowledge and will again into union with the thing *in fieri* till the work is finished and the artist withdraws from it. And Dante's message to poets is this: You have all known, and hence loved, something real outside yourselves—the natural world, Monna Vanna or Monna Lagia, the divine wisdom; and you are not content to rest in it but are moved to communicate the good you have. Make your poems then in due order and worthy material from that which you know and love, and do not through vanity or fashion or human respect overlay the true concept with a false.

Such an appeal is primarily for integrity of the poet's mind and will,* but does not exclude some interest in the material—the language and the verse-forms which Dante was much concerned to rescue from ignominy; and the undoubted presence in him of such an interest has perhaps done something to obscure more important principles. This then is my general position; and having stated it, I may now hope to clarify it by considering in rather more detail the text from which this enquiry began.

Bonagiunta greets Dante as the author of the "new verses" which began with the ode from the *Vita Nuova*, *Ladies who have intelligence of love*. In what sense were these verses new?† Here we need say no more than that in this ode Dante revealed for the first time something like his characteristic powers, and that though the "new style" had been heralded in a way by Guinizelli, the sense of newness remained. Dante himself marked off this ode from his earlier poems as treating not of himself but of Beatrice alone (*V.N.* XVIII); he thus showed a desire for "objectivity" in one sense of the word. It is of the same ode that Dante says that his tongue spoke the first line "as if self-moved"—a phrase which has naturally been seized upon by the champions of spontaneity against rules and reason. However, one has only to refer to the context to see that this uttering aloud was both preceded and followed by reasoning. (I do not deny that a poet "possessing the habit of his art" may sometimes come very close to "spontaneity"‡; only it happens that

* Will: that is, the will towards the doing of the work, which is an efficient cause; not the ultimate intention (final cause), concerning which "art does not presuppose a right appetite".

† An old commentator suggests for *nuove* the meaning *mirabili, alte e rare*; this is hardly likely.

‡ "The ultimate liberty of spontaneity is indeed conceivable only as a workless-manifestation in which art and artist are perfected; but what thus lies beyond contingency is no longer 'art' . . . Ascertained rules should be thought of as the vehicle assumed by spontaneity, in so far as spontaneity is possible for us, rather than as any kind of bondage." Coomaraswamy, *The Transformation of Nature in Art* (1934), p. 23.

this was not the case here.) Then follows the central passage of which I have given my explanation; I may add that the phrase "take note" (*nota*) perhaps implies singing from music.* Finally we have the general contrast of new and old schools, and the words on "the sweet new style I hearken now". There are two points here. Why is the new style called sweet? According to many scholars, "sweet" is an almost technical adjective for love-poems in praise of a lady, as distinct from those describing the lover's pains; naturally this interpretation narrows the whole notion of the new style. Granted that the word is often so used, it is obvious that it is also used much more widely; the "sweetness" of a song of philosophy (*Purg.* II, 113-14), the "sweet love" which invites St. Thomas to abstract discourse (*Par.* XIII, 36), the "sweet aspect of fair truth" concerning spots on the moon (*Par.* III, 2-3)—should be enough to combat this notion. I imagine the adjective here to be as general as Milton's "charming" applied to philosophy. And then why does Bonagiunta say that he hears the new style now? I have never seen the point discussed, but I can only suppose that he recognizes the actual words of Dante here as being themselves in the new style—which seems to favour those few interpreters who hold the new style to extend to the *Divine Comedy* itself.†

On the historical contrast of old and new I wish to say little; to those who have not read these poets discussion would be meaningless, and it would be of slight help to those who have. The chief thing to be remembered, I think, is that the contrast is general, and that Dante does not necessarily condemn all the work of the older school, some of which may appear to us to have more of the qualities he commends than certain work of his own followers. To make a rough and somewhat ignoble parallel—our Romantics condemned the falsity of eighteenth-century verse and aimed at a purer, more natural style. It may seem to us that certain hymns of Cowper are better examples of such a style than any nineteenth-century verse; but the Romantics were not thinking of Cowper's hymns—they were thinking of Gray's odes or the most artificial Pope, and we understand their position quite well.

For Dante then there is a clear contrast—if you like, a simplified contrast. On the one hand there are poets like the Notary and Bonagiunta who forsake the real thing shown them for something they think has pleased elsewhere, who are not

* So Federzoni, quoting *Purg.* XXX, 92-3; cf. Lydgate, "O thou minstrel that can so note and pipe".

† This implies some differentiation between Bonagiunta's language and Dante's; there is one such differentiation in the *issa* of l. 55, and perhaps another in the repeated *veggió*.

satisfied with what they know and love but must trick it out with such conceits as the Notary's

Lo viso e son diviso dallo viso,
E per avviso credo ben visare ;
Però diviso viso dallo viso
Ch' altr' è lo viso che lo divisare.

They have sometimes a mixture of styles which in itself is a proof of falsity, like the mixture in Burns of folk speech and fashions from London. On the other hand there are Dante and his friends, holding, so he believes, the same purpose—the representation with complete integrity of things known and loved, and that in a chosen and proved medium, the true Italian of which he is the exponent and chief maker. And their principles hold good over all the range of all poets, so that the lines of Lapo Gianni,

D' amor sorella mi sembr' al parlare
ed ogni su' atterello è meraviglia,

bear their mark no less truly than Dante's loftiest metaphysics.

Once put into words, this canon of integrity seems so simple and elementary that to each generation it looks a commonplace. We smile at the insincerities of the past and imagine that for us at least there can be no slip between cup and lip. "To cleave With pliant arm thy glassy wave"—we are in no danger of writing that; no, but we are in danger of something just as false. We invent our own mythology, our own irrelevant ornaments; we replace the faded imagery of antiquity with an already fading imagery of modernity—politics and machines ousting the economy of Olympus. The dictator says "poor", and the poet takes his pen and writes quickly—"miser", if he is William Morris, "the man on the dole", if he is one of us. Why cling to the plain truth? Are there not Abana and Pharpar, rivers of Damascus?

It was from this last thought, I suppose, that George Herbert began his poem *Jordan*, which is as good an end as any to what I have tried to say:

When first my lines of heav'nly joys made mention,
Such was their lustre, they did so excell,
That I sought out quaint words, and trim invention;
My thoughts began to burnish, sprout, and swell,
Curling with metaphors a plain intention,
Decking the sense, as if it were to sell . . .

As flames do work and winde, when they ascend,
So did I weave my self into the sense.

But while I bustled, I might hear a friend

Whisper, *How wide is all this long pretence?*

There is in love a sweetnesse readie penn'd :

Copie out only that, and save expense.

WALTER SHEWRING.

OLD ENGLISH: A REVALUATION

READING lately some of the homely, sinewy English of St. John Fisher and St. Thomas More, I realized again that it is too disastrously easy to tick off early English prose as "historically interesting" and then skip on to some modern. It is something excellent in *itself*, as art and utterance, and probably we rush ahead in our development at such a pace that we shed many a virtue on the way. But, as Cardinal Newman said, our mental evolution should resemble that of the Church's heritage: "What the Catholic Church once has had, she never has lost. Instead of passing from one stage of life to another, she has carried her youth and middle age along with her, on to her latest time. She has not changed possessions, but accumulated them, and has brought out of her treasure-house, according to the occasion, things new and old." (Newman's own style, with all its flexible modernity, has constant souvenirs of the Latin classics and the Fathers; and that is its complex charm.)

Frequently it is the mental old fogey who rushes into the ultra-new fashion and hopes to be considered young and knowing. On the other hand, the unconventional young sometimes fall in love with an old style, in life or literature, and have the courage to revive some rich antique that refuses to go out of date. A brilliant living young novelist told me, I confess surprisingly, that he got many ideas, chapter headings, and quotations from Chaucer and Skelton; which is one better than quarrying in Shakespeare. And who does not remember the furore for Fitzgerald's *Omar Khayyám* even before the last war?—a taste undoubtedly due to its cunning and conscious air of the antique. Much of the force in Swinburne's and Kipling's verse is owing to borrowed Old Testament idioms and cadences. In the verse of Hardy there is this same deliberate debt to ancient words as well as ancient things. Lytton Strachey revelled in the opulent Caroline prose of Sir Thomas Browne; and so did Gosse, like Lamb and Hazlitt before. Norman Douglas has written finely of Milton's "kingly elaboration", and George Gissing gloried in the stately prose of Hooker.

It is our chief complaint now, against the shallow taste of the age of Pope, that it actually modernized and thereby stripped Chaucer, and regarded Bacon, Taylor, Barrow, and Browne, "writers of the last age", as worthies inferior to the Butlers and Paleys. The older, nobler side of Dryden, for which *we* value him, they considered to be his dross which *they* had refined out of themselves. The next fifty years rejected this neo- or pseudo-

classicism of taste ; and Gray and Collins delved into the Greek, Celtic, Persian, and Scandinavian ; Blake, Burns, and Cowper into Nature. That re-discovery has never quite ceased since. Coleridge, Keats, Lamb, and Hazlitt explored the Elizabethan forest and beyond, and this was like the return of sap to a tree after a chill winter.

Every vigorous age must write in its own way, and all sincere and competent utterance makes for good writing of some sort. Still, in moving away from the better early English, Elizabethan, and Caroline modes, English lost something of cadenced charm and splendour, and it is a choice pleasure often to return to these. Many educated people today feel more at home with certain older minds and styles than with writers of two centuries ago. Take this, of Ben Jonson :

What a deal of cold business doth a man misspend the better part of life in ! scattering compliments, tendering visits, gathering and venting news, following feasts and plays, making a little winter-love in a dark corner.

The emotional overtones there belong to him and his time, yet it is very like what many a writer today attempts, not always successfully, to produce. Or take Sidney's praise of poets in *Arcadia* :

He cometh to you with words set in delightful proportion, and with a tale, forsooth, he cometh to you, with a tale which holdeth children from play, and old men from the chimney corner.

Or Bacon's little dedication :

Loving and beloved brother, I do now like some that have an orchard ill-neighbour'd, that gather their fruit before it is ripe, to prevent stealing. I did ever hold, that there might be as great a vanity in retiring and withdrawing men's conceits from the world, as in obtruding them ; only I misliked now to put them out, because they will be like the late new half pence, which, though the silver were good, yet the pieces were small ; but since they would not stay with their master, but would needs travel abroad, I have preferred them to you that are next myself ; dedicating them, such as they are, to our love : and so commend I you to the preservation of the Divine Majesty.

Shakespeare's prose, though sometimes light as air, can achieve a meditative music :

These late eclipses in sun and moon portend no good to us. Love cools ; friendship falls off, brothers divide ; in cities, mutinies ; in countries, discord ; in palaces, treason ; and the bond cracked between son and father.

This is the excellent foppery of the world, that when we are sick in fortune (often the surfeit of our own behaviour) we make guilty of our

disasters the sun, moon, and stars, as if we were villains by necessity; fools by heavenly compulsion; knaves, thieves and treachers by spherical predominance; drunkards, liars and adulterers by an enforced obedience of planetary influence; and all that we are evil in, by a divine thrusting on.

There we feel a fine inebriation with language; and, though his real triumphs are in poetry, recall the vivid prose of Hamlet's soliloquy:

I have of late (but wherefore I know not) lost all my mirth, foregone all custom of exercises; and indeed it goeth so heavily with my disposition, that this goodly frame, the earth, seems to me a sterile promontory; this most excellent canopy, the air, this brave o'erhanging firmament, this majestical roof fretted with golden fire, why, it appeareth no other thing to me than a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours. What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason, how infinite in faculty! in form and moving, how express and admirable! in action how like an angel; in apprehension, how like a god; the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals! And yet to me, what is this quintessence of dust? man delights me not, no, nor woman neither. . . .

Such glistening prose is little written in modern times, though some of its rapture sounds in Shelley's "Essay on Poetry"—and in Francis Thompson's "Essay on Shelley". Echoes of it are heard in a few pages of Thoreau and Emerson. A modern indeed, Bernard Shaw, feels the attraction of the opulent older diction and structure, cunningly emulating it in *The Dark Lady of the Sonnets*. Scott intermittently did so in *The Fortunes of Nigel*, and Lamb sometimes gives forth the authentic music—there is hardly a grace or an energy of style which he does not exemplify somewhere; and Landor's Imaginary Conversation between Elizabeth and Cecil is rich in these verbal harmonies. It misled Hazlitt, in fact, to overestimate the lesser dramatists in Shakespeare's day, and Keats to place Chapman too high. The best prose of Milton and Jeremy Taylor would go into a few pages; Milton's dross went into his pamphlets, his refined gold into verse. Hooker's stateliness is beyond them, and Sir Thomas Browne is our master of solemn and imaginative tone.

"What English those old fellows wrote!" exclaimed Edward Fitzgerald, meaning the seventeenth-century men, and including Clarendon, Fuller, and Dryden: "I cannot read the Modern Mechanique after them," by which he meant the nineteenth-century formal "review English". As Milton said of himself and a friend, that they knew how to "build the lofty rhyme", so they could build the shapely paragraph and sentence with their dependent clauses and long-breathed rhythms. A worse rule there could hardly be than that sometimes given to aspiring writers, to keep sentences short, to eschew colon and semi-

colon, and to pepper the page with full-stops. The result is an asthmatic speech and often, by a natural consequence, a superficiality of meaning. It requires architecture to build either a chapter or a city; but to throw together a few basic forms of language will produce only a shack-village—or some modern books and certain popular journals, in which we are in such a hurry to finish with a subject that we frequently do not get really *into* it. The more haste, the less true progress; similarly, the more striving for effect, the less genuine or lasting effect.

Should anyone try to rouse enthusiasm in a hurried, business-like contemporary for the masters of English, and point to any of the above names, or to Burke, Landor, Newman, De Quincey, Hazlitt, or Lamb; a minority only—and with difficulty at first—can distinguish that special value called Style. A disconcerting number read *anything* solely for its matter (of fact or of argument) to agree with or to differ from! That is not receptive, educative reading; it is a form of egotism or self-assertion, and some of the world's best books are virtually dead letters to such. It is impertinent to demand only corroboration from an author; that he shall give, and not ask an impressionable mind in return. A Philistine in a responsible literary post, having read *The Confessions of an English Opium Eater*, assured me that he had not got from it many sensational "facts" about drug addicts and their haunts! Another had rushed through *Religio Medici* as he might have done a theological primer, and tritely disapproved of several quaint opinions vented in it. Neither expensively schooled tyro reacted helpfully when one mentioned the beauty of diction, tone, and orchestration. To such undeveloped people a sunset is not a glory on the horizon but something to light the road home, almost as efficient as a bicycle lamp. Yet this is the kind of heart-break which awaits any missionary who hopes to commend the gems of English literature. Astonishing that perhaps the same people who are almost dead to "the glory of words" in prose or poetry are more sensitive to *musical* impressions; and that some who follow the Promenade Concerts, who buy musical scores and play an instrument, are as ignorant as a bird that "the sphere-born harmonious sisters, Voice and Verse" should be wooed and loved together. It is on the *two* wings that the human imagination can mount. The greatest composers have loved noble literature; the greatest writers have loved fine music; for to the sense of beauty, which is really *one* and which raises us above the brutes, the one shades into the other, and both of them into the vision of beauty in nature, ritual, form, movement, and character human and Divine. And where it does not open to all these there is blindness.

I can look a whole day with delight upon a handsome picture [says Sir Thomas Browne, in a passage which is itself like a slow movement of Beethoven]: it is my temper to affect all harmony; and sure there is music even in the beauty and the silent note which Cupid strikes, far sweeter than the sound of an instrument. . . . Even that vulgar tavern-musit, which makes one man merry, another mad, strikes in me a deep fit of devotion and a profound contemplation of the first Composer. There is something in it of divinity more than the ear discovers: it is an hieroglyphical and shadowed lesson of the whole world and creatures of God; such a melody to the ear, as the whole world well understood would afford the understanding. It is a sensible fit of that harmony which intellectually sounds in the ear of God.

Words then not only *can* evoke in us emotions such as music or even devotion do, but sometimes *ought*. Words are not mere tools for utilitarians; they should be promoted out of the worldling's bargain basement sometimes, into a heaven of meaning, beauty, and great association. When Browne says, "We carry with us the wonders we seek without us; there is all Africa and her prodigies in us"; —or when he says, "There is surely a piece of divinity in us, something that was before the elements, and owes no homage unto the sun," he is speaking to an immortal something in us, to the temper of Wonder, of music, of mystery, and reverence. It is that delicate, thrilling other-world note which repeatedly sounds in the sermons and poetry of Newman; it is heard from time to time in Milton (his poetry—not his prose), as when he speaks of this earth:

this new-made world, another heaven
From heaven-gate not far, founded in view
On the clear hyaline, the glassy sea;

or of the way to Heaven:

A broad and ample road, whose dust is gold,
And pavement stars, as stars to thee appear
Seen in the galaxy, that milky way
Which nightly, as a circling zone, thou seest
Powdered with stars.

or of sundown in Eden:

The sun
Declined, was hasting now with prone career
To the ocean isles, and in the ascending scale
Of heaven, the stars that usher evening rose.

These things are moving and perfect, with the pathos or majesty of cadence felt in Virgil, or in the *tone* of a great singer, almost irrespective of the matter of their song. It was part of the profound temporal wisdom of the Church, in fact, to preserve and encourage for centuries the classics because of their

beauty of utterance despite quite staring and obvious paganisms in them. Is not Job wonderful, too, in grasp upon heart and imagination, even where he seems agnostic? The Bible contains scores of dramas which widen and deepen the compass of emotion but are emphatically *not* "edifying" in any deliberate sense. Nevertheless, beauty is their unfailing antiseptic; beauty of tone, beauty of rhythm—in a word, style.

That is the sovereign preservative of the wind- and time-defying fabrics of verse or prose—conscious style, or unconscious, in sacred and inspired writings or in human compositions. Without setting out to do so, how St. Luke achieves the uttermost classic perfection of narrative art in his incomparable early chapters with the unforgettable picture of the annunciation, Birth, visitation, the Magnificat and other songs; well is it called "the most beautiful book in the world". And whoever wrote the epistle to the Hebrews scaled heights of pathos, pleading, and sublimity (partly by force of the unique subject) unknown to Plato or Cicero. Other summits are the letters to the Ephesians and Colossians, notably the early parts; and the "angelic" gospel of St. John.

It will always be a riddle, to the purely literary man (without specialist knowledge of authorship), why "The Wisdom of Solomon" should be relegated to the Apocrypha, or why it is not oftener cited and praised; for its merits of expression are wonderful. It is far freer, more eloquent, and noble altogether than Proverbs or Ecclesiastes, which *are* in the Canon; just as Judith and Maccabees, as a story, equal most things in the Old Testament. For instance, in Æschylus and Dante alone do we feel the breath of awe and fate that touch us in ch. 17 of Wisdom:

For when lawless men supposed that they held a holy nation in their power, they themselves, prisoners of darkness, and bound in the fetters of a long night, close kept beneath their roofs, Lay exiled from the eternal Providence.

Neither did the dark recesses that held them guard them from fears, But sounds rushing down rang around them, and phantoms appeared, cheerless with unsmiling faces, And no force of fire prevailed to give them light:

But only there appeared to them the glimmering of a fire, self-kindled, full of fear; And in terror they deemed the things which they saw to be worse than that sight on which they could not gaze:

And they lay helpless, the sport of magic art: for wickedness, condemned by a witness within, is a coward thing, and, being pressed hard by conscience, always forecasteth the worst lot.

So they, all through the night which was powerless indeed, and which came upon them out of the recesses of powerless Hades, all sleeping the same sleep,

Now were haunted by monstrous apparitions, and now were paralysed by their soul's surrendering, and with one chain of Darkness were they all bound.

Whether there were a whistling wind, or a melodious noise of birds among the spreading branches, or a measured fall of water running violently ;

Or a harsh crashing of rocks hurled down, or the swift course of animals bounding along unseen, or the voice of wild beasts harshly roaring, or an echo rebounding from the hollows of the mountains ; all those things paralysed them with terror.

But the whole world beside was enlightened with clear light,

And was occupied with unhindered works.

And we all know that eve of Christmas quotation from the Wisdom in the Church's Liturgy :

For while peaceful silence enwrapped all things, and night in her own swiftness was in mid course, Thine all-powerful Word leaped from heaven out of the royal throne.

That is Style : the perfect union of vision and expression. And no praise of wisdom, in Plato, Cicero, or Bacon is quite so beautiful as this further passage :

For there is in her a spirit quick and understanding ; holy,

Alone in kind, manifold,

Subtle, freely moving,

Clear in utterance, unpolluted,

Distinct, unharmed,

Loving what is good, keen, unhindered,

Beneficent, loving toward man,

Stedfast, sure, free from care,

All-powerful, all-surveying, and penetrating through all spirits that are quick of understanding, pure, most subtle :

For wisdom is more mobile than any motion :

Yea, she pervadeth and penetrateth all things by reason of her pureness.

For she is a breath of the power of God,

And a clear effluence of the glory of the Almighty,

And an unspotted mirror of the working of God.

And she, being one, hath power to do all things,

And remaining in herself, reneweth all things,

And from generation to generation passing into holy souls,

She maketh men friends of God and prophets,

She reacheth from one end of the world to the other with full strength

And ordereth all things graciously.

It is no accident that Religion elicits these nobler word-harmonies ; for expression always dilates or shrinks according to the nature of the subject-matter ; and nothing so pulls out all the greater stops in the human spiritual organ as what Browne calls the magnalities and altitudes of religion. So much so that quite ordinary men have by religion been made unconsciously stylists. But it is safer, and more rewarding, to look to the triumphs of the Liturgy. Striking, but true, that he who is assisting intelligently at Mass is, inclusively, receiving incom-

parable impressions of grave and lovely prose, whether you read the English or the Latin; from the "Suscipe" at the offering the paten with the Host, and the commemoration for the living, to the perfect prayers following the Agnus Dei. And what a daring beauty invests the warrior-prayer "Holy Michael Archangel". Those which close the Litany of the Saints breathe an air of sober grandeur which is the height of style. Anyone who enters truly into the soul and rhythm of these time-hallowed praises and supplications has been privileged by the deepest revelations of verbal beauty in this world, because they are foretastes of another.

This note has never, we may be thankful to say, quite died out of our prose and verse; poetry indeed is its natural home, but it should never wholly leave what Dryden calls "that other harmony, of prose". Strength and majesty with lucidity characterize the Decrees of the Council of Trent and other great ecclesiastical acts, and a similar copiousness is seen in the Papal Encyclicals, which say a thing (nearly always) more fully and well than their commentators and popularizers can.

Clearness is not everything in writing, though some critics endeavour to make it seem so. Thomas Hobbes is clear, Defoe and Swift are unfailingly clear; but they have not the glory of the word or the sentence. Bunyan, on the other hand, is clear, but adds charm; Cowley and Addison in their best essays are lucid, but then they also achieve a certain quiet meditative music. Dryden is gloriously plain, and it is the least of his attractions, for these include mellow ease, a cordial personal note, and many a lucky phrase struck off in the warmth of feeling. In some ways Burke is our greatest master of expression, and there are long, rolling sentences of his like some weighty judgement delivered by a Chancellor or Chief Justice, yet pregnant with imagination and telling metaphor as well as with meaning. He is one of the few who can make definition inspire and persuade. The prose writings of Coleridge are in general too cloudy, oracular, and profound; but there are "sunny isles of the blest and intelligible" in them, as in his talk. The idiomatic force and originality of Keats's letters come to many as a surprise; and at his best Hazlitt welds into one the charm of the opulent elder days with the appeal of his later time and its excitements.

On many sides noble English is menaced by both the new and the perennial forms of vulgarity; and we can never have too many defenders against these too-easy corruptions. No time, and certainly not the present time, is without its scholarly writers who are jealous of the honour of English and of Letters in general; but there is a great rôle also for the larger body of

readers in holding back the creeping tendencies to degeneration. It is a mistake to think of the public as necessarily "blind mouths" in all cases: they could, if they would, influence current writing and publishing as easily as they influence broadcasting and entertainment.

W. J. BLYTON.

SOME RECENT BOOKS

The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation. Vol. 1
Human Nature. By Reinhold Niebuhr. (Nisbet and Co. 15s.)

SINCE only the first volume of these Gifford lectures is at present available any criticism must be incomplete and to a considerable extent provisional. For in this volume Dr. Niebuhr states the Christian view of man's nature and position as he conceives them to be, but reserves to the second his view of man's restoration in Christ. Inevitably we are left with a sense of depression, even of moral impotence. Through many disguises the author tracks down human sinfulness deeper, ever deeper, until he finds it not to be indeed a factor of his human nature but an infection which has taken hold of his roots. What healing for this deep-rooted infection Christ has brought does not appear. But there are hints that Dr. Niebuhr will not take so consoling a view of it as that taken by the Church. For the theology he expounds is admittedly a version, though a version considerably modified, of the doctrine of man and his sin taught by the Protestant Reformers. And he expresses dissent from what he calls the relative optimism of the Catholic doctrine of sanctification. He plainly does not think that even the Saint can avoid the sinful pride and self-deception which are the universal sins of humanity. The grace of Christ, we gather, does not turn sinners into men so holy that no sin of deliberate malice survives. But this must be a provisional judgement until Dr. Niebuhr has explained himself.

With St. Augustine, whom he admires, the author takes St. Paul's description of man as desirous but unable to be righteous to be true of all men. It was in fact an account of the man as yet unregenerate before he has been buried and was risen with Christ in baptism. The misconception invites serious consequences. But whatever fault we may find with Dr. Niebuhr's view of the remedy, it can hardly be denied

that his account of the disease is masterly. For this, and for his brilliant criticism of the various non-christian views of man which have prevailed in what was once Christendom, this book will assuredly take its place among the outstanding examples of contemporary theological thought.

In the view of man taught by pre-reformation Christianity Dr. Niebuhr detects two strands: a Biblical and an Hellenic. The Biblical view sees man as God's creature, as such good in his entire nature, body and soul, and as such, set in an environment also good, though temporal and contingent. His freedom, however, as a spirit enables him to transcend this natural order and even his own reason; and in this transcendence to enter into communion with his Creator. This transcendence and its freedom by emancipating him in part from his nature and its environment are the source of his creativity. But the source also of sin. For he is tempted to seek an issue from the limitations and contingency of his nature and environment and the anxiety to which they give birth by treating one or both as absolute, that is to say, by deifying his nature, the natural order, or some part of it. This selfish pride is inevitable though not necessary, for every man succumbs more or less to what his conscience condemns as original sin. However, Dr. Niebuhr departs from the orthodoxy either of Catholicism or traditional Protestantism. For he rejects the historical fall of the first man and the solidarity of an original sin incurred by sharing humanity. And by original justice he understands not a lost state of primeval innocence but the knowledge of sin bearing witness to the law of right conduct, the moral demands of human nature.

The Hellenist view of man sees the essential characteristic of man—his distinctive humanity—in reason. Man's transcendence of reason is ignored and the vital life which is below reason, and in particular the body is denounced as evil, the temporary prison of a reason which seeks release to its own higher sphere. Neoplatonism, however, transformed this rationalism into a mysticism by finding the human spirit a power which transcends reason and makes contact with the ultimate Deity. It was in this form that Hellenism was incorporated into Christianity. In the sixteenth century the synthesis was dissolved. The Protestant Reformers isolated the Biblical view of Man. The Renaissance isolated the Hellenism as a mystical Platonism which advanced or retrogressed to rationalism.

The Protestant restoration, on the other hand, was not enduring. It was progressively beaten back before the advance of rationalism and naturalism. Liberal Protestantism indeed has nothing in common with the Protestantism of the Reform. It is a rationalism veneered with Christian sentiment.

In Dr. Niebuhr's view the Catholic synthesis sought in vain to

combine inconsistencies. He does not, however, show how this was so. It would almost seem that in his opinion the Catholic synthesis is false because more and more people refused to accept it. "The Catholic synthesis", he writes, "broke down under the combined pressure of the Renaissance and Reformation". Why? Because the adherents of these movements proved it false or because they claimed to have done so? Dr. Niebuhr admits that the Protestant view, which in the main he accepts, did not last. Therefore on the same showing it has broken down and is untrue. It is, but not on that account. Nor has the Catholic synthesis been abandoned. It remains the teaching of the largest Christian body in the world.

The Hellenist contribution to the Catholic synthesis was not purely rational. It was the mystical philosophy of Neoplatonism tempered but by no means superseded by Aristotelianism. Like so many Protestants, however, Dr. Niebuhr dislikes mysticism. With one exception his charges against mysticism lack foundation. For they are true not of mysticism as such, still less of Christian mysticism, but only of interpretations of mystical experience current outside Christianity. It is indeed true that mystical theology, as Dr. Niebuhr says, regards the Deity with whom it seeks union as undifferentiated. But philosophy must refuse as firmly as mysticism to admit real differences in the Godhead. Thought imperiously demands an ultimate unity as the ground and explanation of multiplicity. Real differences in the Godhead would require explanation by a higher principle. And the positive values of the seemingly differentiated God of the Bible are in fact embraced in the Supreme Unity. This indeed is at least hinted by the Divine Name "I am that I am".

Moreover, the language of negation employed by mystical theology to which Dr. Niebuhr takes exception is negative only in semblance. It denies only the limitations attached to every finite concept.

Christian mysticism has not denied creation nor regarded finite being as evil or except in the comparative sense as illusory. It is good and on its own level of being real. Neither does Christian mysticism, like Indian, identify the human spirit in its inmost and true being with God. Dr. Niebuhr is not entitled to quote Eckhardt as evidence to the contrary. For he was not an orthodox Christian mystic and the Papal guardian of the Catholic synthesis condemned his teaching accordingly.

Nor is the goal of the Christian mystic the abolition of his individual being but that it should become a vessel retaining its substantial distinction of the Divine.

Far from being contradictory Biblical and mystical religion are complementary. The former safeguards the latter from pantheistic misinterpretation, the latter renders explicit the ultimate presuppositions of the former. Here, as so often, Protestantism stands for the im-

poverishing of either and Catholicism for the enriching of both. And since the exclusive affirmation of one aspect of the truth leads sooner or later, usually sooner, to the exclusive affirmation of the aspect of truth denied it is not astonishing that, as Dr. Niebuhr notes with a pained surprise, the exclusive Protestant affirmation of the Hebraic and explicitly Biblical factor—and even this very imperfectly—did not long resist the assault of exclusive Hellenism and its heirs.

Though Dr. Niebuhr has laid bare with such acuteness the root of human sinfulness, namely the proud affirmation of a finite creature as though absolute, complete and Divine, he is not always successful in his attempt to reduce all forms of human sin directly to this final ground. A man may be aware that he is but a unit among millions of similar units and, recognizing this, may not theoretically attribute more value to his own particular unit than to these others. Yet he may argue that the unit which is himself, because it is the sole object of his selfconsciousness is, not indeed in itself, but for him—though for him alone—the most valuable and important being in the world. That is to say he may be selfish without being intellectually proud. He does not ascribe a divine value to himself but merely thinks that for him his personal value, insignificant though it doubtless is, is the supreme value—a poor thing BUT MINE OWN. From the standpoint of truth no doubt this self-assertion involves a self-deifying pride which Dr. Niebuhr is therefore justified in regarding as the radical sin. But it is nothing more than an indirect and unintended implication. As for sensual sins and other sins of the passions their motive may be nothing more profound than an animal appetite or a nervous defect which the sinner thinks he is too weak to resist. Only when the will deliberately endorses these sins of frailty is pride involved.

That is to say, Dr. Niebuhr's analysis, while profoundly true, does not always do justice to more superficial but very real aspects of sin.

Whatever reservations we may have to make in respect of Dr. Niebuhr's positive views, we can endorse wholeheartedly his critique of the views of man put forward by the philosophies and movements of thought which—from the Renaissance onwards—have found wide acceptance in Western Europe and, with increasing frankness as the process of secularization has advanced, have offered themselves as substitutes for the Christian view of him.

Widely differing in other respects, they agree in minimizing man's sinfulness. Human sin is regarded as the outworn inheritance of an evolutionary or historical past fated to disappear. Or it is placed in an animal nature recalcitrant against an impeccable reason. Or it is the result of faulty economic or social conditions. Yet the stature of man is degraded. For he is held to be the product of an unintelligent and

amoral nature which must finally wipe him out of existence. Or the reason which alone in him is spiritual and pure and transcends nature is not after all himself but an impersonal being in which the individual does but participate for a season and which, moreover, is often believed to be embodied most perfectly in a society such as Hegel's Prussian state, an Absolute Value to which the individual must sacrifice all he has and is. Or romanticism may invest with an illusory halo of spirit a life which is in fact biological and as such below the distinctively human level. And the end of the process is the inhuman disorder of today, the disintegration of a radical scepticism, lifeless, faithless and empty of solid value or the organized energeticisms, bestial or mechanical, Fascist or Communist.

The chapters which analyse these solvent forces and trace the process of dissolution are brilliant, a permanent contribution to the history of the decline and fall of Christendom.

E. I. WATKIN.

La Guerre, Cette Revolution. By J. V. Ducatillon, O.P. (Editions de la Maison Française, Inc. New York, N.Y., 1941.)

PÈRE DUCATILLON'S book is full of light. He neither stresses the evils of totalitarianism while forgetting the faults of Western Democracy, nor indulges in a mere catalogue of combined evils while forgetting the good, positive elements from which they are deviations. On the contrary, his purpose is wholly constructive: to find the positive solution to problems which, particularly for Christians, are crucial: for instance, "the apparent failure of Christianity", "the unfulfilled duty of Christians", "the diabolical virtues" of the totalitarian nations, "the Christian virtues gone mad" of the Western Democracies. The fact that Père Ducatillon is one of the few French priests who, because he happened to be in America at the time of the French collapse, is able to speak freely, lends particular significance to his book: those who have any knowledge of the development of Catholic thought in France in recent years realize that his views must express those of innumerable French Catholics who, in "Unoccupied" as well as Occupied France, are now condemned to silence.

Our civilization, he writes, Christian, Western civilization, must be preserved not for all its present trappings, nor even for all its past glories, but for what it can still become: for "the possibilities it offers of a new Christendom". Civilization, being temporal, can die: Christian civilization is no exception. And it will die if the principles of totalitarian paganism should triumph. But it can also live, in a new form: we need not, nor can we, go back to the mediaeval form, which was neither perfect nor final. What we must

learn from history is how the Christian leaven has leavened human hearts and minds and, through them, institutions. History shows that Christendom was built up by a spirit of holiness and active apostolate: not by an anti-this or that spirit. That slavery, for instance, was not abolished by an anti-slavery campaign, but by a practise and a precept of charity infusing into men a new spirit which made them really want a new—just—social order.

Père Ducatillon points out three characteristic features of this Christian order with which our democracies—almost unwittingly—remain impregnated and which, unlike the new paganisms, they have never deliberately repudiated. They are: the primacy of the person over the group; the fundamental equality of all men; human fraternity.

Generally speaking, in pre-Christian—and present-day—paganism, the importance of the person was measured in terms of his or her social function. Woman's social function, for instance, was to bear children: hence the shamefulness of sterility and still more of virginity.

In pre-Christian times even the greatest moralists and philosophers took slavery for granted: inequality between master and slave was not of station but of *nature*.

In pre-Christian times, there were national or territorial groups which were closed to one another, and which regarded all others as radically inferior. For the Greeks, for instance, all non-Greeks were mere "foreigners"—"barbarians". And if the Romans encouraged the conquered peoples to become citizens of the Roman Empire, it was on condition that they entered a certain closed order with its own religious, social and political rules. Hence sacrificing to the Emperor was no mere form but the symbol of a would-be universal, temporal-spiritual—*totalitarian*—dominion.

Christianity, by separating spiritual from temporal, supernatural from natural ("I am from above, you are from below"), freed men from their separation from one another and established the true dignity and autonomy of the natural order. All men without exception, all nations, all rulers even, were called to a supernatural life infinitely transcending all that the most enlightened temporal ruler could offer: and in this common vocation to a common participation in Sonship with Christ, redeemed mankind found its supernatural—and therefore human—fraternity, its spiritual and therefore natural unity.

Therefore the present conflict can no more be described in terms merely of democracy versus dictatorship than in terms merely of oil-wells. It is a conflict between a conception of life which recognizes the Christian ideal and one which scorns it and proclaims the exact contrary. But Christians, as a whole, have not penetrated

behind the façades of political slogans: they have not recognized, for instance, how much of Christian idealism there lies behind the "leftist" slogan of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" nor, on the other hand, the fundamentally anti-Christian character of the parties of reaction and of "order". Catholicism has become a party label, but an idolatrous one, because it claims for itself the respect which is due to God alone. Fifty years ago Charles Péguy wrote, in *Argent*: "*Il faut qu'il y ait une raison pour que, dans le pays de Saint Louis et de Jeanne d'Arc, dans la ville de Sainte Geneviève, quand on se met à parler du christianisme, tout le monde comprenne qu'il s'agit de MacMahon, et quand on se prépare à parler de l'ordre chrétien pour que tout le monde comprenne qu'il s'agit du Seize-Mai.*" Today Père Ducatillon points to something very similar. Christianity, which is neither a social system nor even a system of morals but a living source of supernatural and therefore universal charity, has come to mean for many, Christians and non-Christians alike, a series of moral prohibitions. It is "anti-human". Or—an otherwordly pretext for the exploitation of the poor. And so on. And the amazing thing is that such accusations have called forth from Christians no general and indignant repudiation; that indeed the conduct of Christians has invited such a distortion of the doctrine of the Poor Man. And if the salt lose its savour . . .

Meanwhile another salt has been offered to mankind. Père Ducatillon tells of a German priest who, in June 1939, visited his community in Paris. They talked of the general slackening of morals. And the German priest said: "Fortunately there is one country in the world where this is beginning to change completely, thanks to a providential man who is restoring austerity of life and integrity of morals." That man is Hitler.

Far worse than vice, writes Père Ducatillon, is virtue directed towards a wrong end. There is no question that the Germans today are showing great heroism, self-sacrifice, a sense of community. Such virtues can only be countered by sacrifice, heroism, sense of community at least as great—but directed towards God and one's neighbour, of whatever race or class. And just as virtue at the expense of reason and conscience leads to the destruction of both person and society, so virtue in the service of God perfects both person and society. The two ends are mutually exclusive: victory will lie with those whose ideal calls forth most virtue, that is, strength. Shall we win this war? "That depends largely upon ourselves; and, even if we lose, we shall be more capable of saving what can be saved in our civilization than if we capitulated. . . ."

I understand that an English translation is being prepared; when it appears it should not merely be read, but meditated.

MIRA BENENSON.

N

The Educational Philosophy of National Socialism. By George Frederick Kneller. (Yale University Press. Oxford University Press. 21s. 6d. net.)

"THE challenge of present-day Germany, however mighty the machine that rolls over Europe, is not in its deepest reaches a military one. It is a challenge of beliefs, into which the energies of a sturdy people have gone and the vitality of a whole generation is being poured." "The Third Reich . . . has renewed and reunited, however brutally, the strength and pride of a great people. Its achievements have been written in stone and steel."

These quotations, the one from the opening and the other from the end of Mr. Kneller's book, are some evidence of the author's deep understanding of the German problem and of the tremendous importance of his contribution towards its solution. For it is no small contribution to outline objectively the aims and plan of Nazi education and to point out its far-reaching effects. When hostilities have ceased, we shall have to deal with a nation whose younger men and women have been almost wholly educated on the lines indicated here, and, even if we have to be severe, we must still make some effort to understand the people who are the objects of our severity.

The purpose and place of education in the Third Reich are easily understood. Education is simply a part of the whole training of the people to be worthy members of the racial State, and therefore it is necessary to understand the philosophy of National Socialism and the roots of the present crisis.

Mr. Kneller, while showing that there is far less National Socialism in Fichte, Herder, Nietzsche and Treitschke than is generally claimed today, certainly makes the Germans' acceptance of Hitler more easy to understand. As Irene Marinoff has pointed out, there was far too much training of the intellect to the exclusion of other faculties in Liberal Germany. Youth especially was discontented with rationalism and looked for action; it "was ready to cast aside inherited doctrines as useless and old-fashioned, and accept an order full of vigour and optimism". And all Germans, young or old, living in a country without clearly defined natural frontiers and only lately and insecurely united as a nation, were ready to welcome a movement which would finally establish unity and give them a sense of security and self-sufficiency. National Socialism promised this and achieved it in no small degree; that is why even opponents of the regime and of the methods by which it was established in power are still ready to fight to the bitter end to maintain what they have gained from it. Its leaders have been diabolically clever in taking over the ideals of the earlier youth movements, assuming credit to themselves for the achievements of these and winning over the young by the same methods; the result is to establish National Socialism firmly in the

hearts of the present generation but to rob youth of all power to create a new world when Hitler and his associates are dead. "One is forced to the alarming realization that if National Socialism continues to be the sole force not only in physical but in all national development, youth will perhaps never again be allowed out of its own unfettered urges to formulate new reforms for a new generation, such as those brought about previous to 1933."

Coming to the actual details of the educational plan, the author very wisely takes *Mein Kampf* as his main source. "Education's chief purpose is to mould the nation in accordance with the pattern set by the State" and since, according to Hitler, the State is a means for the preservation and promotion of the welfare of the race, education must serve the same purpose. This philosophy is not without a certain grandeur, and there is an awful resemblance to the Christian teaching about the highest freedom consisting in perfect obedience to God's will in Hitler's claim that the further development of the nation's intellectual and ideal capacities leads to the highest freedom; it does not, however, seem correct to translate "*böchste Freiheit*" precisely as "the highest freedom of the individual".

Education in the fullest sense of the word means the training of the whole man, body and soul; and this implies, as all agree, character training as well as bodily formation and intellectual instruction. Because the last aspect was over-emphasized before 1933, Hitler naturally laid more stress on the other two and had considerable success in doing so. But, because of his racial theory, he goes to the opposite extreme and attaches the greatest importance of all to the cultivation of the purely physical side of man. He is simple and frank on this subject. First comes the building up of healthy bodies; only after that, *erst in zweiter Linie*, the development of the spiritual powers; and here again the formation of character, will-power and sense of responsibility is most important; last of all, *erst als letztes*, intellectual instruction.

The body is most important because only healthy men and women can beget healthy children who will maintain the power and dignity of the German people. Nevertheless place must be made for training the will and educating an elite for the acceptance of responsibility in the State; otherwise the masses would fail to do their duty to the race on account of lack of leadership. Finally, intellectual training, though least important, is still necessary. Naturally this includes the imparting of the principles of the National Socialist *Weltanschauung*, the teaching of history so as to bring out the achievements of the great Germans of the past, and biology; it is more surprising to find Latin and English also in an important place in the curriculum; but these are taught for their practical advantages, the former because it is an instrument of precise thought and mental discipline, the latter

because of its value in economic and business life. In other words the whole course of instruction is directed to the general end of the State, the maintenance of a strong and racially pure "Aryan" German stock.

With characteristic thoroughness the teacher is also trained to esteem racial values and to be fully capable of building up healthy Germans, with resolute characters and a sufficiency of intellectual powers.

The only question that remains is, how far have these principles of education been carried out in practice? Here the author shows a certain optimism which, one fears, may not be entirely justified. It is true, as he says, that "it would be difficult to find a leading German educator who would, in the long run, devote more time and energy to physical training than to other phases", and that the conservatism of teachers and the material difficulty of providing text-books delayed some of the more radical changes. Nevertheless education has already undergone a great transformation and the process has been carried through with all the speed and ruthlessness that we have learned from bitter experience to associate with the Nazi machine.

Through the upheaval of war, we all have a limited experience of the Germans of the younger generation, but this book will help us to no small degree to know how they have been formed and to estimate the enormity of the problem that must face us when we try to re-educate them to be worthy partners in our Western civilization.

EDWARD QUINN.

The Republic of Plato. Translated with Introduction and Notes by F. M. Cornford. (Clarendon Press: Humphrey Milford. 7s. 6d.)

THIS is not only a good translation, it is the first English translation of the *Republic* to unite accuracy of linguistic scholarship, intimacy with Plato's thought, and a real sense of English idiom. Previous attempts have been rather conspicuously deficient in one or another respect, and Jowett's, which has long been the most used, is the least satisfactory of any. Professor Cornford breaks clean away from a bad convention, and the general effect of almost any page of his book will give Greekless readers a confidence which classical scholars can justify in detail.

"And now what of the corresponding individual? How does he come into being, and what is he like?"

"I imagine, said Adeimantus, his desire to excel, so far as that goes, would make him rather like Glaucon.

"Perhaps, said I; but in other ways the likeness fails. He must be more self-willed than Glaucon and rather uncultivated, though fond of music; one who will listen readily, but is no speaker. Not having a

properly educated man's consciousness of superiority to slaves, he will treat them harshly; though he will be civil to free men, and very obedient to those in authority. Ambitious for office, he will base his claims, not on any gifts of speech, but on his exploits in war and the soldierly qualities he has acquired through his devotion to athletics and hunting. In his youth he will despise money, but the older he grows the more he will care for it, because of the touch of avarice in his nature; and besides, his character is not thoroughly sound, for lack of the only safeguard that can preserve it throughout life, a thoughtful and cultivated mind."

That passage from the eighth book is a good illustration of Professor Cornford's technique. It reads naturally and consecutively—anyone must feel at once that the translator has a clear view of the sequence of thought, the contrasts and correspondences of the original. Some conventional tags of dialogue-form are deliberately omitted ("In the following points"—"What points?"), and the connection and placing of phrases is everywhere more free than has been customary; yet the result is not only more agreeable to read, it is time after time more precise than for instance Davies and Vaughan's rendering, which in spite of genuine scholarship and great conscientiousness makes continual slight misrepresentations of the thought.

It would be rash to call this translation final. There are qualities in Plato's writing which could only be represented in English by one who had powers and sensibilities of style of a quite unusual order—who could reproduce the aristocratic ease of Walpole's letters, the illusion of exquisite conversation in George Moore at his last period, the conscious rhythms of Walter Pater. It is no insult to Professor Cornford to say that his gifts do not reach so far—but meanwhile we lose something which is very characteristic of Plato, something which haunts us in the Greek of the passage on Glaucus the sea-god but in the English has merely vanished. Again, in the notes which so usefully preface each section of the book, there are some points of interpretation which might be disputed still (for example the question of Plato and the arts). But one can quite frankly say that no living scholar is likely to better this achievement, that for an indefinite time it should be our standard version, and that apart from its obvious services to the reading public it has much in it that professional scholars may learn from and ought to imitate.

WALTER SHEWRING.

The High Church Tradition. A Study in the Liturgical Thought of the Seventeenth Century. By G. W. O. Addleshaw, M.A., B.D. (Faber & Faber. 7s. 6d. net.)

THE Vice Principal of St. Chad's College, Durham, has given us a book which is at once stimulating and erudite. Throughout it mani-

feasts a reverence and a deep concern for the liturgical traditions of the Church of England. The combination of detailed liturgical knowledge with a close familiarity with the seventeenth-century Anglican historical background has its own value. Such references as those to the arrangement of the reading pew and pulpit in Leighton Bromswold church and in Bishop Cosin's chapel at Auckland Castle throw a light on the high Anglican outlook of the years before the coming of the Civil Wars. The description of the credence table provided for Chipping Warden church in 1627 and of the ceremonial used at the consecration of Abbey Dore church on Palm Sunday, 1634, suggest with careful accuracy the Anglican climate of that time. A quotation will serve to indicate Mr. Addleshaw's lucid style and the easy balanced learning of his approach. "The school," he writes, in considering that high Anglicanism of which both Bishop Cosin and his son-in-law Dean Granville were examples, "paid great attention to the altar, bowing to it when they came into church and when they went up to make their communion. In the bare churches of the period the altar held the central place; and at the Eucharist the eye would have been naturally carried towards it. It was covered with what the age called a carpet, a covering usually of blue or crimson velvet falling in folds at the corners and embroidered on the front with the sacred monogram. On the altar were two candlesticks, in the centre an alms basin embossed with a scene from the gospels, with the usual magnificently bound Bible and Prayer Book on each side. Arranged in front were the flagons, the sacred vessels and a cushion for the altar book. In the churches which could afford it gold plate was alone considered worthy for the celebration of the Eucharist." One can see the whole picture, what more is to be said?

The author is particularly clear on the place of Bishops Andrewes and Beveridge. He shows a certain lack of sympathy for the Puritan thesis. The chapters on "Edification" and on "Order" are alike excellent. At times Mr. Addleshaw touches on that most interesting subject, the degree of familiarity which the Anglican divines possessed with the works of Catholics of the Tridentine period. A study of this question, which has never yet been made, would have great value.

The High Church Tradition is indispensable to all those who are interested in Anglican worship and in the way of life and the traditional thought of the Church of England. A study of the Non-Jurors, written from the same angle and in the same spirit as this book, would be an interesting and attractive contribution. The author shows a general sympathy with forms of worship in the Catholic Church, but his occasional comments on this subject lack the sureness of touch and that carefully thought-out scholarship which he always brings to bear upon the Anglican tradition. The

book is well-produced, but the references to authorities are placed in an irritating fashion within the body of the text. There are very few misprints. By a slip Basil Woodd is referred to on p. 22 as Basil Wood. All students of the seventeenth century will be grateful for Mr. Addleshaw's distinguished work.

DAVID MATHEW.

The Reformation in England. Edward VI. By Abbé G. Constant. (Sheed & Ward. 16s.)

M. CONSTANT's first volume on the English Reformation, which caused a sensation among Catholics and led to some lively controversy in 1934, has had the distinction of being recommended for study in the Historical School at Oxford. The present volume is an even better book, and will receive a more pacific welcome, as the ghost of Professor Pollard does not walk in it so frequently. The Abbé's rare erudition is visible on every page, but is so controlled as to present a balanced and absorbing story. He does not lose himself in his numberless references, and is human enough, for all his scholarly detachment, to pause to suggest a likely origin of the saying, "Robbing Peter to pay Paul", an adage unaccountably omitted from the new *Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*. With a masterly handling of documents M. Constant traces the stages whereby the schismatic Church of Henry VIII was transformed into the heretical Church of Edward VI. Under Protector Somerset the process was very gradual, for that tolerant and liberal-minded usurper disliked sudden and drastic changes. Somerset comes very well indeed out of M. Constant's detailed and most interesting scrutiny of his career. Indeed, his brief reign seems like a little golden age of liberty between two epochs of Tudor despotism: "Protestants and Catholics could live at peace. . . . Under Somerset, rack and thumbscrew remained idle, the fires of Smithfield were extinct, the executioner's halter or axe was not once used for a religious crime. . . . Somerset, anticipating the future, tried to effect reforms and introduce liberties which would later be England's boast." The Protestants, however—that is to say the radicals of the new Establishment—did not choose to live in peace. Profiting by their new freedom and by the personal bent of the Protector to their doctrines, they started a vigorous and violent agitation against the Henrician settlement. Somerset, who deprecated such methods, restrained their ardour by a series of ordinances designed to put a brake on revolution. As M. Constant well says, he "does not so much impose the Reformation as insinuate it slowly and without violent shocks". Perhaps this method, peculiar to himself, was more deadly to the ancient faith than any despotic imposition of a new order. What he achieved was to give a definitely

Lutheran stamp to the official doctrines and practices of the Church of England. The new *Order of the Communion* (1548) showed by its very name, apart from its plainly Lutheran derivation, that the intention of the English reformers was ultimately to destroy the Catholic Mass, but while Somerset remained in power Mass continued to be said in Latin, despite a powerful and virulent campaign against it, organized by Ridley, Hooper, Latimer and other Zwinglians. Even when the first Book of Common Prayer superseded the *Order* in June, 1549, the English Church continued to echo in many respects the beliefs and practices of the Church universal. This is all the more creditable to Somerset, because he was being pressed continually by Calvin to put down both Catholics and Lutherans with the sword. After the Protector's fall, Calvin had his way in England, not because the country's new master, the abominable Warwick, cared two pins for the doctrines of Geneva, but because he was ready to back any doctrine, by any means, even the most violent, which might be trusted to sever England effectively from its Catholic past, and so make the family of John Dudley safe in its looted titles and possessions. It was now that all the altars of England were overthrown. *Aræ factæ sunt baræ*—turned into pigsties, as one observer lamented. In three years under Warwick, or Northumberland, as he soon chose to dignify himself, England witnessed more religious changes than in the twenty years since Wolsey's fall. Of all these M. Constant is the calm, lucid historian. The second Book of Common Prayer (October, 1552) showed plainly that the wild men had prevailed, that Cranmer himself, so addicted to compromise, had been outmanœuvred, that the Church of England, which began by renouncing the Pope of Rome, had now ended by capitulating to the Pope of Geneva. M. Constant's book, which so admirably describes the successive acts of the tragedy, is a credit to Catholic scholarship and a real addition to the vast literature of the English Reformation. It has one glaring flaw, which might so easily have been remedied. It is without an index.

J. BRODRICK, S.J.

The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard. By Étienne Gilson. Translated by A. H. C. Downes. (Sheed & Ward. 10s. 6d. net.)

SUFFICIENT account, perhaps, has not been taken of St. Bernard's education at Châtillon-sur-Seine by the Canons Secular of St. Vorles. Châtillon, and not Fontaines-lès-Dijon, was the original rock from which his family was hewn. Tescelin, his father, was *indigena Castellionis* and Fontaines was but his *minus castrum*.* We might then

* Gaufr. *Fragm. Cod. Aureaeval.* 2.

suppose him to have taken some pride in the *Collegium Clericorum* of his ancestral home, the great school which Bruno de Rouci, Bishop of Langres, had endowed there some hundred years ago, the fame of which as *nobilium pater instructorque virorum*—to cite William of Armorica—would endure for another century after St. Bernard's early days.* We know how thorough was the education in the Latin Classics which he received there and how apt a pupil he proved himself to be. We know what traces of a certain familiarity with Greek language and literature may be found in his writings. Nor would we miss the implication of his question, asked in maturer years: *Quid ergo docuerunt vel docent nos Apostoli sancti? . . . non Platonem legere, non Aristotelis versutias inversare.*† Philosophy was no end in itself, but a means to the end of knowing God and thereby possessing the life eternal.‡

And thus into the knowledge of God, into the life which is life indeed, the mystical life, would in his case have entered as constructive intellectual elements, as interpretative mental *formulas*, what he had acquired in those impressionable days of adolescence. Inevitably it would have had its part in providing a sure dogmatic basis and a clear systematic framework for his mysticism. Anything like loose thinking, trained as his mind had been, could never have been possible for him. He had a fine contempt for and a pious horror of the *rationculae* of men just because of his *ex animo* acceptance of the *ratio* of the faith and of his profound reverence for the Eternal Reason of which it is the expression in terms intelligible to the human understanding.§ For him the thin dialectic of the schools was worse than vapid; it was blasphemous.

The contention which is the leading thought of this entrancing and exhaustive book is that the Cistercian mysticism derived from St. Bernard was essentially scientific, as against the view maintained by the Abbé P. Pourrat that it had "*aucun caractère scientifique*", but was purely empirical and as such founded solely upon his own experience and upon that of monks whose confidences he had received; in fact that it was "*vierge*".|| With this contention of M. Étienne Gilson we cannot fail to find ourselves in agreement. St. Bernard was educated at a school which taught its pupils a great deal more philosophy than is taught to the sixth form public school boy of today. What he learned of theology would have been presented to him as scientific, as the rudiments of the Queen of Sciences. It is true that he did not afterwards proceed to any university; but this *was* contemplated and failed to take effect only because of the memory of his mother's purpose for him.¶ We trace no reaction, however, which

* Cf. Brial, *Recueil des Hist. des Gaules et de la France*, XVII, 130.

† *In Fest. SS. App. Petri et Paul.* Sermon I, 3.

‡ *Vita Prima*, I, i, 3.

§ Ep. 189.

|| *La Spiritualité Chrétienne*, II, p. 98. Ed. Paris, 1924.

¶ *Gaufr. Fragn. Cod. Aureacall.* 12; *Vita Prima*, I, iii, 9.

eradicated what intellectually he had acquired as a schoolboy. His doctrine, as we know it in his works, was articulated and schematic; its very paronomasia in its facility reveals no less, and there are few of his known writings which in the mellifluous flow of their language do not indicate a controlled and disciplined mentality. Such a treatise, say, as the *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* addressed to William of St. Thierry, a friend with whom he was in most intimate mystical sympathy, simply proclaims itself from beginning to end as a masterpiece in psychological analysis. As elsewhere stated (*St. Bernard of Clairvaux*, XVI), the present writer once commended this treatise to a learned scientist, a Fellow of the Royal Society, the resultant verdict being that the reader had never known before what free will meant.

Having said our respectful, but quite emphatic, "Yea, verily," to M. Gilson's main contention, we turn to a more general survey of the book. Anything from the author's pen must always command our careful consideration. Behind the pen there is the echo of a prophetic voice which we long to hear. It is the message of a clear and honest mind. One missed one of the great opportunities of one's life when one failed to sit at his feet at Aberystwyth in 1933. Yet, however we may regret the *facie ad faciem*, we have here his inspiring teaching in a form in which we can fruitfully ponder it, in the atmosphere proper to its assimilation; like out-and-out gardening, the best work of this kind a man does upon his knees. And at the outset it is right to thank the translator and the publishers for bringing M. Gilson's doctrine so loyally and so scrupulously within the reach of English readers. There are no *lacunae*; notes, appendices, bibliography, indices, they are all there—although one may regret that the notes are no longer footnotes, as in the original French. Any lover of St. Bernard will love not only M. Gilson for the original work, but them too for the channel through which it arrives at him. *Dicitur certe vulgari quodam proverbio!** But it is a great honour to be loved for St. Bernard's sake.

"On the sombre background of the Cistercian mysticism" M. Gilson finds projected the very real *renaissance*, philosophical, political, cultural, artistic and other of the twelfth century. But this mysticism did more than represent itself. It had its kindred energy in the Carthusian Guigo I—perhaps its origin, if we think of it as a product of the twelfth century—in the black monk, William of St. Thierry, in the Victorines, Hugh and Richard, writers a list of many of whose appropriate works, as well as of those of certain of their immediate successors, such as Aelred of Rievaulx and Gilbert of Hoyland, is provided for our information. The influence of Cicero upon the Cistercian writers is restricted to that of a master of style, and full credit is given to his excellent success as such, especially in the case

* S. Bern., *In Fest. S. Mich. Serm.* I, 3.

of St. Bernard—although he never deprived the *Doctor Mellifluus* of that unique pungency, difficult to associate with honey, which was no less than a part of himself. Yet, as we have suggested, is it not possible that more than style belonged to the legacy bequeathed to St. Bernard by Cicero? M. Gilson discusses this question very fully, indicating, amongst others, what we may regard as the salient point of contact between the great Latin orator and the Christian mystic in their doctrine of love, namely *unitas spiritus*, and quoting aptly the words of the *De Amicitia* (XXV): "*Nam cum amicitiae vis sit in eo, ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus . . .*" While such a sentiment from such a source could never in St. Bernard's case have been more than confirmatory, it was not in him to ignore the testimony of a *gentilis* as such, as we know from his *In sancto quid facit aurum?* cited from Persius* in the Apology to William of St. Thierry (XII, 28) and from his other citation of the same writer noted later.

M. Gilson, with Dom Ursmer Berlière,† recognizes the Rule of St. Benedict as the fount of that *renaissance* of ascetic life which marked the early days of Cîteaux. How far is this true of the mystical life? A reference to the LXXIIIrd, the last, Chapter gives us the answer, if we have but the gift to understand St. Benedict's words. It is the study of the *Collationes*, *Instituta* and *Vitae* of the Fathers of the Desert which leads in the end to the *perfectio conversationis*, to the *majora*, to the *culmina*. This is St. Benedict's final word, and the first Cistercians made obedience to it more possible by their *coenobia in deserto*. The impression made upon St. Bernard by St. Antony and the monks of Egypt is quite evident.‡ And the Carthusian ideal had its essential eremitic element.

The treatment of the Johannine love is adequate to display its influence upon St. Bernard, in particular in his book *De Diligendo Deo*; and this leads to the subject of *ecstasis*. M. Gilson raises the question as to whether St. Bernard had ever read the works of the Pseudo-Dionysius. He notes that the word *theophany*, characteristic of this writer, is absent from his vocabulary, whereas the word *excessus*, probably adopted from Maximus the Confessor, is his more usual term for ecstasy. And it is not improbable that St. Bernard was familiar with the word as used in this sense in the Vulgate with the qualification of *mentis*, e.g. Ps. xxx, 23, lxvii, 28; Acts, x, 10, xi, 5. The implied state is vividly described in the *De Diligendo Deo* (X. ad init.) by such phrases as *Divino debriatus amore, vas perditum, § totus pergat in Deum, adhaerens Deo*, and finds its climax in the *raptus* becoming *unus cum Eo spiritus—raro licet raptimque*, as he tells us in the *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* (v. 15). The Chapter on the *Regio Dissimilitudinis*, with its frequent reference to the *De Diligendo Deo* and the *De Gratia et Libero*

* *Sat.* II, 68. *seq.*

† *L'Ascèse Benoîtine*, p. 92.

‡ Cf. *Apol.* IX, 19 and 21; *Ep.* I, 11.

§ Cf. *Ps.* xxx, 13.

Arbitrio, admirably illustrates St. Bernard's clarity of thought both psychological and theological; for instance, the distinction between *necessitas* and its "urges" (*urget*) and *cupiditas* and its "lures" (*trahit*) is well set forth,* and the development of *liberum arbitrium*, *liberum consilium* and *liberum complacitum* and their relation to the Divine Image—which the Divine Word alone is, but in which man was made—are clearly expressed. This *liberum complacitum*, Mary's part, indisputably the best part, can in the present life be enjoyed only by contemplatives, and by them but *ex parte, ex parte satis modica, viceque rarissima*—hence the attraction of Cîteaux.† It is well remarked that for the Cistercians, loyal to St. Benedict, the monastery was a *Dominici schola servitii*;‡ the term *schola* is adopted in the *Exordium Magnum*,§ when speaking of them as *schola primitivæ Ecclesiæ*; the *schola*, however, was not a scholastic monastery, but a monastic school; profane literature did not invade the *coenobium*, the coenobite's purpose was *scire vivere*, that is to say, to know God;|| if he was endowed with a mind trained in philosophy it was in the mould of such a mind that his *scire vivere*, even in its highest form of *excessus*, was possessed by himself and expressed to his fellows; it was, for him, the purpose of knowledge to edify, which purpose is either *caritas*, if others are his object, or *prudencia* if his object be himself. And St. Bernard does not hesitate to invoke the testimony of a *gentilis*: *Scire tuum nihil est, nisi et scire hoc sciat alter*¶—to the *turpis vanitas* of much of the misdirected knowledge of his day** M. Gilson dwells upon the *Terram intueri ut cognoscas te ipsum* of the *De Gradibus Humilitatis*†† as the first step to be taken in arriving at *caritas*, whatever be its stage. Even the unbeliever is inexcusable for not loving God if he knows, as he should know, himself; the very *lex naturalis* rebukes him for the infringement of an *innata et non ignota rationi justitia*.‡‡

St. Bernard's preference for the love which is directed towards the Divine Word as He is *justitia, veritas, sapientia* and the like to that which *Christo passo pie compatitur*, is carefully noted.§§ The former, certainly, should be the fitting climax of the latter; the *præsentia* will prove to be what the *memoria* has made it worthy to be.

The last four chapters (XII-XV) of the *De Diligendo Deo* practically reproduce St. Bernard's Epistle XI (*ad Cartusianos*); they distinguish the *lex timoris*, the *lex cupiditatis* and the *lex caritatis*. M. Gilson discusses the view that *caritas*, while giving "its proper direction" to *cupiditas*, yet "will maintain its force", a view professedly founded upon the doctrine of the above-mentioned epistle, which treats of the

* Cf. *Serm. in Psal. Qui habitat*, XI, 3.

† *Reg. S.P.B. Prol. ad fin.*

‡ Cf. *In Fest. SS. App. Petri et Paul.*

** *In Cant. Cant. Serm. XXXVI*, 3.

†† *De Dilig. Deo*, II *ad fin.*

† *De Grat. et Lib. Arb.* V, 13.

§ *Dist.* I, 2.

¶ *Serm.* I, 3.

¶ *Pers. Sat.* I, v, 27.

†† II, 10, 1.

§§ *In Cant. Cant. Serm.* XX, 4-8.

four degrees of love. Here we read that in the highest of these *ne seipsum diligit homo nisi propter Deum*. This view he meets by insisting upon such truths as that God Himself is love, that the *quo modo* of loving Him is *sine modo*, that the union with God which is effected through love is something little short of the Beatific Vision, a state in which the soul, *oblitus sui et a se penitus velut deficiens, totus perget in Deum, et deinceps adhaerens Ei unus cum Eo spiritus erit*. Surely *cupiditas*, belonging, as we know it, to the *carnale*, has at least lost the force which is proper to itself, in so far as the soul is one spirit with God.

M. Gilson distinguishes the Rectification of Reason by the Word and of the Will by the Holy Spirit as stages in the passage to mystic union, and proceeds to treat of the conditions of this state. He wisely recognizes, as we understand, no implication of any difference between the conditions described as *raptus*, *excessus*, *unitas votiva*,* *sancti connubii contractus*, *complexus plane*; † these terms do but connote some of the various attributes of one and the same subject.

And this subject may not unfittingly be regarded as a *unitas spiritus*. M. Gilson is careful to show that there is in such a unity no suggestion of Pantheism. Essentially founded, as it is, upon the divine gift of *caritas*, it is confirmed by the possession of the same; and this *caritas* is the *lex Dei immaculata*. But in the Giver it is *substantiva*, in the recipient it is *accidentalis*.‡ The term *deificare* is discussed. It is no more than a translation of the word *θεοποίησιν*, used by St. Athanasius in the sense of "to make partaker of the divine nature". By other Greek Fathers it is used to express the result of mystic contemplation.§ It is noticed that *ecstasis* is a rare word with St. Bernard. In the Sermons *In Cantica Canticum*|| he speaks of the state which it denotes as negatively *abductio sensuum* and positively *illuminatio sensus interioris*; in the latter case only does M. Gilson seem to regard the *ecstasis* as complete, being "then identical with the *excessus mentis*"; certainly in St. Bernard's view the soul *non modo cupiditatibus, sed et similitudinibus exuit*.

The passage in this book¶ which deals with the distinction of Cistercian mysticism from that of Fénelon and the Quietists, and even from that of St. Francis de Sales, is of great interest. Space prohibits anything like complete analysis of it. Perhaps it may be summarized in the doctrine that *amor purus*, *amor castus*, i.e. disinterested love, "is essentially a mystical experience", that any rational calculation is entirely excluded from it in so far as it is *purus* or *castus*; that it is in this life neither permanent—but momentary—nor perfect—but incomplete. We might add that the very terms in which St. Bernard

* *De Consid.* V, viii, 18.

‡ *De Dilig. Deo*, XII *ad fin.*

§ Cf. Dom Cuthbert Butler, *Western Mysticism*, pp. 158 *seqq.*

|| *LII.* 3, *seqq.*

† *In Cant. Cant. Serm.* LXXXIII, 3.

¶ Pp. 146 *seqq.*

describes God as *mentes . . . dilatans ad capiendum** sufficiently indicate the limitations from which it is impossible to escape.

The book concludes with five most helpful appendices on *Curiositas*, the always interesting Abélard, the almost repulsive Berengarius of Poitiers, Courtly Love and William of Saint Thierry; the last but one being a devastating criticism, seasonable enough in these days, of what is "at the antipodes of Cistercian love".

WATKIN WILLIAMS.

Essays in Criticism and Research. By Geoffrey Tillotson. (Cambridge University Press. 15s.)

MR. TILLOTSON has written a humbling book. It is not every critic who can show his readers, in the first few pages, that they have completely misread one of Shakespeare's most famous phrases, because they have misunderstood one word. I will not quote the correction; let everyone refer as soon as possible to Mr. Tillotson. He continues that kind of instruction, though fortunately not always with such shattering effect, throughout his valuable book, following his own epigram that "the face of literature is also its spirit". This—truer perhaps than we understand about many things—is peculiarly true of the arts. We are always, in literature, running away from the actual words. Dante should have instructed us—"sicuri appresso le parole sante"; it was in the security of the sacred words that he entered Dis.

Mr. Tillotson's particular attention is to instruct us in the value the words had for the writer who used them; he is practising on any poem, as we have it, "a historical and critical clairvoyance". "The organism which functions after the witchdoctoring of the historical critic will be a strange organism, but its functioning will show that it is alive, and its strangeness that its life is not a reflection of our own." He gives, in his long and fascinating preface, examples of the way in which we impose our present contemporary life on words. I may add, from experience, that nothing is more maddening in using a word for verse than to be aware that most readers will laugh; and yet not to use it, because of that critically senile laughter, is as impure and cowardly as the laughter. I should not now dare, like Shelley, "some calm and blooming cove": why? because I am afraid of the giggle of the gutter—the intellectual gutter against which most of our cultured homes are built. To recover purity is a difficult business.

The essays are on various subjects—one on Henryson; five on Elizabethan, and eight on eighteenth-century subjects; four on nineteenth-century; four more general. His careful attention to

* *De Consid.* V, xi, 24.

words does not make Mr. Tillotson niggling or pedantic; he is simply learned and accurate. He sees, for example, the element of pity, even of compassion, in Pope. "No other poet has put or answered the question how to live with tenderer concern and more pointed wisdom." Everyone remembers the sharp destructiveness; who the lonely courage? who the understanding of

One would not, sure, be frightful when one's dead;
So, Betty, give this cheek a little red?

Many, probably; but it is good to have it stressed again. So with what are called reminiscences but what might better be called sympathies; recollections, deliberate or undeliberate, in one poet of another. This has been much overdone in school-books; we are sickened by it before we are nourished, but we ought to be nourished. "Even his (Collins's) red-armed vengeance seems a more serious figure when we find whose arms were red before hers"—in Milton, Dryden, Pope. A poet must give his proofs before he can claim that double attention on our part, to him and to his predecessors, but we must be capable of it, as of all that Mr. Tillotson calls "the precise complexity of poetry".

Poets' words, their written breath,
Fix faster than chalk of bones,

Mr. Tillotson says, in a fine preliminary poem: but he sums up our stupidity and negligence in another line.

The living defraud the dead of their dear-bought honour insured.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

Michael Drayton and his Circle. By Bernard H. Newdigate. (Blackwell. 15s.)

MR. NEWDIGATE'S book accompanies and supplements the five-volume edition of Drayton which the Shakespeare Head Press has recently carried to completion—a solid and dignified memorial which no one is likely to grudge the poet. If Drayton's name rises less readily to the mind than that of some great contemporaries, this is not so much through any deficiency in his powers as through the nature of their employment. Like other Elizabethan writers, Drayton could achieve in small things a perfection which was not sustained in greater; no poet of the time seems to have had the art of Byrd, who could construct a whole Mass as faultlessly as a little Pavan. But in dramatic form then, as in novel form today, the interest of plot

and character could cover a good deal of unevenness and indiscipline in the writing. Though Drayton also wrote plays, nothing of them has recognizably survived; and when we think of him we remember first some fine sonnets, then some longer poems, and one very long poem in which common weaknesses of the time are exposed and accentuated by the pastoral or narrative form. Hence we are likely to contrast him unfavourably with such men as Ford or Middleton or Beaumont and Fletcher, who after all were not greatly his superiors.

Mr. Newdigate prints in this volume a sequence of studies on Drayton's life, work and times which will excite the admiration of specialists without repelling the common reader. New details gleaned by research are not, as so often happens, flaunted and over-elaborated; they fall naturally into place among matters of wider reach—education in schools of the time, the conditions in which pastoral verse was fostered, the association in England of the Renaissance (as in Italy of the Middle Ages) of the now disconnected studies of law and poetry. In short, Mr. Newdigate's erudition is uncommonly humane. I should add that there is particular interest in the correspondence between Drayton and Drummond (here printed complete for the first time) and in Walter Aston's translated sonnet (p. 157), which merits more fame than it has won.

WALTER SHEWRING.

The Starlit Dome. By G. Wilson Knight. (Humphrey Milford. 16s.)

IN this book Mr. Knight has carried on his poetic studies to deal with Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley and Keats. His method is that with which his readers have long been familiar, a search for those complexes of symbols which show the essence and progress of the poet's thought at least as clearly as the expressed logic of his work and much more richly. The effect of magnificence produced by this massing of imaginative material loosened from its setting is a main feature of all Mr. Knight's books, and is particularly in evidence in the essay on Keats in this present one. The "Bright Star" sonnet provides a title for the essay, "The Priestlike Task", and besides emphasizing the poet's love of ritual, recalls as well his outstanding ability to recreate the individuality of sensible qualities and his "fanatical" love of sleeping life. This combination unites the extremes of conscious achievement and unconscious springs of life of which the combination is the implicit theme of the book, so that the priestlike character of Keats is more than ever apparent. The symbolism of all the poets is grouped round that of the aerial or heavenly dome poised as its goal above the river of life issuing

from its hidden founts. In its essence it is the sunny dome of *Kubla Khan*; Yeats' putting it in darkness as starlit or moonlit (see the title-page) emphasizes its apparent remoteness from "the fury and the mire of human veins". For Keats it is one with earth and sky and sea, and whether it be described in terms of Neptune's underwater palace, or of arching forests or of celestial scenery, tends to be seen as the all-embracing symbol of a universal ritual. As a result of this vision of a universe at one with itself and wholly plying its best task of worship there is an absence of conflict between the sunlit world of conscious, rational life and the sinister gloom of the underworld from which life flows. Keats shows no attempt at a final rejection of either. They both form one life, and to lose either is to lose the whole, as Lycius lost life itself with the passing of the serpent woman Lamia.

None of the other poets treated of show quite the same extent of acceptance. Their intuitions are more partial and establish with greater urgency a problem of salvation or of evil. They too know the dome and the river winding to it from its subterranean source, but they cannot luxuriate, as does Keats, in a world at peace. They must seek to plumb the depths of crime as in *The Borderers*, or of devilish fascination as in *The Ancient Mariner*, or to stress the agonizing tension coming from many elements in the whole life-movement as does Shelley. The latter indeed shows a breadth of intuition almost equal to that of Keats, but because his approach is wholly dynamic we may say that the worshipful transcendence which would solve Shelley's problems as it solved Keats's before he started, is never actual for him. Shelley's world does not receive and give; it becomes, and in becoming travails. In Wordsworth the prevailing tone is diabolic, in Coleridge anthropocentric, in Shelley naturalistic. Keats, on the other hand, presents a pagan world-view of the best type of such, hinting at a reality beyond itself. Each constructs artistically a possible world on the basis of his intuition; not one of them sees the Christian whole, the actual creation from which all these elements are taken. We may guess that the author has some inklings of it since he has made a unity of the four, but their several deficiencies and his own self-imposed limitations of scope rule out any detailed expression of this.

IVO THOMAS, O.P.

The Poems of Samuel Johnson. Edited by David Nichol Smith and Edward L. McAdam. (Oxford English Texts: Humphrey Milford. 25s.)

TODAY, Johnson's verse seems distant by two removes. The Doctor, for us, is so very much a person that his status as writer comes necessarily as an afterthought; and again, when we recollect his writing, it

is of his prose that we think in the first place. Yet there is no doubt that he seriously considered himself a poet, and it seemed at the time a natural enough title for the author of two famous satires and an esteemed if not a successful tragedy. *Irene* is now irreparably faded (even for its latest and most religious editors it is a subject of apology rather than of apologia), and though there are good things in *London* and very good things in *The Vanity of Human Wishes*, neither of these two longer poems has the continued technical excellence which might have been looked for from a man of Johnson's abilities in an age where the heroic couplet had so sedulously been cultivated. The more striking lines, for instance

Till rude resistance lops the spreading god

are striking by contrast with a convention, not by mastery of that convention.

He was happier sometimes in briefer uses of the same metre, witness this couplet from the Anthology :

Soon fades the rose ; once past the fragrant hour,
The loiterer finds a bramble for a flow'r—

and these from Boethius :

O thou whose pow'r o'er moving worlds presides,
Whose voice created, and whose wisdom guides,
On darkling man in pure effulgence shine,
And cheer the clouded mind with light divine.
'Tis thine alone to calm the pious breast
With silent confidence and holy rest :
From thee, great God, we spring, to thee we tend,
Path, motive, guide, original, and end.

His best work was in fact his least ambitious—the lines on Levet, the *Song of Congratulation*, to which I should be inclined to add the first three of the *Stella* pieces written for Hervey, as showing, in Boswell's engaging phrase, "with what facility and elegance he could warble the amorous lay". But to select for praise such things as these is really to forget or deny the standards by which he and his age would expect to be judged. So be it. The solicitude of two scholars and of the Clarendon Press has assured for his verse a monument—not to say a cenotaph—which is ultimately a tribute not to a poet but to a great man.

A Mortal born, he met the general Doom,
But left, like *Egypt's* Kings, a lasting Tomb.

WALTER SHEWRING.

A Choice of Kipling's Verse. Made by T. S. Eliot, with an Essay on Kipling. (Faber & Faber. 8s. 6d.)

MR. ELIOT has performed a task very grateful to those of us who have long admired Kipling. He has done it—need it be said?—with lucidity and precision; no word in his Introduction sits awry or fails to carry its weight of exposition. The result is to explain our mingled feelings to ourselves, and to justify our better sensations to our less capable minds. Mr. Eliot has, in fact, done what few such introducers can do; after reading his essay and then the poems, we grudge his restraint and almost demand a wilder, if not greater, enthusiasm.

It is astonishing how well Kipling wears; even the best of us, forty years ago, would hardly have expected that. We have disagreed with him, and even sometimes (it is to be feared) patronized him. We were a little awkward with our admiration; we were not slow to change the talk from his poetry to his prose, because fashion was more likely to support us there. The *Recessional* we threw hastily to his enemies; even Chesterton, no fashion-follower, was rather lofty about it. "Lesser breeds without the Law"—"the Widow at Windsor"—how smug! how vulgar! and yet . . . The "yet" was right. He shared one fortune with very great poets; the older one grows, the more he means, the better he endures.

"He remains somehow alien and aloof from all with which he identifies himself." Mr. Eliot comments there on a quality the careless reader misses. But that quality was not mere detachment; it was an attachment to an almost Platonic world of energetic forms—the Law, the Empire, machinery, danger, death. He expressed that attachment in energetic verse. "The harmonies of poetry" (loosely so called; it is Mr. Eliot's adverb) were alien from it. This is one of the points where Mr. Eliot clears our minds. The very nature of his genius prevented Kipling from mingling one kind of energy with another; it was a limitation, but not "a failure or a deficiency".

He was indeed deficient in very little. He lasts so well partly because he was so little limited. After reading some poems one used to write a label for him; read others, and it has to be destroyed. Imperialistic? and *Jobson's Amen*? and *We and They*? Materialistic? and "My new-cut Ashlar"? and *Cold Iron*? and the *Recessional* itself? "Kipling knew something of the things which are underneath, and of the things which are beyond the frontier." It would not be a bad thing if all pious-minded people were compelled to learn *The Sons of Martha* by heart; there Kipling wrote one of those energetic challenges of—call it convention, which are profounder than our habitual thought. He was (on occasion) profound, just as he was (on occasion) "almost 'possessed' of a kind of second sight". "The ordinary charges brought against him," Mr. Eliot says, "are either

untrue or irrelevant." I will add that they are, mostly, merely untrue.

The selection of poems is admirable. It would be almost impossible to make an unworthy selection from Kipling, but this is peculiarly valuable. The *Complete Verse* is, of course, a necessity; everyone will here miss some poems dear to him. For my part I could have wished for the *Mother-Lodge* and the *Palace* and *A Recantation*—no, there are too many, it could not be. We must have, and keep, both books. Beyond our expectations, Kipling is permanent—for us at least; it is all we can say. He is one of those to whom we continually return, and never without satisfaction; he is one of those also who stir, strangely, the prick of serious tears.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

Street Songs. By Edith Sitwell. (Macmillan. 3s. 6d.)

MISS SITWELL's new poems are called *Street Songs* "because", her publishers say, "they are on themes common to all mankind". It is a good reason, but there might have been others. Miss Sitwell, for all her strangeness, her arranged dances, her arabesques of abandonment, has always been a part of the City, even of the Street. The stately houses and Chinese landscapes have always had a gate somewhere opening on the street we know; the gate in the heart, as (risking a sentimental phrase) one might say. Here her figures are diverse—girl, beggar, lover, ghost, baby, old woman—but the chief recurrent figures are two: the sun and the shadow. These are real figures, and the poems are their dance in the street—in Babylon, in great gardens, in the battle-field and the Potter's Field. The sun dances with the shadow, the shadow being not merely the absence of the sun, but a real thing. Sometimes they are very small:

The last faint spark
In the self-murdered heart, the wounds of the sad uncomprehending dark.

Sometimes they are very royal and great—"the pomp and splendour of the shade", the "precious cloud":

no shade of a rich tree
Shall pour such splendour as your heart to me;

and "the Abraham-bearded sun", "the great gold sun", the sun that promises a child

in your soul, my Happy Land,
Shall be my shaken mane of gold:
Man's dark shall tremble at my paw,—
Time's thunders change into the sand
Whereon I lie and roar.

It would be easy, and quite wrong, to say Blake. It is however true to say that, unlike Blake as Miss Sitwell is, a certain similar Innocence wanders among these poems. The pity they contain is provoked by that innocence, and by the helpless pathos of man even at his most evil, even when his hands are Ape's hands.

The resolution of any poetry is always the bitter test of its poet. Can it be concluded in its own terms? Or must it have some little outside language, some prose moral, some borrowed (or even stolen) re-assurance—or even not re-assurance? I think Miss Sitwell does, in fact, achieve her proper business there; though for some time I swung level in the last poem, wondering. Was there the faintest inflexion of a borrowed re-assurance in the poem called *An Old Woman*? Had Miss Sitwell invoked some doctrine not absolutely within her own poetic terms of reference? But it is not so; her imagination of the triumph of the sun—and of the true Dark—is authentic; and the more one reads these poems the more authentic it becomes. They are very lovely, very strange—"Aldebaran and wild Cassopeia", but all in the street, our street, the street of the skeleton in the slum. They can make their own beauty uncertain and fantastic beside our real pain, and that is a measure of their power. They certify reality and are certified by reality. Miss Sitwell has always been among our most actual poets.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

Seven Tempest. By Vaughan Wilkins. (Jonathan Cape. 9s. 6d. net.)

MANY readers of this novel will be reminded of that "Protean" actor who used to fill twenty minutes or so of old music-hall time with the presentation of a play in which he assumed, unaided, each separate rôle. Densely disguised as Mr. Charles Dickens the author rings up his (?) curtain, and thenceforward, through 400 pages, with lightning changes of make-up and costume, reappears as Lytton Strachey, Anthony Hope, Henry Seton Merriman and Miss Ethel Dell. The Victorian theme is presented with a strong Victorian cast. Aristocratic heroine, comic relief, romantic hero, all mounted, "regardless" against a lavish period setting, spin out a rich and varied interlude. *Seven Tempest* may have been the victim and the product of nineteenth-century industrialism, but he bears a strong resemblance to those dour and dominating protagonists of a simpler tradition. Seventh son of a merciless iron-founder who numerated instead of baptizing his bastards, he learned the harsh lessons of child labour and the Manchester School, and mislaid his heart, until the final chapter, in the remorseless clangour of factory and shipyard. To him, as an older stage convention would have it, entered the

Grand Duchess Anne Louise of Limburg, cousin of Victoria herself, in flight from the sinister marital machinations of Belgian Leopold and Baron Stockmar. Scornful of royalty, Seven seizes the heaven-sent opportunity, and sets himself to teach the facts of life to one who may find herself entrusted with Queenly powers. Angelic and aloof she sails through ordeals that might well break the toughest constitution—an ambush by highwaymen, the wreck of an emigrant ship, imprisonment amidst the tarnished splendours of a degenerate South German Court—to win, on the last page, his humbled and repentant love. There are intrigues in plenty and great figures galore—Albert the Good, old Ernest of Hanover, wicked Uncle Leopold, and an unspeakable Grand Duchess of Ehrenberg deep sunk in brandy and the memory of past debaucheries.

Ill-balanced and overcrowded though the tale may be, it is related with a gusto and an adroitness of invention which will carry through comfortable hours of entertainment any reader capable of a "willing suspension of disbelief". It belongs to that vast and popular family of picaresque fictions which has swept, of late years, through American and English hearts. Anne Louise of Limburg can say "cousin" to Scarlett O'Hara and Anthony Adverse, and will, no doubt, thrill almost as many sensibilities.

GERALD HOPKINS.

Lost Fields. By Michael McLaverty. (Jonathan Cape. 7s. 6d. net.)

IT is the measure of Mr. McLaverty's success that he imposes upon us a pattern of simplicity which we query, if at all, only in an after-thought. We take his word for it that the feelings of the Belfast slums are simple, though, in fact, we have no reason, beyond that word, for believing so. But no doubt he can claim with justice that he is free to do as he will with his material, and that if simplification is the essence of his treatment he can quote in defence many respectable practitioners, and is content to abide by the success or failure of the total result. But if the members of his Griffin family are simple, they are not crude, and violence is not bred in them by poverty. That is not to say that the book is empty of incident, but only that incident is never allowed to intrude on atmosphere. It would be unfair to say that "nothing happens". In the course of 250 pages one son steals and is sent to a Reformatory school; another attacks the bailiffs who are trying to evict his parents, and goes to gaol; a daughter leaves home for a Convent only to be sent back again as unsuitable; a grandmother abandons the country scenes in which her life is rooted to help, with the contribution of her pension, a feckless, town-bred family, and dies in exile; while Johnny, her eldest born, having buried her and mourned her, escapes with wife

and children to the cottage which had been her home, and finds at last the life for which so long he has been craving. No, the incidents are there in plenty, but the author's stress is never on action, but on the emotional response to action. Increasingly, the figure of the old grandmother takes the centre of the stage, and we are made to feel the genuine nobility of a character that abandons all it has known of happiness for a fancied duty, even at the cost of knowing that the gift is accepted often grudgingly and never with full comprehension.

Mr. McLaverty has achieved a feat of minor sentiment with tact and skill. Within his chosen and deliberately contracted field, he has been true to his vision, and succeeds in persuading us of the truth that he has seen.

GERALD HOPKINS.

Talking at Random. By Douglas Woodruff. (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne Limited. 7s. 6d. net.)

MACAULAY's method of reviewing a book was to disregard the author entirely and, in a masterly essay, shew how much more he himself knew about the subject. This volume is safe from such scornful treatment, for it is itself a creature of scissors and paste, being a collection of the author's weekly gleanings from the world's press; and no hawk ever marked and pounced upon folly with more decisive certainty. The Catholicity of our Church is well exemplified by this record of the hebdomadal comments of its most important weekly journal. Sometimes the satire takes a graver note, as when Dean Inge is pilloried for his suggestion that there are no reliable statistics wherewith to check the efficacy of prayer. To balance this is enshrined a regulation of one of the big block of flats near the Marble Arch: "No religious services or immorality permitted in these flats". Then there is the delightful story of the young lady, aged nineteen, who was collecting for the Salvation Army and asked the elderly moneylender to give a shilling to the Lord, to be told, "I'm seventy-five, so I shall be seeing Him before you do, and I'll give it to Him." Throughout its meanderings there is one constant urge: the suggestion that Life is made up of such a variety of factors, it would be a rash man who would boldly affirm what is important and what merely trivial.

Mr. Woodruff has a gift of treating the trivial with a gravity that cannot but add to its stature. When the dire news of the rationing of soap reached us, I wonder how many people shared my personal reaction, and harked back to a day when the third leader of *The Times* began: "The soap statistics are out"; and for half a column succeeded in making us believe that these facts and figures were as important

as those of the Chancellor's Budget speech. It was, of course, an unsigned article; but the late G. K. Chesterton might with greater reason have hoped to preserve his anonymity. For our Douglas manages to include in his style all the elements of a mortal sin except its wickedness; and a hypercritical person might object that gravity of matter is more often than not replaced by gravity of manner. Those who wish to understand the disaster of Pearl Harbour should re-read "Plato's American Republic", the most powerful and accurate analysis of modern America that has yet appeared. It is not a book to be read in this season of coughs, that may be brought on by an unexpected piece of humour. For those who fear such painful results the quieter laughter of the present volume may be confidently recommended. And one just risen from a sick-bed would suggest putting it high up on the list of Bedside Books, to be read in all times of stress when a quiet and amused mind is to be desired.

MAURICE HEALY.

